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This dissertation project examines the role of identity, the politics of identity
contestation and domestic political structures as part of the

that

may

be involved in the decisions that states

their colonial

questions:

policies?

and

Why

territorial possessions.

do intransigent

And why. even when

states

violent struggles? Focusing

down on

states decide to

some of these processes peaceful while

make regarding disengagement from

Specifically,

back

mechanisms and processes

it

focuses on the following

previously entrenched

disengage from their

territorial

territories, are

others are scenes of prolonged, bloody and

on Britain and

its

reaction to Indian calls for independence

from 1929-1935, and Indonesia’s withdrawal from East Timor

in

argues that the processes and mechanisms involved

in identity

construction,

maintenance and change can play an important role

in

territorial

disengagement. At the same time,

domestic

political

system may also

it

affect the

viii

how

states

1999. this project

approach the issue of

also argues that the structure of a state’s

way

in

which disengagement takes

places.

Based on
constructed

at

its

empirical findings, this dissertation also argues that identities are

both the domestic as well as the international levels, and against an

Other, and through narratives. Further, identities do not acquire ‘substance’ once they

have been constructed. Rather they are continually constituted by processes, relations

and practices as

identities are defined,

recognized and validated

in

an actor’s interaction

with and in relationship to others. Finally, identity does not only influence

human

actions through enabling or constraining actions but also through the need to perform

who we

are or

who we

say

we want

to be.
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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION

1.1

Introduction
Disputed lands, whether

in the

determination and sovereignty are

intra-state conflict.

form of colonies or

at stake,

battle

where

have been the source of much

self-

inter-

and

France and Holland resisted strong independence movements

Algeria and Indonesia respectively by deploying troops
the end of the

territories

World War

II.

The

Israelis

in efforts to retain

its

after

and the Palestinians have waged a bloody

over land for more than half a century. China's refusal

attempts by Taiwan to assert

them

in

to

countenance any

independence and sovereignty has created tremendous

tension and the potential for conflict in East Asia. While peaceful solutions for such

may

conflicts

appear near impossible

at

times, there have been intractable states that

have abandoned previously entrenched positions on colonies and disputed

Why

do

states

disputed territories?

conflict in

territorial

territories.

abandon previously unshakeable positions on colonies and

And why

some cases and

does the process of disengagement

itself

not in others? This broad empirical puzzle

disengagement continues

to be relevant

and

is

engender
important as

critical in various parts

of the

world. Restless provinces remain a challenge for the central Indonesian government

which

is

struggling to keep the archipelago together. Tibet, in addition to Taiwan,

another potential arena for conflict for a China that insists on the rightness of

its

is

rule

over the country. The question of Quebec persists to this day for Canada. Sudan.
Somalia. Zaire and Liberia are also states whose
various reasons. Examining the factors involved

territorial

shapes are under pressure for

in territorial

disengagement may thus

provide

some

insight into the processes

and mechanisms

that influence the

way

in

which some of these cases may unfold.
This dissertation concentrates on these issues but
the following questions:

entrenched

Why

do intransigent

some of

more narrowly focused on

back down on previously

And why, even when

territorial policies?

their territories, are

states

is

states decide to

disengage from

these processes peaceful while others are scenes of

prolonged, bloody and violent struggles? The rest of this chapter proceeds in five main

parts.

Section

1

.2 is a

short

processes and decisions

and necessary detour

made by

the colonial or

to address this dissertation's focus

more generally,

the disengaging

on

power

rather than the equally significant political developments and decisions in the colony or

territorial

literature

1

.4

and

1

possession. Section

1

on decolonization and
.5

.3

territorial

by an analysis of the

discussion of the theoretical

dissertation.

provides a

literature

framework on

critical

overview and discussion of the

disengagement. This

on identity

is

followed

in

sections

and a

in International Relations

identity to be used in the rest of this

Section 1.6 focuses on the role of domestic political structures while the

last

two sections discuss methodology and chapter

1.2

Focusing on the Territorial Power

outlines.

There have been two main and often sharply bifurcated avenues

that

characterize past studies of territorial disengagement and decolonization.

focuses on decisions

developments

made

in the

in the territory

first

disengaging power while the second concentrates on

seeking independence or secession. Explanations of the

former variety often study the pivotal impact of changes
domestic reconsiderations

The

in the

in international politics

disengaging power. Explanations

9

in the latter

and

category

on the other hand, restore agency

to these territories

and colonies by foregrounding the

1

rise

of resistance and nationalism

masses, or the collapse

empires of the

in the elite, the

in the social structure

subsequent mobilization of the

of collaboration that had propped up

many

past.

Core-centered perspectives often give the problematic impression that the

decision-makers there were
2

their colonies or territories.

in

complete control of the situation and dictated the

The problems associated with

this perspective in

fate of

which

the

decisions are assumed to have developed in an isolated and sealed environment,

divorced from external pressures, are also repeated
these,

it

is

territorial

periphery-centered analyses. In

the agency of an important group of actors but this time, in the colonial or

power,

that has

been excluded. The inadequacies of such explanations solely

focused on the periphery can be seen
notably

in

in the

in the fact that

form of independence and

nationalist

developments

in the

movements, have always evoked

extremely uneven reactions from various disengaging powers. Thus,
that neither

colonies, most

of these sharply divided approaches can provide a

it

is

full picture

quite obvious

or

explanation of the complex processes that affect and influence decolonization and

territorial

disengagement. Discerning and attributing relative causal significance of one

over the other and making generalizable statements across
task and one

which

remember

that the

is

act in isolation

I

do not attempt

to undertake.

all

cases

Perhaps what

is

is

an impossible

most important

disengaging power and the colony or territory interact and do not

from each

other.

1

See Grimal 1978; Low 1982; Hodgkin 1956; Wallenstein 1961; Gallagher and
Robinson 1953; Louis 1976; and Robinson 1972.
2

Low

1982,

to

6.

3

This dissertation takes

this point seriously

and

on the disengaging power and the decisions

attention

will concentrate

it

makes

much of

its

in reaction to internal

and

external developments including those in the colony or territorial possessions. Thus, the

focus here will be on decision-makers in the metropole
but are rather, engaged with, and responding to the

anti-colonial

movements

1.3 Theoretical

who

are not acting in isolation

demands made by independence and

in the colonies.

Approaches

Disengagement and Decolonization

to Territorial

Realist and neo-Realist approaches, reflecting their assumptions that states are

rational, unitary actors with fixed

and given

interests rooted in

power and security

in

an

anarchical world, argue that states divest themselves of their colonies and other

possessions

territorial

This

may

Changes

when

they no longer have the will or the ability to retain them.

be the result of either domestic or international changes or perhaps both.

in military

shifts in the sources

technology

like the invention

locations, markets,

of nuclear weapons and qualitative

and engines of economic growth and wealth for example,

to the increasing irrelevance of territorial

economic

3

may

lead

possessions which, due to their geographic-

raw materials and populations, may have been security and
4

assets in the past.

.

.

Thus, original economic and strategic reasons like gaining

and guaranteeing access to scarce resources and markets as well as protecting land and
sea routes that were responsible for the scramble for territory and colonies

longer hold sway.

Kennedy 1989.
4

Spruvt 2005, 4.

4

may no

At the same time,

states facing vastly different

period in which colonies were

first

colonies or territorial possessions

is

the national interest. For example,

militaries

and economies

World War

II.

that

In addition,

acquired

may

no longer

domestic circumstances from the

also find that holding on to their

politically or

economically beneficial for

European colonial powers had

to

cope with

had been devastated by the long and protracted fighting of

they were faced with the declining value of their colonial

possessions and the rising costs of maintaining their positions

in the face

of increasingly

vocal and persistent independence movements. With decimated treasuries,

prudent and rational for these states to
their ambitions.

As

make new

political calculations

such, twentieth century decolonization

was just

later

was both

and scale back

part of an almost

timeless narrative regarding the competition between great powers, their

and

it

rise,

expansion

declined

Systemic and material factors, however, do not necessarily make their impact

when expected nor do

they affect

all

countries to the

The immediate years following World War

II

same degree or

are an important

at

the

example of

same

time.

this.

Colonial powers then were uniformly faced with adverse domestic conditions and a

reshuffled international

power

structure anchored by the United States and the Soviet

Union. However, there were very few indicators

that decolonization

would sweep

across the world within twenty years. In fact, the prospects for Asian and African

independence were dim as discussions
paternalistically centered

in

postwar planning conferences were

still

on eventual “self-government” through guidance and tutelage

from the colonial powers rather than the granting of independence and statehood. The

?

For example, see Kennedy 1989.

5

United Nations Charter of 1945. while reaffirming the principle of equal rights and
determination of peoples, also declared

territories

had

UN

was
,

73 that

to accept as a sacred trust the obligation to

people in these
the

in Article

territories

who were

a right that could be claimed only

c

self-government.

members with

foreign

promote the well-being of the

not yet capable of self-government. Thus, even in

much hope

Charter which held so

UN

self-

for the rights of people, “self-determination

by peoples who were demonstrably capable of

,,6

In addition, there

were colonial powers

despite diminished political and

like Portugal

economic power and

the

who

clung

to their

growing human and

colonies

financial

costs of maintaining control. France and the Netherlands fought tenacious but

ultimately losing battles for their colonies. Clearly, states do not uniformly disengage

from

their colonial or territorial possessions

changes

may

even when international and domestic

ensure that the costs of holding on to them greatly outweigh the benefits.

This seems to indicate that other factors that are not part of

frameworks underpinned by assumptions regarding
of national interests defined

Other approaches
state grant a larger

and when

narrow

There are

6

that

do present

a

may

and the fixed nature
also be

more complex and nuanced

role to

domestic actors

disengagement takes place.

may

and neo-realist

a unitary state

terms of security and interests

and more important

territorial

interests

in

realist

in

Key domestic

at

play.

picture of the

explaining how.

actors with their

why

own

influence their government regarding territorial disengagement.

historically,

two groups

that

have a stake

R. Jackson 1998, 121.

Kahler 1986; Snyder 1991

:

and Spruyt 2005.

6

in their

country’s territorial policy

and more

specifically, in the territorial status
8

settler populations.

in the

quo - economic or business

interests

and

Business or economic actors with trading and investment interests

colonies or territories are likely to influence or attempt to influence territorial

policy for tears that changes will have adverse effects on them.

also have important stakes in the status

properties, plantations

and factories

to their

Settler populations

sunk investments

in the

form o

as well as their privileged social positions in these

colonies and territories. Settler groups

communities

quo due

9

in

the

West Bank and Gaza,

the

Dutch

settler

Indonesia and Portuguese farmers in Angola, for example, fiercely

in

opposed disengagement and decolonization and attempted
policies in their capitals through political

Other groups which

may

to influence

and change

and other, often violent means.

influence territorial disengagement are the military and

Militaries have historically played an instrumental role in acquiring,

political parties.

maintaining and defending territories and colonies. As such, their recruitment patterns,

promotional incentives, budget allocation, as well as strategic doctrine

towards a “strong corporate interest
10

However,

configuration.”

as

quo

corporate interests

maintaining the existing

is

°

Spruyt 2005,

8.

8;

more

malleable. For example, their

could be better served through non-imperial policies instead

s

Spruyt 2005,

settler

neither always nor even necessarily/or the

as they have interests that are

may and

be directed

territorial

Hendrik Spruyt notes, the military, unlike

populations and business interests,

territorial status

in

may

and Kahler 1986.

8.

10

Spruyt 2005, 28.

7

of fighting losing and prestige-eroding colonial wars that drain or divert resources.
Alternative policies that enable the military to secure large budgets, organizational

autonomy, new career opportunities and prestige

may

be just or more advantageous

in

1

the long-run.

A

fourth actor that

may

influence territorial policy are political parties

whose

ideologies or interests are linked to imperialism or the retention of colonies and annexed

lands.

they

In general, political parties

may

interpret

“changes

in the

can have both direct and indirect
colonial empires

roles.

Indirectly,

and simultaneously increase the
1

sensitivity ot metropolitan politics to these changes.” "

A

direct role

comes from

serving as the voice for opponents of change like settlers, the military and business

interests

who

are attempting to influence political

outcomes through them.

13

These parties may themselves have ideological, organizational and electoral
stakes that are intimately connected to territorial policy. In Miles Kahler’s analysis

the role of political parties on French

comprehensive treatment on
theoretical

framework

that

and British decolonization, the most

this subject to date,

he discusses domestic actors

in a

combines Albert Hirschman’s concept of exit, voice and
14

loyalty with an incentive-based theory of political organizations.

In particular,

he

discusses the options that are available to political parties that are organizationally

'

'

Spruyt 2005, 28.

12

Kahler 1986. 59.
13

Kahler 1986. 59.
14

These are material, purposive and

identity incentives.

8

on

committed

to the territorial status

quo but faced with the

reality

of having to impose

greater and greater repression on increasingly rebellious territories in order to sustain

these relationships. Kahler’s analysis concentrates on the strategies that are available to

these parties and the

way

in

which

the structure of the party system

shaping the behavior of party members,

that

is,

by exiting the

is

decisive in

party, voicing their

opposition, or through loyalty and towing the party line.

In these

accounts which desegregates the state into various domestic competing

interests, the explanation

is

driven by actors acting rationally to protect and defend their

narrow and typically material

self-interests.

While undeniably plausible, these accounts

begin with actor identities and interests that are already fixed and given. Moreover,

some of

these are not able to discount ideational factors

political parties for

-

Kahler’s discussion regarding

example, acknowledges the importance of ideology but
1

aside to focus on processes involving institutional structures.

this is put

^

Unlike the above approaches that converge around neo-utilitarian premises of
self-regarding units in the pursuit of material interests, Neta Crawford, Robert Jackson

and Daniel

'

^

16

Phil pott place ideational factors at the centre of their accounts.

Institutional structures are important as will be discussed later in this chapter.

problematic issue here
actors

u
’

At the

is

must be based on

that

The

both begin with the assumption that the interests of these

neo-utilitarian precepts

and premises.

See Spruyt 2000 for a study on the importance of

utilitarian

norms

in the calculation

However, Spruyt excludes and dismisses too quickly the impact of
powers who were ultimately the ones who made the final
decisions to withdraw from their colonies, and grant them independence and statehood.
Was there a transmission in these utilitarian norms from strategic and calculating
nationalist elites to the colonial powers? How does Spruyt explain the influence of
individuals like Frantz Fanon, CLR James, George Padmore, and Nkrumah? What was
the relationship between the colonies and the colonial powers?
of peripheral
these

elites.

norms on

colonial

9

broadest level. Crawford, Jackson and Phi pott share the following 1

norms and ideas

like equality, self-determination, nationalism,

rights, non-intervention

and anti-racism were

critical for

all

three argue that

democracy, human

paving the road

to

1

disengagement and decolonization.

The

cluster of ideas and

determination,

by her

human

rights,

pivotal to Crawford’s account

-

equality, self-

democracy, non-intervention and anti-racism -

to the sixteenth century

New World

norms

when some of

is

traced

the colonial practices of the Spanish in the

were being debated and questioned by Francisco de Vitoria and Bartolome

de las Casas. Crucially, these ideas and norms, she explains, were also present in
debates and arguments regarding the international slave trade and the abolition of
1

slavery during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

were also part of

the

In the

twentieth century, they

arguments used by opponents of colonialism

in the

colonies and

the metropole to successfully challenge beliefs about colonial rule, the legitimacy of

colonialism and

The

at a

more fundamental

ideas that are

at

level,

what

it

means

to be

human.

the heart of Robert Jackson’s and Daniel Philpott’s

arguments, on the other hand, converge on what

it

means

to be a

sovereign

state.

For

Jackson, the ideas that dismantled colonialism were equality and self-determination

ideas

which were already

part of the

Western

political tradition,

-

which "extols
,19

democracy, equality and condemns unrepresentative or discriminatory governance.”

17

18

Crawford 2002;

R. Jackson 1998; and Philpott 2001

Crawford 2002, 49-50.

19

R. Jackson 1998, 134.

10

Instead of Western-style ‘civilization’ and other requirements like political

capability, national unity, military power, national wealth,

and an educated population.

statehood, self-determination and independence turned on the belief or idea that

people have the right to self-determination.”

?o

Thus, decolonization

"all

in the twentieth

century was. according to Jackson, tied to principles of juridical statehood based on a
rights-based model of international relations and law.

For Philpott. anti-colonial nationalism and racial equality were the ideas that

made
was

a difference in challenging colonialism. Decolonization of the twentieth century

in fact a revolution in

sovereignty marked by a fundamental shift

intersubjective understanding,

was based on

the ability

in the

meaning and significance of sovereignty from one

and capability

to

that

govern to one based on self-determination and

independence.
Besides their shared perspective on the importance of this particular group of
ideas, these accounts also highlight a similar

group of actors which carried and

transmitted them into the heart of these colonial empires where they eventually

influenced and changed policies. In the colonies, these actors were intellectuals,

radicals,

non-governmental organizations, and anti-colonial nationalists.

In the heart

of

empire, the carriers and transmitters were political parties, and non-governmental
organizations and

movement

movements

like the late eighteenth century anti-slavery trade

as well as anti-colonial organizations

and lobbies."

In

twentieth century

20

R. Jackson 1998, 124.

Crawford (2002) has placed particular emphasis on the importance ol the arguments
the anti-slavery trade movement for decolonization. She argues that the

made by

Britain, for

example, organizations

very influential

Movement

In France, the Socialist

like the

for Colonial

League Against Imperialism and

Freedom, were formed

later, the

22
to tight colonialism.""

and Communist parties were both anti-colonial. Besides the

adoption of these ideas and beliefs by these groups, there were changes
taking place at the international level. The

US

that

were also

and the Soviet Union adopted

colonial positions publicly and placed pressure on colonial

powers on

anti-

the issue of self-

determination through private diplomatic channels and in the very public forum of the

United Nations."
Despite these similarities, there are also subtle differences

how and why

approaches on

norms

are neither singular, scarce nor uncontested

ideational commodities, addressing this issue

generally, for

the three

these ideas were able to have the impact that they did on

the political level. Since ideas and

more

among

how we understand

is

a critical part of their explanations and

decolonization and constructivist International

Relations theory.

For Robert Jackson, the power and influence of these ideas
characterization of them as principled beliefs which

movement and
beliefs
??

See

the eventual

is

lie in his

defined as those that “specify

ending of the slave trade and slavery challenged core

and de-legitimized core practices of colonialism. See especially. Chapter

Owen

(

1998).

As Owen

4.

points out. they were of varying forms and had different

degrees of commitment. In the twentieth century, they ranged from the more moderate

Fabian Colonial Bureau to the radical Movement for Colonial Freedom.

The

label

of "non-colonial' and

course, debatable.

its

relevance for the Soviet Union and the U.S. are ol

criteria tor distinguishing right

these ideas

worked because

practices that

were

right

standards were derived.

political

Britain

egalite,

it

and

from wrong and

from unjust.”

just

24

In other

words,

provided policymakers with the standards to distinguish

just.

However,

The answer

is

and moral basis of these ideas

to

this

how

begs the question of

these

be found in Jackson’s connection of the

to those

by which the western powers, France.

and the U.S., had defined themselves very publicly, whether through the

and fraternite of

the French Revolution, the rights of

man

in the

liberie,

U.S.

Declaration of Independence or the ideals laid out in the Atlantic Charter. Moreover,

these

in

were also ideas

that

were increasingly practiced and institutionalized domestically

these countries as past barriers to democratic citizenship like class, gender and race

were gradually removed one by one
minorities.

to first include all

men, and then

women

and

racial

These ideas worked not because of their sheer rightness but because they

challenged the anti -democratic character of empires and colonies and more
significantly, the identitarian basis of these colonial

For Philpott, the power of ideas

“change or convert people

must also wield

social

to

that

commitments

Goldstein and Keohane 1993,

liberal

democracies.

generally to be found in their ability to effect

identities

power - power

transmitters to convert their

”4

new

is

powers as

and new

is

?5
political ends.""

These ideas

rooted in the ability of their carriers and

into real political costs

and benefits

in the

8.

Here, Jackson equates normative ideas with the “principled beliefs” of Goldstein and

Keohane’s typology of beliefs.
"5

D. Philpott 46.

13

form of “money,

offices, votes, the prospects for violence" for the

who may have

pursue new policies that these ideas demand to remain

In

to

order to explain the radical changes

in

empires were being dismantled, Philpott argues
of ideas

-

the interaction

the key. Couriers of

of states

doing

new

who were asked

so, these couriers

head of the polity
?6

power."

in

policy between 1945 and 1960

that

it

was

the reputational social

between revolutionary ideas and established ideas

account for their inability to

to

fulfill their initial

promises.

to

undermine the reputations of heads of

In

new

state for not

27

in stating that the driving force

was

the

ol releasing colonies

change

w ho

ot

-

the

by them and the impact of

the incentive structure of heads of states and leaders.

which depends

critically

and

keeping them.

based on two causal mechanisms

are genuinely influenced

power on

therefore, an explanation

is

is explicit

in their conviction of “the political

and the similar costs

Therefore, Philpott’s explanation

Rather

revolutionary ideas."

than a change of identity of these heads of states to anti-colonialists, Philpott

reputational social

was

reconfigured the incentives of these leaders, and imposed costs

upholding their goals through comparison with the

couriers of these ideas

that

-

power

revolutionary ideas held up the old established ideas to heads

and benefits by threatening

economic benefits

when

It

is

on the material incentives of

decision-makers. At the same time, these are calculations driven by the exigencies of
reputational social

6

power which can only come

D. Philpott 46-49.

27

D. Philpott 162-3.
2S

D. Philpott 161.

14

into effect through

meanings and shared

understandings which provides the basis for these leaders and heads of states to

and understand that there

is

first

see

a discernible and potentially disadvantageous difference

between the new ideas and the established one and

its

impact on their reputational social

power.
Unlike Jackson and Philpott, Crawford’s approach concentrates on political
in 20'

argument, persuasion and practical reason as fundamental processes
?9
-

Her process-oriented explanation has two driving

decolonization.

30

These

ethical

arguments work bv

initially

century

The

factors.

which she foregrounds, are ethical arguments or arguments about "what

in particular contexts."

h

it

is

first.

right to

do

denormalizing and

delegitimizing dominant beliefs and practices and their ability to offer “ the articulation
3

of an alternative that meets normative criteria,”

alternative conceptions of possibility

among
the

and

and the adoption by some actors of
3?

interest.

It

these “arguments are persuasive

individuals and groups, then the balance of capabilities between those

dominant nonnative belief and new normative

belief will begin to

who

favor

change" and

99

She argues

that several

kinds of argument exist

in

world

politics: instrumental or

practical arguments, identity arguments, scientific argument,

“Instrumental or practical arguments are about

how

to

and ethical arguments.

do things most effectively

in the

arguments suggest that people of a certain kind, such ”we the
civilized.” ought to act in a particular way; (c) scientific argument use the laws of
science, technology or nature to define situations and show how they ought to be
social world; (b) identity

addressed, (d) ethical arguments are about what

(Crawford
30

5).

In

some

Crawford 2002,

cases,

all

it

is

to

do

right in particular contexts

4 arguments are present.

5.

1

Persuasive content also depends on the purpose and intended audience of the

argument, connection to larger issues tabled, relative power and identities of the
interlocutors;
32

and relevant cultural contexts.

Crawford 2002,

7.

15

“actors [will] begin to change their social world.”"

vis-a-vis colonialism -colonialism

made

The second driving

which

means

it

to

be

20

th

which

human and who

^

necessary for these arguments to work,

is

rights,

embedded

in beliefs

which are

lies

in turn,

and anti-racism gained broader persuasive power when they

applied from sovereigns to individual

first

in the

Like Jackson, these ideas of equality, self-determination,

in culture.

democracy, human

what took place

full rights."

context and content which are crucially,

embedded

were

factor,

is

persuasive ethical arguments

means of conceptualizing "what

belongs to the community of humans with

in their

This she argues,

was denormalized and delegitimized

century because anti-colonial reformers
catalyzed alternative

'

gradually expanded to include citizenship for

More fundamentally,

all

humans

in the colonial

white males,

power and

women and

36

minorities.

“early advocates of colonial reform and later proponents of

decolonization called on colonizers to act

in

ways

that

were consistent with

their

(evolving) identities, including their newly discovered empathy with the other, colonial
37

subjects.”'

In other

words, these particular arguments worked because they called the

identity of western countries into question.

33

4

35

36

'

Crawford 2002.

7.

Crawford 2002.

4.

Crawford 2002,

54.

Crawford 2002. 388.
Crawford 2002. 388. Emphasis mine.
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I

do not dispute

that ideas

and norms, as discussed by Crawford. Jackson and

Philpott were important in the large

wave of decolonization

that

took place

in the

middle of the twentieth century. As Crawford argues, decolonization:

“was

consequence of normative changes - if only because the other
explanations for the end of colonialism could have and probably did. apply in
other epochs, but colonialism was not outlawed in those areas. In other words,
the material conditions for the end of empire were present and did not operate in
the past. A major new element in the twentieth century was changed normative
in part a

38

beliefs.”

However, these approaches,

like others

based on norms, ideas and principles,

point to a “logic of appropriateness” as the guide for

“logic of appropriateness

selection.”

This

which can point

is

is

action and behavior. This

not equipped to provide a non-tautological account of

because normative frameworks do not provide standards or

norms

to the

no independent theory of

that are

why

most important

a particular

norm

dominant or “what constitutes appropriateness
Moreover,

human

my

in a social

or set of

system. There

which gave these

from the inconsistencies present between

criteria

is thus,

norms become important or
40

is a

given social context.”

discussion of Crawford. Philpott and Jackson also

logic of appropriateness

norm

ideas,

norms and argument

show

their

that the

power came

the principles associated with a state’s identity
41

and

its

practices via

its

colony or

territorial possession.

In particular, the existence

and possession of colonies challenged the colonial power's own understanding of

38

39

40

Crawford 2002, 56.

Hopf 2002,

13.

Hopf 2002,

13.

41

.See in particular,

Crawford 2002, and R. Jackson 1998.

17

itself

arguments based on principles and norms of self-determination and equality pointed

as

to the contradictions

and arguments

between

their stated identity

and their actual practices. The ideas

formed the crux of these approaches were effective only when they

that

were considered and reflected upon

in the

context of the state’s identity. Hence, the

efficacy of these ideas and arguments hinge ultimately on identity.

however, identity, though necessary,

is

In these analyses

unfortunately, rather underspecified and under-

theorized.

In this dissertation.

territorial

I

will focus

to

dissertation

is

not focused on developing an invariant

space and time. Such a task

political

world

are replicated again
42

is

is

is

to

encompass an

model

is

in

that

I

the explanatory

explicitly, this

for territorial

entire universe of cases across

likely to be less than productive since

it

assumes

that

our

one where large-scale structures, processes and sequences

and again

in different locations

and times

to

produce the same

•

Such a world, as Charles

Tilly argues, does not exist.

Rather, the regularities that are present

in political life

recurrent causes that "concatenate into substantially different

initial

mechanism

important to emphasize

disengagement and decolonization. More

disengagement and decolonization

outcome.

it

develop a theoretical framework where identity

factor for territorial

and

role of identity as a causal

disengagement and decolonization. Here,

do not intend

social

on the

43

consist instead of

outcomes depending on

conditions, subsequent sequences, and adjacent processes.”

42

Tilly 1995, 1596.
43

Tilly 1995. 1601.
44

Tilly 1997,48.
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44

Thus, a

far better

model

for explaining large-scale processes

reconstruct the

outcome

in

way

in

would concentrate on these causes and

which they may be linked and connected together

question. In other words, a

more

fruitful

way

to

produce the

of understanding territorial

disengagement and decolonization would therefore, involve the search

for:

“deep causes operating in variable combinations, circumstances; and sequences
with consequently variable outcomes. Most of the work therefore concerns not
the identification of similarities over

whole structures and processes but the
_JS

explanation of variability

A

among

related structures and processes.”

significant part of this larger research effort

would

on understanding specific causal mechanisms which
processes. In this dissertation,

discussing a

-

mechanism

that is

I

will concentrate

involved in

also involve focusing our attention

may

be

at

work

on the task of examining and

territorial

disengagement and decolonization

the role of identity.

In the next

two sections of

this chapter.

I

will focus

on outlining and discussing

theoretical conceptualizations of identity in International Relations.

brief discussion of the fundamental difference

approaches

discussed

this will

in

between

to identity in International Relations.

discussion and presentation of

how

rationalist

begin

first

with a

and constructivist

This will then be followed by a

and

various social constructivist theories in International Relations. Following

be a discussion of the processes and politics associated with the contestation

in a social

context where multiple identities and

an embarrassment of norms, both positive and negative, co-exist

"

I

identity construction has been understood

and emergence of a dominant identity

4

in these overall

46

The

final step

Tilly 1995. 1602.

4

Jeffrey Checkel points out that there

is

an embarrassment of norms, a condition with

consequences for our understanding of a socially constructed world

19

that

has been

left

involves a discussion of

the decisions that states

1.4 Identity

how

identity affects

make regarding

human

territorial

action and

more

disengagement.

specifically here,

47

and International Relations

There

is

now

considerable agreement

among

scholars

who work under

the rubric

of constructivism that identity, understood as the product of social construction, matters

in

world

4S

For James Fearon and Dav

politics.

of identity by self-interested
4

inter-state conflict.

elites is the

id Laitin, the instrumental constructions

cause of ethnic violence and the intra- and

The nature of the postwar

'

international order, according to

Ruggie, was not only due to the presence of a hegemon but

to the fact that

it

John

was an

11

American hegemony

.

Mlada Bukovansky has highlighted

principled conception of American identity in explaining

the importance of a

why

a w'eak

and divided

eighteenth century American state clung to a neutral rights policy stubbornly and
consistently despite inadequate national resources and constant challenges from far

woefully under-theorized by scholars working under the constructivist IR rubric. For

more, see Checkel 1998.
47

48

Checkel 1998.

While

1

begin from the perspective that identity

is

a social construction, there are

arguments based on essentialist conceptualizations of identity. Essentialist perspectives
view identity as a natural and objective part of social and political life, rooted in ancient
cultural, ethnic, linguistic

and civilizational

ties.

This argument that identities have a

primordial and unchanging core has been overtaken and rendered obsolete by a

burgeoning and cross-disciplinary literature that demonstrate that identities are invented
and manufactured, arising out of social, economic and political forces.
4

Fearon and Laitin 2000.
°

Ruggie 1996.

20

stronger powers.

identity in

'

Ted Hopf s inductive study of Soviet

1999 show

how

understood other states

in

identity in 1955

they were the lenses through which

world

definition of itself largely in

5?

aftairs.' “

its

and Russian

decision-makers

Peter Katzenstein has argued that Japan's

economic terms shaped a security policy

that

went

far

"

beyond

traditional military notions to include political

Katzenstein, along with other scholars like Robert

identity can

change and

its

interests, along with

it.'

and economic dimensions.'

Herman have
More

also argued that state

recently, Janice Bially

Mattern has boldly and brilliantly argued, contra neo-Realism and other rationalist
perspectives, that identity

is

a fundamental source in shaping

and securing international

55

order.

While united by the position

that identity is

important

in

giving us a more

complete understanding of international relations, these studies, representing varying
epistemological and ontological standpoints, are divided by

One of

the primary divides lie

between approaches

Ruggie, Katzenstein, Bukovansky,

neo-utilitarianism

where

identity

is

like

how

it

Fearon and Laitin’s and those of

Hopf and Mattern.

The former

exterior to interests.

In fact, identity, in rationalistic

1

Bukovansky 1997.
52

Hopf 2002,

xiv.

Katzenstein and

Okawara

4

Katzenstein 1996; and
""

v

1993, and Katzenstein 1996.

Herman

actually matters.

(1996).

Mattern 2005.

There are differences even within

this

second group of scholars.

21

is

anchored by

and neo-utilitarian accounts of world
and exogenous

interests

assumed

security and survival. John

and national identities

to

politics,

are pre-given

be the acquisition of power which can guarantee

Mearsheimer

in the

becomes a function of what

post-Cold

for example, discussed the rise of nationalism

War
7

conditions of the international system.'"'

period purely as a function of the structural

The

logic of such explanations

on the

is built

characterization of world politics as anarchical and therefore, a ‘self-help system' where

the threat of

war

are constant features of

world

politics.

In these structural conditions.

the national interest should be to ensure "that their countries possess as

possible, or at least

enough power

to guarantee their

own

security and survival.”

There are several problematic issues associated with
national interests. First

anarchy

is

from

it

understanding of the

neorealists that state interests

As argued persuasively by Helen

Milner,

59
this

demands

understanding of anarchy can only be assumed.'
phrase "the national interest'

may

suggest policies “to promote

that are ascribed to the nation rather than to individuals, sub-national groups,

mankind

as a whole,” but

Mearsheimer 1990.

S

Ringmar 1996,

60

58

almost entirely indeterminate. Therefore, interests that have been derived

In addition, the

or

some

this

as

an exceedingly slippery concept which makes the propositions that one can

derive from

'

the problematic claim of

derived from the conditions of anarchy.

is

7

is

much power

50.

Ruggie 1998, 862.
Wolfers 1962,47.

it

may mean

60

different things to different people.

During

the late 1920s

and early 1930s

policy toward India

he led

was conceived very

when compared

ambiguous and
In a

as

in Britain for

to the

Wolfers

fundamental

example, the ‘national

differently

interest’ vis-a-vis

by Winston Churchill and the group

group led by Stanley Baldwin. The concept

is

extremely

61

states,

has “very

little

meaning.”

insight, constructivists argue that interests are not

pre-formed

or exogenous but rather, inextricably linked with identity. Beneath this consensus

regarding the importance of identity to interests and by logical extension, the overall

importance of identity,

is

a variety of theoretical approaches for understanding the

various processes involved in identity construction, maintenance and change as well as

the relationship

between

identity

and human

action.

Subsequently, understanding

impact on politics and political behavior also vary according
identity

and the processes involved

in its construction are

Theoretically, this dissertation

begins from the standpoint that there

they do not exist singly or alone, as

is

many

collective ideas about the state or nation

how

the nature of

conceptualized and theorized.

broadly interested

may

to

its

in these

processes and

be dominant state and national identities but
b~>

studies have demonstrated.

may

be ‘dominant’

are almost never uniformly and universally accepted by

all.

at

Moreover,

a particular time but they

Instead, they are typically

questioned, challenged and politically contested by individuals or groups offering
6

different ideas about the state’s collective distinctiveness and purpose.

The dominant

Indonesian identity throughout most of the Suharto period for example, was rooted

61

Wolfers, 1962, 147.

Katzenstein 1996;

Hopf 2002; Smith 2003; and Goff and Dunn

63

Katzenstein 1996a,

6.

23

eds. 2004.

in a

narrative

threat

where Indonesia’s passage

and danger

into

nationhood and statehood was one of constant

This identity however, was challenged and

to the collectivity.

contested by another construction of Indonesian identity, one that promoted

democratic conceptions of

More

more

itself.

on the construction of

specifically, this dissertation will focus not only

identities, but their contestation, the

emergence of

the identity that mattered,

and

the

interaction of these processes with the domestic political structure of the state in

shaping and influencing foreign policy.
practices, processes,

And how

Why

politics

involved

in the

does a particular identity matter

does one identity emerge as dominant ?

dominant identity and domestic

at

How

What

are the

construction and

a specific period and

do the emergent

political structures affect the decisions that states

regarding disengagement as well as the

The next

asks the following questions:

mechanisms, actors and

contestation of identities?

not others?

It

way

in

make

which disengagement takes place?

section of this chapter proceeds in

two

parts.

The

first

begins by

defining identity and presenting a critical discussion of one of the key aspects of

Alexander Wendt’s systemic constructivism, the most developed theoretical exposition
on identity

in International Relations.

processes and

mechanisms

identity, as well as the

states

make regarding

1.5 Social

way

that are

in

involved

which

territorial

In the

second
in the

half,

I

present and discuss various

construction and contestation of

identity shapes

and influences the decisions

disengagement.

Constructivist Theories of Identity in International Relations

Definitions of identity, perhaps reflecting a concept that

to pin

that

down

as well as the fact that constructivism

24

is still

is

notoriously difficult

relatively

new

in

International

Relations, abound. Janice Bially Mattern defines

cognitive, sociological or emotional ties through

Jeffrey Legro together with Paul

political actors

Kowert define

it

very generally as “the mutual.

which

it

states

understand themselves.”

64

as "prescriptive representations of

themselves” as well as “their relationships

to

each other.”

6^

Peter

Katzenstein gives the preceding definition greater specificity by defining these
prescriptive representations as the “shorthand label for varying constructions of nation

and statehood”

66

where nationhood

collective distinctiveness

is

refers to “the nationally varying ideologies of

and purpose” while statehood

enacted domestically and projected internationally.”

identity is “not fully

rather,

it

is

refers to “state sovereignty, as

67

determined by geostrategic position,

For Mlada Bukovansky,
territory or

population” but

"the interplay of material interests and political discourse [which] generates

collective identity, articulated in terms of constitutive principles and role conceptions”

These principles are

in turn, “the

how

be enacted.”

64

this role

was

to

Mattern 2005, 43. Her

full

evocation of a vision of a set of expectations about
69

definition of international identity

especially in relation to others, identity

is

other understanding” (43).

° Kowert and Legro 1996, 453.
66

Katzenstein 1996a,

6.

67

Katzenstein 1996a, 59.

69

is:

“the mutual,

which states understand themselves,
an embodiment of shared categories of Self-

cognitive, sociological or emotional ties through

68

it

Bukovansky 1997, 210.
Bukovansky 1997, 218.

25

68

In these definitions, there is

like 'states

in

phrases

understanding themselves' and 'prescriptive representations of political

When American

actors’.

one important commonality demonstrated

political actors, for

example, refer

to the

democratic country founded on and constituted by freedom and

United States as a

liberty, they are

presenting a specific definition and understanding of the nation. Amalgamating these
definitions, this dissertation defines identity as a collective idea of

how

states

understand themselves, usually in the form of prescriptive representations of collective
distinctiveness and purpose.

How
involved

in

then

is

identity constructed

contestation and change?

human behavior? There

are

and maintained? What are the processes

How

does identity affect or influence politics and

no simple answers

to these questions in International

Relations and venturing into a theoretical discussion of these issues

into a

to risk stepping

quagmire of differences. These range from debates over whether analytic

attention should be focused on the international level or

on

is

the processes

and mechanisms

that are

at

the domestic level to those

involved in identity formation, maintenance

and change.

1.5.1

Wendt’s Systemic Constructivism
I

begin

my

overview of

how

identity has

been conceptualized and theorized with

Alexander Wendt’s Social Theory of International
theoretical interjection

on identity

Politics,

still

"

in International Relations.

70

the

most discussed

According

to

Wendt,

While there are other notable contributions on identity like Campbell 1992. Doty
Neumann 1999. Mattern 2005 and P.T. Jackson 2006, focus and begin with
Wendt because he has had the most influence on the field, spawning critiques and other
1996.

scholarly

1

work which draw on

his insights.

26

there are four different kinds of identities:
71

and (4) collective.

refer to the essential properties

body while

1

personal or corporate. (2) type, (3) role,

)

Personal or corporate identities are “constituted by the self-

organizing, homeostatic structures that

physical

(

in the

make

.72

actors distinct entities."

“

These structures

and material base of actors - for a person

case of states,

is

it

many

it

is

the

bodies and territories. Most

important in the personal or corporate identity of intentional actors “is a consciousness

and

memory

members

of Self as a separate locus of thought and activity."

73

For

states, their

require “joint narrative[s] of themselves as a corporate actor, and to that extent

corporate identity presupposes individuals with a collective identity.

The

state is a

‘group Self capable of group-level cognition. These ideas of Self have an ‘autogenetic’ quality, and as such personal and corporate identities are constitutionally

exogenous

4

to Otherness."

Type
persons

who

identity

on the other hand, refers

share (or are thought to share)

appearance, behavioral

traits, attitudes,

to a social category or “label applied to

some

characteristic or characteristics, in

values, skills (e.g. language), knowledge,

opinions, experience, historical commonalities (like region or place of birth) and so
7>

on."

71

72

73

74

7

"

The

Wendt

characteristics that “underlie type identities are at base intrinsic to actors"

1999, 224.

Wendt 1999, 224.

Wendt

1999, 225.

Wendt

1999: 225.

Wendt 1999,

225.

27

and are qualities

that

make

the actor exist “whether or not Others are present to

recognize them as meaningful.”
'regime types’ or 'forms of

76
In the states

system, "type identities correspond to

state,’ like capitalist states, fascist states,

monarchical

states,

7

and so on.”

The

third category, 'role identity' are those identities that

one can have through

the occupation of a position in a social structure and adopting behavioral

Others that possess relevant counter- identities.

intrinsic properties but "exist

In

other words,

only in relation to Others.”

‘

it

is

norms towards

not based on

The fourth and

final

category in Wendt’s framework, collective identity, “is a distinct combination of role

and type identities” which has "the causal power

to

induce actors to define the welfare
79

of the Others as part ot that ol the Self, to be alternative.”

identity

~

where

i

as Other.

the “Self-Other distinction

Thus,

framework

76

80

is

is

Wendt has chosen
a cognitive

meanings, determined by a process of interactions with other

78

a category of

'categorized'

„80

primarily on a state’s role identity which he argues

77

is

becomes blurred” and "Self

Despite outlining these four types of identity,

76

it

that

focuses on the construction of identity

Wendt

1999. 226.

Wendt

1999. 226.

Wendt

1999. 227.

Wendt

1999. 229.

Wendt

1999. 229.

28

at the

to focus

schema of shared

states.

Critically, this is a

systemic

level.

This

is in

turn, built

on the ontological assumption

that all state identities are

fundamentally

corporal with certain essential properties, and can therefore, be bracketed and put aside.

In

doing

so,

Wendt

acknowledges

effect

is in

important

to be

excluding domestic processes and politics which he
in the

construction of state identity from his framework.

This part of state identity therefore becomes ontologically prior to the

exogenously given
,

With

this

who
act."

system.

„8I

,
.

conceptualization of identity,

Wendt

therefore, “presents us with

materially constituted, uncomplicated, preformed state actors ...”

interact with

states’

each other

at the international level

82

They

are states

who

with “some pre-existing idea about

they are even beyond their awareness of their individuality and their ability to

This conceptualization and theorization of identity, as several

critics

have

already noted, excludes historical, social, cultural, political and economic forces and

institutions that

have been influential

in constituting the identities

of states which are, as

Sujata Chakrabarti Pasic points out, fundamentally and “in their entirety, social
84

arrangements."

a

monopoly on

and

Sl

States,

beyond

their corporate

and

intrinsic properties like the

claim to

the legitimate use of organized violence, sovereignty, physical resources

territory, are

“deeply social and socially contingent."

85

Hence, focusing on identity

Zeh fuss 2001. 321.

s:

Pasic 1996, 89.
83

S4

Zehfuss 200 1.321; and Hopf 2002, 289.

Pasic 1996, 90. For similar critiques, see Mattern 2005; Doty 2000;

Zehfuss 2001.
85

Pasic 1996.90.

29

Behnke 2001

construction solely

at

the systemic level

is

problematic as

conceptualization of identity formation that engages

all

it

lacks “concrete

the social levels of states'

„86
y.
sociality.
•

It

is

therefore, critical to

level in order to

mechanisms

the

involved in identity construction but also,

influences foreign policy and

more

territorial or colonial possessions.

eschewing the systemic
at

how

While

indeed a

call to

1

am

include

not

that a state's identity is

home. Instead of assuming the importance of either

as

we

I

only

the systemic or the

begin from the standpoint

leave this levels-of-analysis issue in identity construction as an

open-ended question

What

to be

examined, the matter of

outlining three

mechanisms and processes

how

that

I

have been prominent

against an Other, the construction of identities

will discuss

30

first

studies of

the construction of identities

-

do not necessarily function

them separately here

Pasic 1996. 89; and Zehfuss 2001, 335.

many

by

from social relationships with others, and

the construction of identities through narratives

I

-

in

still

politics that are

will turn to this question next

and identity construction. Although these three

independently of one another.

identities are constructed

and mechanisms, actors and

are the practices, processes

involved in the social construction of identity?

identity

and

an empirical question that can and should be examined.

Even

remains.

identity shapes

identities are constructed.

argument

level for a reductionist

this is

domestic level and therefore, prioritizing one over the other.
that this is

how

specifically in this dissertation, the decision to

the domestic level in our understanding of

constructed

blackbox of identity below the systemic

provide a more complete understanding not only of the processes and

that are

disengage from

unpack

for heuristic purposes.

1.5.2

Constructing Identities: Processes and Mechanisms

1.5.2.

1

Self/Other

Across disciplines

like social

anthropology, psychology, sociology, political

science and critical social theory, there

“in-group” usually entails

demarcation

its

is

a general consensus that the “lineation of an

demarcation from a number of “out-groups,” and that the

an active and ongoing part of identity formation.”

is

87

Identity is not only

relational but also inextricably linked to the notion of difference “since

one

is

requires recognition of

scholarly

work from

who one

is not.’”

knowing who

For example, a whole body of

history, anthropology, English

and Comparative

literature

on

European colonialism of the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries, have

documented

that the

European Self was usually constructed against

a colonial ‘Other.*

“usually through the employment of binary oppositions and the demarcating and

policing ot boundaries ot difference.”

89

The colonizer was

otten portrayed as the

epitome of civilization and progress while the colonized were constructed as barbaric
>0

and backwards,

its

binary opposite.

07

For example, see Barth 1969; Hogg and Abrams 1988: Tajfel and Turner 1985:
Jenkins 1996; Connolly 1985; and Said 1978.

For a review of some of the developments regarding the construction of identity, and
the production of boundaries in the literature in sociology, see Cerulo 1997 and Lamont

and Volnar 2002 respectively.
SS

89

,0

Phoenix 1998, 859.

Dunn 2003,

27.

Dunn 2003,

27. See also

Doty 1996 and Said 1994.

31

many

In International Relations,

insights and argued that identity

example, David Campbell,
that

American

identity

is

important monograph. Writing Security

in his

like

women,

the

Americans, and communists, or other

that

Critically, the first

Relations

secure

Other

its

was based on an

is

own

from

Europeans, Jews. African92

states in the international system.

literature

on the construction of identity

Iver
93

in International

implicit and a priori assumption that “identity requires

94

self-certainty.”

While

into otherness in order to

constructed against an

this insight that identity is

an extremely important component for understanding the overall puzzle of

and maintained,

sometimes but not always oppositional.

See

class. East

For

1992), argued

against an "‘Other" either

more importantly, "converts difference

identities are constructed

M

working

(

>]
.

Russian identity was constructed against a European "Other'.

wave of

difference to be" but

drawn on these

defined and constructed against an Other

was defined and constructed

groups within the nation

Neumann argued

scholars of identity have also

Neumann

1999; Todorov

1

95'

it

is

how

important to recognize that identities are

Ted Hopt

s

careful and detailed study of

984; Campbell 1992; Doty 1996, and Goff and

Dunn

237.

Some

argue that an "Other'

Rumelili 2004. While

is

this is

a necessary part of identity formation. For example, see

outside the scope of this dissertation,

it

needs further

study.
99

“

See Campbell 1992 and Smith 1993.

Among many

others

who

have noted and

documented this, see the work of Anders Stephanson and Emily Rosenberg on
American foreign policy.
M

Neumann 2002.

94

Connolly 1991. 64. Connolly has been

Relations scholars

work

in the

who drew

influential

first

group of International

inspiration from poststructuralism and were producing

1980s and 1990s.

Hopf 2002,

on the

7.

32

Soviet identities in 1955 and Russian identities in 1999 has shown that binary

oppositions and the resulting conflict and violence that seem to characterize such

identity relations

do not form

Following Hopf,

I

the

sum of all

Sell-Other relations.

do not begin with the assumption

%

that that identity is

always

97

constructed against a binary or oppositional Other.

difference with the Other

is

to

be regarded as a critical empirical question.

treated as an empirical question
99

Generally, the 'Other'

Sell.

in International Relations.

100

examination.

Instead, the Sell's treatment of

is

is

what constitutes an Other

the issue of

assumed and

Again, this

is

treated as

98

for

Also

any given

synonymous with another

Instead of another state, the Other could be in the form of "real others

whom we

own

past as from cultural narratives; historical others; and the generalized other."

are currently involved;

imagined others, including characters from our
101

1. 5.2.2

Symbolic Interactionism

The concepts developed
develop a framework where

in

symbolic interactionism have also been utilized

state identities are

% Hopf 2002, 264.

98

99

Hopf 2002,

7.

Hopf 2002,

7.

Hopf 2002,

10.

100

101

state

an assumption that requires further

with

97

to be

Hopf 2002,

263.

Hopf 2002,

9.

33

to

constructed through social interactions

with other states

in the international

identities “are learned

significant Others.

,,103
7
'

systems.

and then reinforced
Here, “actors

come

102
"

Wendt

for example, argues that

response to

in

to see

how

actors are treated by

themselves as a reflection of

how

they

think Others see or “appraise" them, in the “mirror" of Others’ representations of the
104

Self."

More

specifically, a state’s identity

is

constituted

when

it

is

named,

recognized and validated through a process of interactions and social relationships with
other states. Thus, identities are a product of social interactions

capacities, attitudes,

ways of behaving,

based on how others

may

such interactions.

In

- an

individual’s

as well as her conception of herself

see or act towards

him or

her.

may change

Identities are also sustained

by

105

Wendt's framework,

constructs state identities

at

social interactions are an important part of a process that

the systemic level.

These

identities

however, range

narrowly from negative identification to positive identification with co-variation

between relations of identity and difference, and co-operation and
example, when the other
identification

is

seen as different, inferior and a threat, there

and relations are conflictual.

103

104

105

Wendt

1999.

Wendt

1999. 327.

Wendt 1999,327.
Wendt

is

1999, 331.

106

Rumelili 2004, 34.

34

106

While Wendt’s

For

negative

In contrast, there is co-operation

Self sees the Other as similar and non-threatening.

102

conflict.

critics

when
have

the

rightly pointed to the

problems assoeiated with

identity relations, they should not detract

his

framework regarding

this

narrowly conceptualized range of

from some of the broader

identity construction.

insights present in

Particularly significant

is

the

incorporation of social interaction and practices in the construction of identities, a

process which other scholars have also noted

Dunn
shall

in their

work on

10

identity.

As Goff and

note, “not only does identity dictate practice; practice determines whether identity

congeal around certain ideas or evolve.”

1. 5.2.3

108

Narratives
Narratives based on certain historical events have also been important in the

constitution ot the identities ot

many

109

states.

American

identity has been constantly

constructed and indelibly marked by dominant stories regarding the principles and
ideals of

its

founding through history textbooks, the national monuments
1

Washington, D.C., movies

Germany’s

role in

as well as other cultural sites.

World War

II

and the extermination of

lead to serious ‘soul-searching’ but

was

understood their past and envisioned

107

I0S

See some of the contributions

In International Relations, see the

draw on

edited

postwar period,

six million

particularly important in

the

Jews did not

just

how Germans

community and

as a

volume by Goff and Dunn 2004.

work of Barnett 1999 and Dunn 2004 who both
also Ringmar 1996, Mattern

work of sociologist Margaret Somers. See

2005, and Smith 2003 for his discussion of
10

In the

Goff and Dunn 2004. 244.

109

1

10

their future as a political

in the

that dot

See Klein 2000 on the

‘return’

‘stories’

of memory

35

of ‘peoplehood’.

in the social sciences.

1

1

Recently, observers have noted that stories stressing the humiliation that

people.

China experienced

encounters with the West and Japan during the nineteenth and

in its

accompanied the emergence of

early part of the twentieth centuries have

1

belligerent

part of

form of Chinese nationalism.

how

Israel

understood

itself not

P"

In Israel, the

more

a

Holocaust has been a central

only as a victim but as a redeemer of this

1

victimhood.

In all these states, certain

narratives regarding

how

events have played an important role

these states and their people

came

into being.

in

these

It

is critical

to

understand that “events do not have an objective meaning” but rather, have been “made

meaningful and

intelligible

by actors

who

locate

them within an overarching narrative
1

that provide a link

between an interpretation

ot the past

and image of

14

the future.”

In

these narratives, a series of events are interpreted and cognitively connected together in

causal and associational

significance and

ways

in

an overall plot that provide communities with larger

meaning through “some understanding of

See Zehfuss 2002 for the impact of

this identity

its

origins and

its life

on German foreign policy

in the

1990s.
112

Gries 2004.

1

'

For a recent and fascinating application of narratives of the Holocaust

in the

constitution of Israeli identity, see Zertal 2006. Zertal also argues that this construction

did not

become

part of the

everyday

until the

Eichmann

trial in

the 1960s

when Ben-

Gurion’s actions harvested these memories into a collective consciousness.
114

Barnett 1999. 13.

36

1

1:>

The establishment of such

history.”

a narrative “constitutes one of the most

important mechanism by which a nation constructs a collective identity.”

What however,

are the engines driving these

1

16

mechanisms and processes

in the

construction of identities? Identities are not constructed against an Other based on

some

externally determined truth. Neither are they the passive product of repeated

1

social interactions, or free-floating

identities

and already formed narratives.

do not simply emerge out of a

articulated, constructed, circulated

examine and not

to

assume away

social

and

political

1.5.3

in identity

vacuum. They

and contested by actors. Therefore,

the role of

human agency and
1

involved

In other

One approach

theories

essential to

the politics that are

1S

that

in Identity

Construction

does focus on the role of agency and politics in identity
1

is that

is

are

construction, contestation and change.

Agency and Structure

construction

it

words,

of

elite

manipulation or strategic choice theories.

where constructivist explanations have merged with

19

In these

rationalist, strategic

analyses, identities are constructed either strategically or as a by-product of the efforts

115

Barnett 1999. 13.
116

Barnett 1999, 12.

1

1

Mattern 2005,
1

1

13.

Katzenstein 1996b and for the importance of investigating where norms

see Checkel 1998, 339.

1

’

Fearon and Lai tin 2000.

37

come from,

1

of cynical, self-interested political

elites to acquire or strengthen their

Identities are thus really epi phenomenal,

particular policy.

why

the

when

stir

it

find these

could lead to

messages based on

civil

war and high

identity particularly

overall costs.

from

political disputes

political actors

who

and conflict over identity

for

compelling

These strategies are

therefore not always subjectively rational nor politically successful.

Moreover,

may

PI

very well emerge

see the construction of a certain sort of life and collective

ideas of identity in the form of ideas regarding political ideals of citizenship

and

states,

notions of governance and proposals for specific institutions, such as political

constitutions, legal systems, rules of property

12 ^
~

which “successful

political actors

incorporate into their political programs, politics, and personal identities and

ambitions”

identities

the

123
"

as their highest ideal.

and competing

P4

Thus, these disputes could very well be over

political perspectives

means of achieving them.

1- ^

1

°Fearon and Laitin 2000, 853.
121

Brubaker 1998, 291.
122

123

124

I_ri

20

up the masses and justify a

These theories are however, problematic as they cannot account

masses would

especially

used to

hold on power.

Haas 1993. 508.
Smith 2003. 46.
Smith 2003, 37.
Beissinger 1998. 171: and Smith 2003.

38

on the nation’s true mission as well as

Perhaps more importantly, instrumentalist approaches as well as those that

emphasize the importance of language, discourses and culture
identities tend to create a false

actors

do have agency, can be

construction of

dichotomy between structure and agency. On one
strategic,

and

may

that certain policy

proposals constitute plausible and acceptable solutions to pressing problems.”
are therefore, not only "bearers of structures” but can

to rewrite the cultural landscape...”

made by

127
'

level,

indeed, deliberately construct

“convince each other as well as the general public

identities to

in the

However,

"engage

the locus

on

in practices that

~

They

attempt

strategic calculations

self-possessed actors advances too radical a "separation of the material and the

ideational.”

128
“

Actors

may

as well as their interests

construct identities for strategic reasons but their strategies

do not materialize from

constituted form, as implicitly

approaches.

129
“

thin air in a pre-given

assumed by instrumentalist and

Actors can and do act but they

may

also

elite

do so from

and already

manipulation

their

knowledge and

awareness of the normative and social structures which constrain and determine what
1

30

are considered to be legitimate strategies.

In short,

any account of the construction of

identities that takes

agency into

account must recognize that actors can and do act strategically and are “capable of

126

Barnett 1999,

8.

Barnett 1999,

7.

Barnett 1999.

7.

127

I2S

1

2W

Brubaker
1

1

998, 292.

,(
’

Barnett 1999,

8.

39

1

appropriating

1

1

At the same time, such an

cultural taproots for various ends.”

...

account should not neglect the underlying structure of cultural and social rules

Thus "the attempt

constitute and constrain their practices.

to

and

The next

fails to

recognize what makes social action what

it

forces

133
it

is.”

section delves further and deeper into the issue of identity contestation

by building a framework that examines the question of

1.5.3. 1

may

reduce action to either

rule-governed action or strategic behavior might be analytically seductive but

false choices

that

when and why

it

take place.

Stages of Identity Contestation
This dissertation adopts Peter Haas’, Ian Lustick's and

frameworks of contestation of ideas

to

processes and mechanisms involved

in

contestation

is

J.

Legro's theoretical

examine, outline and explain the
134

the contestation of identity.

by no means neatly demarcated,

it

is

conceived here

political

While

identity

in three stages to aid

conception and analysis of the processes. The three stages are as follows:

1.

Changing

internal or external political, social

and economic conditions

arise to

challenge dominant conceptions of state or national identity.

2.

The presence of an appropriate
identity

which provides

alternative to the

dominant

state or national

a different conception of state- or nationhood.

131

'

Barnett 1999,

7.

Barnett 1999.

8.
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133

Barnett 1999, 27.

1

4

Haas 1992/1996; Lustick 1993; and Legro 2005. See

40

also

Ringmar 1996,

83-5.

3.

The presence of dedicated
push the alternative onto the
the right

In stage

conditions

may

way

1,

to

conceive

political-ideological entrepreneurs

political stage

state- or

and

to

who

persuade others

are able to

to accept

it

as

nationhood.

changing internal or external

political, social

and economic

challenge collective ideas about the state and nation especially

when

they lead to growing discrepancies between the dominant identity's stated mission and

political objectives

and

its

ability to translate

them

into success. In particular, social

expectations that have been derived from collective ideas or principles that guide state

behavior

critical

may

interact with the experienced

consequences of the changing conditions or

events to create a ripe situation where the dominant identity and
1

ideas and principles of state- and nationhood can be contested.

° Thus,

its

attendant

these collective

ideas do not only contain "a notion of appropriate action but also a portrayal of what

consequences constitute a success (or are socially desired) and what ones are a

(as

opposed

failure

136

to success).”

Contestation however, will also require the presence of alternative conceptions

of state- or nationhood (or stage

2).

As

Lustick points out, “no politician, confronted

with beliefs honored or advanced as hegemonic,
unless another available

reality

135

136

schema can

is

likely to treat

them as problematic

articulate those beliefs as an interpretation of

and the imperatives of national

life,

rather than as the direct

Legro 2005, 29.
Legro 2005, 30.

41

and unavoidable

#

expression ot immutable facts and ultimate values.”

J37

Following Rogers Smith.

I

argue that alternatives are generally not simply created or invented from scratch.
Instead, they are usually "largely generated by. motivated by, and also meaningfully

limited by the particular range of stories of possible political identity that they have
1

inherited and long valued.”

^8

These

may

myths, legends and a country’s founding.
narratives or stories are

flexibility,

It

and reinterpretation.

and ideological entrepreneurs,

These entrepreneurs

that arise

must however, be noted

complex which provides some degree of

from

that these

malleability.

139

Critically, the political impact

(stage 3).

be narratives and stories

of these alternatives are dependent on political

e.g. leaders, intellectuals as well as their

are necessary to

organizations

push the alternatives onto the

political

stage and to persuade other political actors of the rightness of the identity and

its

related

ideas and principles of state- and nationhood for the country. Since several alternatives

may

be present,

it

matter ultimately

is

is

also important to note that the conception that will

one wielded by entrepreneurs who are most successful

the

efforts of transmission

What

is

I

and Action

address the relationship between identity, interests and action.

the relationship between identity and interests?

137

Lustick 1993, 123.
138

139

in their

and persuasion.

1.5.4 Identity, Interests

In this section.

emerge and

Smith 2003, 48.

Smith 2003, 48.

42

How

does identity work

itself

into the

realm of human action and behavior

eschewing the pursuit of

interests as an important reason for action,

Alexander Wendt, Erik Ringmar and others

we

that

we

are,

can

in international relations?

know what we want."

that “it is

140

furnishes a

mode

because

it

argue, following

1

know who we

.

.

Identity,

provides us with ideas ot

As Roger Brubaker

provide a basis for seeing the world.

“It

only once we

Without

are

who

argues:

of vision and division of the world, to use Pierre

mode of social counting and accounting. Thus it inherently
and interest - bv identifying how we are to calculate our

Bourdieu’s phrase, a
links identity
,,141

interests.

It

therefore precedes the definition of interests “and the formulation of particular actions
14

in certain situations

and

intelligible

or interest areas”

and others not

Specifically, identity

"

as identity

may “makes some

144

so.”

may frame

issues in a different

reconstitution of the country's national interests, paving the

formulated and implemented.
decolonization,

way

new

In the case

of

territorial

actors understand and constitute their interests.

colonial or territorial possessions, old policies

140

141

142

Ringmar 19%,

way

13;

and Wendt 1999, 231.

13.

144

Barnett 1999, 10.

43

for a

lead to a

new

policy to be

disengagement and

When

may no

new conception of state-

Brubaker 1998, 291.

Ringmar 1996.

way and

or newly emergent and dominant identities

for political actors with the

action legitimate

may have

altered the

confronted by the issue of

longer be compelling or logical

or nationhood.

Besides shaping interests, there
links

it

to action.

A

is

another important dimension to identity which

wide range of scholars w ho work from varying epistemological and

ontological viewpoints have noted that while identities are indeed constructed, thinking,

imagining and inventing them

dimension involved

is

in the substantiation

In

By

much

second and equally

critical

of identities comes from acting and performing
144

these identities in the process of becoming.

they do as

A

only part of the process.

States, as

Legro notes, "become what

14:1

as they

do what they are...”

order to understand

intersubjective,

I

mean

this,

it

is

critical to

that they are not

note that identities are intersubjective.

only understandings of the self but rather.

shared understandings and ideas regarding the self and other that can only be produced

and sustained from

it,

"identities

This

is in

and

social relationships

and interactions w

146
ith others.

interests are not only learned in interaction

contrast to primordialist accounts

substantive and which can stand on

its

where

own.

It

is.

identity

in

....

As Wendt

But sustained by

amounts

to

puts
147
it.”

something

other words, "an identification

I4S

process, not an identity condition.”

144

See Campbell 1992; Laffey 2000; Mattern 2005; and Jackson and Nexon 1999 on

the importance of practices and processes for identity construction and maintenance.
I4 ‘"

146

Legro 2005, 20.
Mattern 2005, 49.

147

Mattern 2005, 50.
148

Mattern 2005. 51.

44

For an individual or group which

identity, the intersubjectivity

Following Erik Ringmar,
their identities.

on

all

alone.

like

its

own. Due

X

trying to establish a contested and

and social nature of identity

149
is

°

to their social character, identities

cannot be decided by individuals

Ringmar, following G.W.F. Hegel and sociologists

Part of this sociality involves the

15
'

“is

always taken together

need for "recognition for the persons

we

take ourselves to be, and only as recognized can

an identity.”

particularly important.

cannot construct, declare or imagine an identity into existence

George Herbert Mead and Alessandro Pizzorno, argues,
1

new

argue that there are limits to the ability of states to construct

Instead, this decision, as Erik

with others."

we

State

I

is

conclusively

come

to establish

Thus, these constructions and declarations will depend on the reaction

and more importantly, the recognition of the audiences, both domestic and international,

whom

to

they are addressed.

Recognition of the declared identity
152

is

rarely automatic

order to do so,

and will involve proving

that

often forced to act

convince people regarding the applicability of our

descriptions.”

arguments,

14

...

to

While

there are

many

others

is

(

1(1

IM

1

it

153
'

-

our interpretations

“

1x4

Ringmar 1996.

80.

Ringmar 1996.

14.

Ringmar 1996.

14;

Ringmar 1996.

14.

Ringmar 1996.

13-14.

and Mattern 2005, 51.
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tit

In

us.

ways

to

do

so. e.g.

“we

are

self-

through discussion or

1

“only through action can

we provide

proves the others wrong. The action
such

the kind of final, decisive evidence that
will

be there for everyone to see and as

will be an irrefutable manifestation

it

of our character, our action will
'’

encroach upon our detractors and force them

Thus, identity does not only shape interests and influence action,

heart of actions to "defend a certain conception of

“we

act. that is,

not only because there are things

we want

there are persons

during periods

contested.

157
'

to

be”

The need

During these periods
still

may have emerged

who

1

they are.”

we want

'"

0

it

is

In other

to have, but also

also at the

words,

because

]:)h

when meanings and

be available and

4

to reconsider their views.”

for recognition is especially strong

categories of self-understandings or identities are

in

which multiple interpretations or

identities

may

circulating in the social and political discourse, the identity that

as a

dominant one needs

to

be consolidated and

it

is

during these

times that states are in particular need of acting or presenting displays and
manifestations of “visible signs that

if

other people see us in a certain

our character.

By

way

indeed are persons of a particular kind;

that they are able to

facilitating identification, display also

boundary between those who belong

14

we

Ringmar 1996,

83.

Ringmar 1996,

3.

Ringmar 1996.

3.

to a certain

it

is

draw conclusions regarding

makes

it

group and those

possible to draw the

who do

1

58

not.”

1

1

h

1:1

Ringmar calls these ‘formative moments’ in his framework. It is similar to the
framework that has been outlined in section 1.5.3 and also as presented by Haas
1992/1996, Lustick 1993 and Legro 2005.
158

Ringmar 1996.

87.
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only

1.6

Domestic

Political

Systems and the Manner

in

Which

State Contraction Takes

Place

While the emergence of a dominant
changes

in the

way

states

identity is important for explaining the

have approached the issue of disengagement, there are

differences in the withdrawal process even after the decision to do so has been made.

Why

are

some of these processes peaceful while

others are scenes of prolonged, bloody

and violent struggles? This section outlines and discusses the way
structures

may have

disengagement

159

an impact on

way

in

which

identity

is

in

domestic

involved in

while section 4.2 of Chapter 4 will discuss

its

political

territorial

theoretical significance

in greater detail.

Domestic

systems can vary along two dimensions - the institutionalized

political

structure of the decision-making process and the degree to

governing the outcome of
institutionalized.

For the

may

political contestation

first

dimension, they

where decision-making

is

fragmented democratic

political

may

or

which the rules and norms

may

not be well

range from unitary political systems

highly centralized to multiparty parliamentary systems or

systems

like the

American system where

intra-

inter-branch struggle have been built into the structures of government from the

and
start

allowing for greater recourse to other branches of government and centers of power
160

should disagreement exist.

making process

1

in a political

More

specifically, the

more fragmented

the decision-

system, the more veto players, defined here as an

5Q

This section draws on insights from Spruyt 2005; Snyder 1991
160

Tichenor 2002, 30.

47

;

and Snyder 2000.

“individual or collective actor

quo,

„161

..

,

it

has.

In

whose agreement

is

necessary for a change of the status

systems where there are multiple veto players with the means and institutional

opportunity to block or oppose the passage of a policy,
issues of contestation to identity or to

the rise of a

dominant one.

On

it

implement changes

is

more

that

difficult to resolve

may have emerged from

the other hand, in highly centralized political systems

with one veto player system, changes are more likely to be implemented once accepted

and adopted. Hence, “the number of veto players influences the latitude

governments

will

have

to

change

policy.

If a

proposed policy confronts

that

many

veto

players with variant preferences, the veto of any player can forestall compromise.”

The second dimension
governing the outcome of
institutionalized.

In

refers to the degree to

political contestation

may

mature democratic systems

which the
or

may

rules

16 ?

and norms

not be well

like Britain’s,

decision-making

is

fairly

centralized and there are "free, fair and periodic elections in which a substantial

proportion of the adult population can vote: the actions of officials are constrained by
constitutional provisions and

commitments

to civil liberties;

sometimes lose elections and leave office when they do.”

norms and regulations governing

the

outcome of

institutionalized. Thus, challenges to identity

interests in favor

of disengagement take place

IM
Tsebelis 1999, 591.
162

Spruyt 2005,
163

7.

Snyder 2000. 26.
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and government candidates

Ul

In such systems, rules,

political contests

have been

and the eventual reconstitution of
in

circumstances where actors w

state

ill

abide

by the outcomes of these contests and the decisions
the withdrawal process

is

that follow.

likely to be peaceful.

Highly centralized and unitary

political

systems

characterized by an oligarchical distribution of power,
representative institutions, and few rules or

In

in the

system, e.g.

of the main center of power by another

new

identity

when

may

and the implementation of new

contestation of identity

be other actors

who

are

may
still

is

weak

administrative and

only possible

a dictator loses power.

political actors.

when

The replacement

At the same time however,

policies.

difficult to resolve as there

power during such

transitional periods.

regulations governing outcomes of these contests, disengagement

1.7

may

turn to other

means of over-turning

may

may

Since

norms and

actors in such systems are also less likely to abide by institutional rules,

these actors

there are

provide the opening for the emergence of a

be extremely fraught and
jostling for

like Indonesia's are

norms which may constrain

such systems, the process of identity contestation

openings or ruptures

In these circumstances,

be violent as

the decision.

Methodology
In

analyzing not only

how

identity matters but

more

specifically,

contestation of identity, mediated through domestic political structures,

decisions states

make

how

may

regarding disengagement from their colonies and other

possession as well as the manner

in

the

affect the

territorial

they disengage, two cases of multinational states

which backed down from previously entrenched positions on disputed lands were
selected.

The

first

concerns Britain and

demands from 1929

to 1934.

its

This was a

response to Indian nationalist challenges and

critical

period for

proposed series of constitutional reforms purportedly aimed

49

relationship because the

this

at

the gradual transfer of

power from

Britain to India

over a colony

in Britain.

was

the site of the

The decisions

that

most

were made then would go on

significant influence on the course of events that

independence

growing

in

ever fought

hitter political battle

would culminate

to

have

in India’s

August 1947. The second case focuses on Indonesia’s response

calls for self-determination in East

Timor and

steadfastly refusing to countenance any changes to

its

its

withdrawal

in

policy throughout

1999
its

to

after

twenty-four

year occupation.

These cases were selected
denominator

that is

related to identity

in relatively

-

most

in

likely to

order to ensure

homogeneity of

countries like Japan and

from heterogeneous countries

across a

have an effect on the processes and mechanisms

the heterogeneity or

homogeneous

some degree of similarity

in the

Here, two heterogeneous countries

building of a

its

Germany would probably

common

- multinational

population. Requirements

Britain

differ

identity for their citizens.

which encompassed England.

Scotland. Wales and Northern Ireland, and Indonesia were selected in order to provide a

better basis for understanding how'

some of

construction, contestation and change

may

the processes related to identity

unfold under the broadest of these domestic

conditions.

At the same time, the selection of these cases which differ along other
dimensions and contexts rather than two identical or very similar cases

more confidence

for understanding

how

will also provide

identity affects territorial disengagement.

other words, examining these cases will provide an opportunity for “showing that a

particular

model or

164

sets

of concepts usefully illuminates these cases.”

164

Collier 1993, 108.
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In

Since
involved

this project is also interested in the

in identity construction,

domestic processes and mechanisms

contestation and change as well as the

identity shapes and influences policy in international relations,

theoretical assumptions about identity.

insights about identity

Instead, the focus

is

it

way

in

which

begins with few

on extrapolating theoretical

from the empirical evidence of the two cases which have been

gathered through adopting several of the following overlapping steps

presence of identities in the cases for the periods examined and

in the

-

establishing the

discourses of the

relevant political elites, process-tracing, and pattern-matching.

In

order to study identity.

produced -

examined

in the

I

concentrated on the place where

arguments, narratives and discourses of

it

is

mainly

political elites.

Specifically,

the arguments, narratives and discourses of political elites like legitimate

decision and policymakers within a state, party elites and other influential

members of

society in order to understand the chief ideas and principles characterizing a particular

vision of nationhood or statehood. This

was accomplished mostly through studying

political debates, official publications, statements,

memos, speeches, memoirs of

leading statesmen and newspaper articles related to the issue of the colony or territorial

possession.

Secondary sources which discussed and analyzed representations of a

state’s identity at various cultural sites

novels,

monuments, museums, history

ranging from

texts,

art

and architecture, travel books,

and movies were also used

to

complement

this research.

In

terms of empirical evidence, the type collected and the w ay
;

differed across the

archival sources

two cases examined

examined included

in this dissertation.

it

was collected

For Britain and India,

the discussions, debates and decisions of British

51

1

party and policy elites surrounding constitutional reform for India between 1929 and

1934.

More

specifically, these included

primary archival sources

like

Conservative

Party documents, British parliamentary debates, and official and conference reports

related to the issue of constitutional reforms for India during this period.

primary documents, the general pervasiveness of
through a wide and

critical

this identity

was

Besides these

also established

reading of secondary material which discussed

representations of Britishness in novels, travel books, children’s novels, and

art

and

architecture.

In the case

of Indonesia and East Timor,

the Suharto period,

I

first

I

examined a variety of material. For

examined primary Australian. American

government documents which reported on meetings between

their

as well as British

government

representatives and those from Indonesia between 1974 and 1975. Since government

memos

and other primary documents from the Indonesian government are not available,

these Australian.

American and

British

documents were the next best option.

Moreover, examining documents from these three different governments allowed

comparison of

how

similarities and differences in

matter of East Timor and as a

result, greater

consulted. Other primary material

Indonesian officials discussed the

confidence

examined

articles, official publications, statements, speeches,

Timor.
also

In

in the reliability

of the material

for the Suharto period included

from the Indonesian military which had emerged

for

memoirs

as well as

newspaper

some memos

into the public sphere regarding East

order to establish the general pervasiveness of the identity being discussed.

examined

I

the dominant representations and narratives of Indonesian identity during

52

the Suharto period through critical secondary sources

national

museums,

which analyzed monuments,

history textbooks and movies.

For the Habibie period, interviews were conducted with proponents of change
like senior

members of the Indonesian government

governmental organizations

who were

in

time, as well as non-

favor of disengaging from East Timor. Also

interviewed were individuals from the military

Indonesia.

at that

who were

against disengagement from

Information and views from newspaper articles and publications from these

organizations were examined

Secondary

order to supplement the interviews.

in

historical studies

have also been used to construct the background

narrative of the cases involved. Here.

distribution of implicit theoretical

I

commitments.”

was

particularly in the case of Britain, there

historiographical terrain.

More

presumed

that “narratives consist

16

''’

In order to

of a normal

avoid selection bias

explicit consideration of the

specifically, the

background narrative was constructed

through quasi-tri angulation using the claims of different historians based on different
66

archival sources and/or implicitly theoretic or political angles.

In order to trace the relationship

disengage from

its

colony or

territorial

between

making process which connects

165

Lustick 1996.
166

Lustick 1996, 616.

In this

initial

and a

state’s decision to

possession, as well as the relationship between

domestic political structures and the manner
uses the process-tracing method.

identity,

in

which

states disengage, this dissertation

method, the chain of events or the decision-

case conditions with the outcomes are

167

examined.

Process-tracing

a particularly suitable

is

method

as

it

allows for the

unfolding of the “cause-effect link that connects independent variable to [the] outcome”
1

whereby "the investigator looks

for observable

evidence of each step."

6H
In other

words, process-tracing allows for the tracing of the relationship between the dominant

identity

and the stages involved

decision-making of the case being examined.

in the

Finally, confidence in the dissertation's account

matching where an empirically-based pattern
specifically, the empirical evidence

theoretical account

proposed

is

was established using

compared with

in this project

and those of alternative theoretical

have even annexed East Timor since

to

material benefit to the archipelago.

other hand,

would have predicted

Indonesians to annex East Timor

politics

A

it

hold

its

was of little

theory based on the role of positive norms on the

the absence of

in

More

the

approaches. For example. Realism would predict that Britain would maintain

on India; and for Indonesia not

pattern-

a predicted one.

from these cases were matched against

1975.

If

any contemplation on the

part of the

alternative theories of international

such as realism and a constructivist approach based on norms are unable

to

provide a more complete and satisfactory explanation of the outcomes of both cases

comparison
validity of

167

168

16

to the

my

framework offered

here, this should provide

theoretical account.

George and

McKeown

Van Evera

1997. 64-66.

169

1985.

’

Bennett and George 1997.
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some confidence

in

in the

1.8

The Road Ahead: A Brief Chapter Outline
Chapters 2 of

this dissertation

examines the case of

Britain

British political elites to calls for constitutional reforms in India

and the reaction of

between 1929 and

1934. Chapter 3 provides an in-depth discussion of the case of Indonesia and East

Timor during

the stasis of the Suharto period and discusses the transformations that

took place between mid- 1998 through 1999
the processes of disengagement.

Chapter

when

4. the

new' Indonesian leadership initiated

concluding chapter of the dissertation,

summarizes the specific empirical findings of both cases and
territorial

disengagement.

It

will also

summarize

their implications for

the processes and

mechanisms

involved in identity construction, contestation, change, the impact of identity on policy

in

these

two cases

as well as general theoretical implications on

understood in International Relations.
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how

identity can be

CHAPTER
THE QUESTION OF

INDIA:

THE BATTLE BETWEEN THE DIEHARDS

THE REFORMERS

“Responsibility

the centre to

at

Commandments

that

2

ANI)

IN BRITAIN, 1929-1935

some people appears

you must always observe, and

to

be one of the Ten

to others

it

appears the

1

unforgivable sin that you must never commit.”

2.1

Introduction

When

India

became an independent and sovereign

appeared to have given up the lynchpin of

its

empire and

2

the

world” without as much as a whimper. In 1947.

this

nation in 1947. Britain

its

"secret to the mastery of

may have appeared

to

be the

case but the profound changes leading to the end of this imperial relationship did not

only begin during the 1940s. Substantial changes also took place

1929 and 1935. The

latter period,

in

1919, and between

culminating in the 1935 Government of India Act,

challenges most perspectives that portray Britain’s disengagement from India as one

that

was uncontested.

political battle

It

was

was fought

in

in fact, the period in

which the

fiercest

and most sustained

twentieth century British politics over India or

generally, over any colony of the British empire. This six-year battle and

was

a

major turning point

in British politics

its

more
outcome

regarding the question of India and forms

the focus of this chapter.

1

~

Samuel Hoare, House of Commons Debates. 260.

Quoted

On

in

Bridge 1986.

c.

12 10 (2

December 1931

).

2.

the critical significance of this period, see Ball 1988, 128-9; and

56

Pugh 1992.

2.2

Interwar Britain
During World

And The Question Of India
War

the

I,

imperialists in his cabinet like

government of David Lloyd George and self-avowed

Lord Birkenhead approved

the 1917

Montagu

Declaration which stated that British policy was the ‘“increasing association of Indians

in

every branch of the administration, and the gradual development of self-governing

institutions, with a

view

to the progressive realization of responsible
4

India as an integral part of the British Empire.”’

While

government

this declaration

recognition of the need to keep India ‘contented and supportive’ due to

monetary and manpower contributions

to the British

war

effort,

it

was

in

was made

its

in

crucial

in fact followed

by changes on the ground when the 1919 Montagu-Chelmsford reforms were
implemented. These reforms devolved power from the centre
the introduction of a

new

to the

constitutional structure called dyarchy. In this structure,

government functions were divided between the provinces and
controlling policy

affairs,

at

provinces through

the local

and provincial

level,

the center, with Indians

and the British holding on

to foreign

defense and the economy, matters they regarded as the central areas of policy.

At the provincial

level,

power over governmental functions was again divided between

the British and the Indians.

'Transferred' subjects like education, health, agriculture,

public works and local self-government were placed under the responsibility of Indian

ministers

who had

to

answer

to the legislature

and through

it.

the electorate. ‘Reserved’

subjects like law and order, finance, irrigation, land revenue administration and control

4

Boyce

1

999, 89-90.
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of newspapers, books and presses on the other hand, were under the control of the
British-appointed Governor and his executive

During

Mahondas

K.

this

period

in

council.'"'

which the 1919 reforms were being implemented,

Gandhi emerged

as a pivotal figure in the Indian

Congress Party and

Indian politics/' His strategy of satyagraha or peaceful resistance to perceived injustice

was

symbolic and effective means of challenging British colonial

a potently

Phases of

direct,

non-violent opposition to the Raj took place, for example, between

1920 and 1922, and between 1930 and 1934.

This method of resisting and contesting

colonial rule also alternated with participation in constitutional

While Congress’ appeal

in India spread

widely during

work of

-

“'Liberal' politicians, articulate Untouchables,

religious minorities,

the legislatures.

this period, the strength

challenge to colonial rule was diluted by the problematic issue of

national voice

rule.

its

of

its

legitimacy as the

many Muslims and

other

and India's princes and many of the substantial landowners with a

stake in the established order were deeply suspicious of Congress and resentful of

its

exclusivist claims to speak for India.”'

3

Brown

1994. 207.

h

Metcalf and Metcalf argue that the reforms might have been accepted had

it not been
powers of detention and
trial without jury that had been enforced (2002: 166). These measures evoked intense
hostility from Indians who viewed them as a bitter reward for their wartime sacrifices
and provoked protest like the effective nationwide work stoppages that were linked to
marches in major cities. Second, the failure of the British to wholly repudiate the 1919
Jalllianwalla Bagh massacre of unarmed protestors at Amritsar and the responsible
British officer led to a loss of faith in Britain's good intentions. It also became an
extremely significant symbol of colonial injustice.

for the Rowlatt

Brown

Acts which allowed the British

1998, 434.
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to maintain the

issue of constitutional reforms and the promise of self-

In Britain, the

government for India only exploded onto the

political

arena

in

1929 with the Irwin

Declaration despite the 1919 reforms and developments in India. Initiated by Lord
Irwin, the Viceroy of India, the declaration stated formally that in the British view “the

natural issue of India's constitutional progress
8

By

status.”

... is

the attainment of

Dominion

was more expansive

1929, a different definition of 'Dominion status’ that

than previously understood which had implied a measure of subordination to the British
Parliament, was already in the public domain.

this

new

definition

affairs,

though united by a

members

common

the British empire, equal in

Crown, and

freely associated as

9

ol Nations.”

The Irwin Declaration had two immediate consequences.
ongoing work of the Simon Commission, appointed
of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, moot.

Commission toured
after Irwin

India for 18

10

in

Headed by

that

Sir

to

conclude

major problems

and the lack of a true party system

Baldwin who was also

°

Moore

it

rendered the

John Simon, the

Irwin was a Liberal Tory and Viceroy of India from 1926-1931.
the position by Stanley

First,

1927 to review the effectiveness

months and was only able

had already issued his Declaration,

ineffective provincial councils,

status in

any aspect of their domestic or external

allegiance to the

Commonwealth

ot the British

in

Dominion

specifically.

meant "autonomous communities within

no way subordinate one to another

status, in

More

in

like

still

1930. months

communalism.

existed.

Since

He was nominated

to

a personal friend.

1983.

1

°Boyce 1999, 92.
appoint the
in the

was appointed

It

members

in

Tory government wanted to
possibly Liberal government coming to power

early because the

anticipation of a

next election.
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the resolution of these

problems were considered essential

path to self-government, the

Simon

for further progress in India’s

report did not endorse further reforms at that time.

Second, the Irwin Declaration quickly became the source of debate and protest
in British politics.

-

The

declaration had been possible in large part due to happenstance

a series of misunderstandings

Minister

between

Ramsay MacDonald, and

Party, allowed

it

to slip

Simon Commission,

the then

Labour Prime

Stanley Baldwin, the leader of the Conservative

through without

misunderstandings came to light

the

in the

much

1

notice.

week preceding

By
the

the time these

announcement, copies of the

Declaration had already been released to Indian leaders. Postponing or reversing

it

was

therefore impossible despite the protests of Conservative and Liberal party experts on

India and

most members of the Simon Commission.

In Britain, the battle lines

drawn

in late

November

but he had to refer

it

over the right approach to the question of India were

that year.

MacDonald supported and upheld

to the leaders of the Liberal

and Conservative parties as he lacked a

parliamentary majority. Moreover, the genesis of the 1919 Act

political parties in Britain

that

Irwin’s initiative

in a

coalition of the

and the all-party make-up of the Simon Commission dictated

MacDonald and Labour would

not be able to

make any

unilateral decisions.

P

Important figures of both the Liberal and Conservative parties strongly contested the

1

Baldwin who received it when he
w as at Bourges. en route to Aix-les-Bains, France. Assuming the agreement of the
Statutory Commission and without consulting his colleagues, Baldwin approved the

MacDonald had

sent notice of Irwin's initiative to

The Commission on the other hand, had not seen the draft statement but
MacDonald's government assumed its acquiescence as its chairman. Sir John Simon,
knew of it. Similarly, Simon assumed that the initiative had Baldwin's approval when
the Government proceeded with it.
plan.

12

Moore

1983. 11.
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Irwin Declaration and

greater

in particular, its

autonomy and independence,

seeming promise

was

a stage that

that

far in

1

government.

Birkenhead, Secretary of State for India

(

Dominion

advance of responsible

1924 - 1928) and a

the Tories, described the declaration as

making

Reading of the Liberal Party, "objected

to the declaration chiefly

view

it

as an

was however

advance

in policy

'an indication never

He supported

despite being charged “with jettisoning the empire”

15

made

self-

member

of

before.’

because Indians would

and demand early implementation.”

the pivotal exception in these ranks.

status implied

14

Stanley Baldwin

Irwin’s initiative

and more importantly, the

challenge to his leadership mounted by a Conservative-Liberal coalition.

While the Irwin

initiative

was upheld

in 1929. there

was continued and

steadily

increasing domestic opposition in Britain to any changes in the country’s India policy

over the next several years. This political battle over the question of India reached a

peak

in Britain in

eventually

1

became

934-35.

the

U
'

During

this

two-year period, the White Paper for what

Government of India Act of 1935 was
;

contested by both

its

proponents and opponents.

The

latter

scrutinized and bitterly

were

all

members of the

Conservative Party and led by Winston Churchill. This group of diehards w as
;

uncompromising

13

14

15

16

17

Moore 1983,

Moore

1

in their

opposition to these reforms, arguing that they were an

1.

1983, 12.

Moore 1983,

11-12.

Ghosh 1972,

1

17.

Reform (CMD 4268). the White Paper
was hammered out in twenty-one meetings over a marathon six-week period in late
1932 by the British government’s Cabinet India Committee.
Entitled Proposals for Indian Constitutional

61

abdication of Britain’s responsibility to India. Proponents of these reforms, also from

the Conservative Party

and led by Stanley Baldwin, were convinced

that the

implementation of these constitutional reforms would be the best and most effective

means of addressing
India.

the

grow ing demands

While both had the same goal of holding India

had very different ideas of how

The

it

independence

for self-government and

to the

in

empire, these two groups

could be achieved.

bitter battle underlines the

extreme controversy of the 1935 Act w hich

eventually passed after being the subject of approximately 2000 parliamentary
1

speeches.

Forced through by a coalition National government

former Labour leader,

Ramsay MacDonald, and underpinned by

was helmed by

that

a Conservative

majority in parliament, this Act created a federation encompassing

all

of India, and gave

Indians effective self-government at the provincial level and majority representation in
1

the central

government.

Responsibility in the areas of foreign affairs and defense was
?o

however, retained by the British."

The passage

ot this

Act was both a major loss for

diehard imperialists and a major political shift on the issue of India

in Britain as the

2

diehards did not and could not raise another battle like this again

iS

Rubinstein 2003, 64. and Pugh 1999, 242.

passed
19

?o

at that

It

became

the

not in 1947

most voluminous

bill

when

ever

time.

Pugh 1999. 242.
Boyce 1999,

93.

The constitutions

ol Britain's

white Dominions, Australia,

Zealand, and Canada formed the model for the Act though
several important w'ays.
21

-

Pugh 1992.
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it

differed

New

from them

in

Clement Attlee's Labour Government
nor

in the

timetable for British withdrawal from India

set a

1950s and 1960s when most of Britain’s colonies became independent.

The next

section of this chapter

have played a role

in the

examines several important factors

first

passage of the 1935 Act. The

final part

may

that

of the section then

focuses on the battle between the diehards and the reformers during the passage of the

act

and more generally, between 1929 and 1935. Did

superficial differences

British

this battle

merely represent

between two groups whose ultimate aim was the retention of

power and supremacy? Were domestic

interest

groups with economic stakes

India involved in influencing the positions of the diehards and the reformers?

question of India part of a cynical strategy by these two groups in their

political

power and

the leadership of the Conservative Party?

own

What was

Was

in

the

fight over

the battle

about?

2.3 Alternative Explanations

There

is

no doubt

that India

was

the British for a long period of time.

communications and

was

India

w as

power and material

interests of

a key staging post in imperial

the base of a low-cost imperial army.

Britain’s overseas trade network

It

central to the

It

also held a

key position

in

and investments which generated sterling remittances.

also a source of export of unskilled, indentured labour within the empire and a

place where Britons could find employment.

22

This importance was reflected

in their

imperial and diplomatic strategies between the Napoleonic

Wars and World War

acknowledged by men

Arthur Balfour in 1901. said:

22

Low

like

Lord Curzon who.

1997. 27; Friedberg 1988, 218; and

in a letter to

Brown

63

1998. 426.

I

and

“As long

we

as

rule India

we

are the greatest

power

in the

world. If

we

lose

it,

we

shall

'

drop

away

straight

By

to a third rate

the early part

power.”"

of the twentieth century however, the relationship was

changing. The system of indentured labor had been terminated
opportunities for expatriate

employment had decreased

....

in

1917 while

as an increasing

number of

?4

Indians joined the military, police, and civilian services.

Britain's fiscal and

commercial relationship with India was also undergoing such drastic changes
latter

became

the holder

of a sizeable sterling balance

that

was draining

?5

There

Despite these changes, there were no decisions

~

liability.

is in fact little

when

II

particular, the

made

Britain

was facing

Even

a financial Dunkirk,

economic

"

24

23

realist vein points to these

quickly eroding position in India and holding

Quoted

in

Brown

1998, 439.

Friedberg 1988. 220.

Holland 1991.

2f
’

issues,

and

in

it

did not figure in

decision-making over India.”

second argument along the

its

period after

massive debt which Britain had incurred from India, were considered by

their high political

stemming

to cut India adrift.

in the critical

“Treasury and cabinet as a ‘technical’, short-term aberration and

A

into a net

concrete evidence to suggest that material factors were primary in

British decisions regarding India's political future.

World War

Britain’s scarce

was turning

resources. Instead of shoring up Britain’s material power, India

that the

Blasted and Bridge 1994,

1

10.

64

it

reforms as a means of

to the

empire

in the

ultimate effort to maintain Britain's diminishing

power around

?7

Thus, the

the globe.

1935 Act was an inevitable or inescapable conclusion for British politicians and
policymakers and nothing more than a means of satisfying and co-opting the forces of

nationalism

in

order to prolong the British hold on India.

the relevant politicians in Britain

realist

approaches

assumption

that point to this are

that there

In reality, there

wanted India

was

to

remain

-

While

I

do not dispute

part of the empire.

incomplete because they

start

as discussed later in this section,

who

Instead, there

despite having the

the empire, had competing positions regarding

how

argue that

from the

a unitary voice representing the British state and

was no pre-formed unitary voice.

I

that

its

interests.

were two main groups,

same goal of holding

India to

these interests could be best

achieved.

Domestic-level explanations focused on groups and political parties

may

provide some insight into these competing positions. In early twentieth century Britain,
the area of Lancashire

Government of

had the most

India Act.

from the implementation of the 1935

to lose

Before 1914. Lancashire’s industries produced a quarter of
?9

all

British exports

and employed nearly a million people.

Lancashire’s continued prosperity as

textile industry,

Brown

absorbing halt of

it

was

exports/

1994; and Bridge 1986.

2S

Boyce 1999. 93; and Bridge 1984.
29

30

Muldoon 2003,
Ghosh 1972,

w as

in turn vital to

the largest market of the latter’s cotton
30

its total

India

94.

11.
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During the interwar period

however. Lancashire suffered severe economic distress and

hit particularly

Bv 1931,

the

hard due to competition from India, the United States and Japan.

unemployment

rate in

Fiscal

Lancashire was over 40 percent and the region was

in

Lancashire connected the region’s economic difficulties with the Indian

Autonomy Convention,

granted as part of the 1919 reforms which gave New'

Delhi the ability to set an independent tariff policy.

percent had been imposed on
33

cotton industry.

the 1930s

there

all

Therefore, proposals for greater Indian autonomy in the

economic or revenue

first

half of

Muldoon 2003.

94.

Muldoon 2003,

94.

Muldoon 2003,

94.

In practice, 'an
It

34

raising purposes.”

that

a nationalist India for political

During

this period.

Lancashire

indeed attempt to influence and shape the British government’s India

policy through business lobbies.

cabinets.

1931, a general duty of 25

and a duty of 15 per cent, on the

would be further imposition of import duties “by

interests did

33

British products

By

were met with great apprehension and opposition for those w ho feared

rather than

32

1

deep recession.

Many

31

cotton textile industry
'

was

in a

its

independent

The Manchester Chamber of Commerce (MCC) and

tariff policy’

did not

mean

the

same thing across

all

British

“varied from administration to administration and from Secretary of State to

Secretary of State.” Montagu, for instance, had used the convention to underline the
British

Government’s powerlessness to come to the aid in Lancashire in 1921, but Peel,
had made it clear to the government of India that he considered that the
government had the right to make ‘representations to in relation to fiscal policy

in contrast,

British

which affected British
34
to

interests” (Peele 131).

Peele 1975. 132: and

mask

Ghosh 1972.

the fact that they

were losing

1

1.

British exporters also used the Indian situation

their share

from Japan and the U.S..

66

of the market due to tough competition

the

more aggressive Cotton Trade League

in particular,
35

to eliminate or reduce the Indian tariff harrier.

Were

mounted an intensive campaign
they however, successful in

influencing and shaping the interests or the strategies of the diehards or the reformers?

The reformers, and
(

1931

-

in particular,

Samuel Hoare,

the Secretary of State for India

35), the India Office as well as the Cabinet did appear to take the concerns and

interests

of Lancashire

MPs

Hoare for example, made

seriously.

a concession to the

lobby by including Lord Derby, advocate of Lancashire Conservatism and supporter of
the region's business interests in the Joint Select

Government of

Committee examining

India Act. However, this concession

was mainly symbolic

only disliked constituency politics but was also a pragmatist

might

split the

party and drive

it

from power.

who

Derby not

Instead of giving in to these interests,

region did not cause his Indian plans to lounder in the

Lancashire lobby was hardly a monolithic entity
faction that had a

as

avoided anything that

Hoare concentrated on waging "a determined and energetic campaign

While there was a

the 1935

when

Commons."
it

came

to

ensure that the

Moreover, the

to the Indian question.

more narrow and embittered perspective on

region’s economic problems and certainly wanted to derail these reforms, there

the

was

also

35

Muldoon 2003, 95-97; and Ghosh 1972, 11.
The MCC was “an umbrella group whose members came
but from

all

not just from the textile trade,

areas of the region’s economic life” while the Cotton Trade League

was

formed
MCC as too moderate and cautious in its
approach. However, those involved with the CTL did not renounce their affiliation with
in early 1933 by a group that

the

MCC but

saw the

government’s India policy, arguing that
fiscal and otherwise” (Muldoon 97).
36

37

more

on the
India had already attained too much autonomy,

lobbied “within that body for a

Muldoon 2003, 105 and Pugh 2004,
Muldoon 2003,

144.

102.

67

direct and aggressive attack

a moderate

camp

Commerce

like

with powerful and influential figures of the Manchester

Raymond

Chamber of

and T.D. Barlow who were not only willing but co-

Streat

operated with Hoare.

The diehards could have
their

campaign against

the

strategically linked Lancashire’s

Government of

however, never harnessed by the diehards
importance of India

India

who

bill.

focused most of their energies on the

to British prestige as well as the political, moral,

himself of his belief

in free trade

was present

economic zone, an idea

if

that

If

was never able

the empire

was redeveloped

to

disavow

was being discussed by

into a British-directed

40
intellectual circles ol that period.

little

success and did not in any
41

or influence the debates over the question of India

economic

electoral interests

British

and strategic

and therefore, could not conceive the economic

At the end of the day. the Lancashire lobby met with

way dominate

to

This political potential was

aspects of the constitutional reforms. Churchill in particular,

potential that

economic issues

actors

were not

and power

Labour Party did

may

influential,

what about the

in the

1930s.

political parties

whose

be directly linked to the fortunes of the empire? The

not perceive their electoral interests during this period to be

served by adopting a stance of fervent anti -imperial ism. Generally, the interests of the

young party

38

39

40

41

laid in the validation

Muldoon 2003,

of

its

claims to be a responsible party of

104.

Pugh 2003,144.
Pugh 2003. 45.

Muldoon 2003,

96; and

Pugh 2004.

144.

68

government.

42
"

At

that time,

and disproving tears

While

it

is

being responsible entailed achieving a bipartisan approach

Labour Government would lead

that a

some segments of the Labour

true that

to the

end of empire.

Party did oppose British

colonialism for moral reasons, these reforms were also not part of the party’s careful
plan with India’s self-government and independence as the final and long-standing
44

goal.

In fact, the

work of

Carl Bridge point to

"little

historians like

J.

Gallagher, P.G. Robb, B.R. Tomlinson and

sign of selfless abdication in British constitutional reforms”
4:>

in British

policy-making between 1917 and 1947.

The Labour Party of the 1920s and

who made

his party’s India policy his

formed during the

first

early 1930s

own.

46

was

led by

MacDonald's

decade of the twentieth century and

position on India

it

who had begun

to identify

movement, MacDonald and key members of

4

“

43

Howe

1993, 46; and

Howe

1993,46.

Cook

Bridge and Blasted 1994, 94. See

Howe

4f

Robb

and discounted the

of State for India, Lord Olivier
Lord Olivier, a colonial administrator,
nationalism and would do nothing without his
).

It

(

direction.

Brasted and Bridge 1989; and Bridge 1976, 397.

69

1976; and Tomlinson 1976.

was implemented by others like
1924) and W. Wedgwood Benn (1929shared MacDonald’s diagnosis of

Brasted and Bridge 1989, and Bridge 1976. 397.

his Secretaries

47

with the Indian nationalist

1993 as well.

Brasted and Bridge 1994, 95; Gallagher 1982;

1

Unlike left-wing

his frontbench rejected

4

193

4

1975, 201.

44

’

was

remained unchanged

throughout the time he had leadership of his party and country.
factions within the party

Ramsay MacDonald

nationalism of the Indian Congress Party as "a dead-end

MacDonald

believed that India

was not

in

Indian development."

a national entity but only a geographic

expression with acute differences and divisions of caste, race and religion.
'unifying and controlling power’

MacDonald.

was needed

to

4

*

Thus, a

ensure harmony. According to

Britain had not only played this role

and ’saved" India but would have

continue as “the guardian and the nurse of India’" until a remote day in the future

it

was ready

48

to

when

°

for self-governance.

Labour’s policies during

its

two terms

in office

during the 1920s were consistent

with this view. In 1924 for example, overtures from India for a Dominion constitution,

calls to accelerate the

appointment of what eventually became the Simon Commission,

and a unanimous

by the Party for a round table conference to prepare a scheme of

call

1

self-government were either rejected or ignored by MacDonald’s government.

Labour took office
remaining

48

for the

in India until

it

second time

(

1929-1931

).

their policy

When

remained focused on

could be “launched, properly, honestly and honourably.’’

5?

Brasted and Bridge 1988. 72; and Bridge 1976. 396.

The dichotomy

Labour attitudes began with the differences in the attitudes of J.K.
th
Hardie who headed the party in the first decade of the 20 century and Ramsay
MacDonald.
in

4>

Brasted and Bridge 1988. 76.
M)

~

Brasted and Bridge 1988. 75.

M

Brasted and Bridge 1988. 80.

Brasted and Bridge 1988. 86.

70

This

is

reflected in their support of the Irwin initiative and the 1935 constitutional

reforms for India.'
For the Conservative Party, the empire had long held a central place
ideology as well as

in its

organizational and electoral interests. Generally. Conservative

its

parties had three political alternatives

due

to the

late

nineteenth century

when faced with an unenviable minority

position

expansion of the electoral base with the advent of universal suffrage

in the

As Kahler

points

out, relying

-

subclass loyalties, religion or nationalism.

on subclass loyalties had

distinct limits

due

to increasing urbanization.

Religion was also an ineffective rallying point due to secularization as well as

its

14

potential to divide

members of

a conservative coalition.'"

resistant to erosion by internal social

was indeed

the path

fairly

change.”^

Harnessing nationalism and cultivating
party

Only nationalism “was

its

status

and self-image as a national

adopted by the Conservative Party

in Britain.

Disraeli’s premiership in the late nineteenth century, imperialism

was

With Benjamin

central to their

1

politics of nationhood.'

logical

and

of India when

54

Retaining the empire would therefore have appeared to be the

rational position for such a party.

However,

'

''

it

the Conservatives did not

arose

-

have a unitary voice or position on

the ranks of the party

Blasted and Bridge 1988, 86.

Kahler 1986, 71.

Kahler 1986, 71.
56

Lynch 1999,

12-13.

71

were deeply divided on

the issue

the matter.

Proponents of these constitutional reforms like Stanley Baldwin. Lord Irwin and Sir

Samuel Hoare
different

them

tied

to British

and Indian

from those of the Labour Party’s.

interests.

In fact,

Their policies were

Baldwin’s front-bench and

Macdonald’s front bench have been described “as ditching

their "dissident factions’,

arriving at ‘a sort of interpenetration of ideas’” on the question of India/

contentious 1929 Irwin Declaration, for example, had

Conservative

who had been

come from Lord

7

and

The

Irwin himself, a

appointed by the Conservative Party.

Baldwin's 1924 general election manifesto spells out

“We

little

their attitude well:

favour the progressive grant of constitutional liberties in every part of the

Empire where the capacity and loyalty of the people

make such measures
we are no less

will

benefit to themselves and a strength to the Empire. But

a

determined to maintain the authority and the unity of the Empire against factions

and misguided agitation wherever

Reformers

like

it

may

Samuel Hoare, the main Conservative framer of

argued that constitutional reforms were the only
carried out well and skillfully, reforms

at risk

as the diehards alleged.

centre even as there

58

assert itself.”

was

way

59

to "hold India to the

would not be putting

Instead, they

a devolution of

British

would strengthen

power

the 1935 Act.

empire.””

It

dominion over India

British control at the
60

to India's provincial

governments.

Last but not least, these reforms were also considered an important part of a process

Brasted and Bridge 1988. 70; Gallagher 1982, 103-6: Kiernan 1974; and Gupta 1975.

Bridge 1986.
59

60

14.

Low

1997. 17.

Low

1997.

72

which would
dominion

making "a smooth

assist India in

transition, in the fullness of times, to

61

status.”

Neither the party’s interests nor Baldwin’s

were actually served by

this position. ~

own

political or personal interests

Baldwin laced constant challenges

to his

leadership and also critically, threats that might have been fatal to the Conservative
63

Party in the early 1930s.

William Gladstone's decision

Ireland in the late nineteenth century and

was

a parallel that

was not

were many indicators of

from

far

irrevocable
64

his

mind.

Over

for concern

at

on

India.

In

damage

In

February 1933,

resolution received by an

this

Rule for

to the Liberal Party

February 1931 for example, there was

the Central Conservative Office

66

Home

were many who disagreed with

towards the India proposals from among the party rank and

apparent.

contemplate

the course of several years, there

a possible party revolt as there

the position that he had adopted

growing cause

its

to

when growing

tile

hostility

became more

widespread unease was conveyed

in a

MP who was a close friend of Baldwin's which

constituency

stated the

following:

"The demand

for a central self-government

as a whole, but

from

comes not from

a small, noisy minority of townsfolk,

the population are not

town dwellers and 66 per cent

the people of India

whereas 89 percent of

are rural cultivators.

61

Bridge 1986,
6

"

Ball 1988,

1

viii.

12;

Middlemas and Barnes 1969, 698; and Williamson 1999. 262.

63

Rubinstein 2003. 64.
64

66

Ball 1988; and

Middlemas and Barnes 1969, 702.

Gilbert 1976, 391.

73

What

the great majority of Indians desire
,„66

is

not self-government, but firm and stable

i

rule.

Two months

later in April 1933. the

Government’s White Paper policy was rejected by

161 votes to 17 at the annual meeting of the

Horsham and Worthing Conservative

Association despite a defense put up by Lord Winterton, their

MP for the

last

29

67

years.

In

June 1933. the issue was

on a resolution which expressed

finally put to a vote

grave anxiety over the proposed transfer of the central government, the judicial system,

and the police

to the

hands of Indian ministers

at

a meeting of the Conservative Central

Council attended by more than 1200 Conservatives. While Baldwin’s win of 838 votes
to

356

after three years of constant attack

ensured that his position on the India question

could not easily be challenged within the party again,

it

so far recorded against his position on the India policy.

Opponents of the reform

like

was

still

the largest party vote

68

Winston Churchill and other diehards argued

that

they would ultimately harm Indian as well as British interests for several reasons. One.

they argued that the Indian Congress Party, considered the primary beneficiary of these

reforms, did not represent

all

of India and

was

unfit to govern.

Second, these reforms or

concessions, as they called them, was the beginning of the end of the British Empire as

66

Gilbert 1976. 467.

67

Gilbert 1976.478.
68

Gilbert 1976,483-4

74

well Britain’s leading plaee in the world.

69

Finally,

approving and implementing these

reforms would be nothing but an act of irresponsibility and cowardice.

While some have argued

that Churchill

Baldwin's position as Party leader

commitment
was

to his position

in

was using

order to assume

on India did not lead

to

it

the India issue to usurp

himself, his long-term

any personal

political gain for

isolated from his former colleagues in the Cabinet and rejected by
71

Conservative Party because of

this issue.

He

in fact,

70

many

he

within the

spent years in the political

wilderness because of his stance on the question of India. There was also no doubt

in

Churchill’s mind, according to the author of a multi-volume biography on him "that his

chosen course could only weaken

still

further his political position, and possibly destroy
7?

altogether his chance ol future political oftice."

self-interested in these actions

~

Thus, there was nothing rational or

which drove Churchill forward and sustained him

in this

much-derided course.

While
the reforms

it

and

may be tempting
its

to write off these differences

between opponents of

supporters within the Conservative Party as a normal part of

policymaking, there was nothing prosaic about them as the two

opposing sides of the divide had everything

60

70

71

Low

1997, 7; Bridge 1986,

Low

1997. 32.

On

viii;

to lose

at

representing

the personal level to

and Pugh 1999. 242.

his self-interest. Bridge 1987. 26;

and Bridge 1986. 61. For the contrary

perspective, see Gilbert 1976, 483-4.
72

and nothing

men

Gilbert 1976,483-4. See also Peele 1975, 122-3.

75

gain. In fact, the battle over India

being torn apart and

its

had also placed the Conservative Party

danger of

future, at great risk.

do not argue with many historians of the period

I

in

who

see these constitutional

reforms as the actions of a group of desperate politicians and policymakers
trying to patch up an empire that

was

in the first

who were

For theoretical

stages of decline.

perspectives that stress the structural determinants of the international system or the

importance of power
appear

understanding and explaining the behavior of

to be all that matters.

why Baldwin and
arrive

in

at

However, such conclusions exclude the

the reformers chose to

embark on

the conclusion that holding India to the

this

empire

states, this

issue of

particular path.

laid

may

how and

How

did they

with constitutional reforms

rather than in the rejection of them, the path adopted by the diehards? This difference

cannot and should not be easily dismissed for three reasons.

was
over

critically

this.

important to the two groups

who

was something

Second, the path of India’s decolonization was irrevocably

as Churchill

wished

later in 1947, to "arrest or reverse these

sense Churchill’s stricture that there

full

it

independence was true.”

was no

that

fought a long and bloody political battle

and decisions taken between 1929 and 1935 - they ensured

before

First,

set

by the events

that Britain could not,

developments.

even

In that

logical stopping point for their policy

4

Third,

outcomes

in international politics, contra

realism and neo-Realism, are not always dependent on the ultimate goal of the decision-

73

Low

1973; and Seal 1968.

74

Ball 1988. 128.

76

makers but the
7

strategies

and the means

that they

choose

order to arrive

in

at

these

''’

goals.

Before ending

this section, a final note is

necessary on the role and position of

the Conservative Party in the governing structure of Britain during the first half of the

Between 1931 and 1935, Ramsay MacDonald headed

1930s.

which had been
national

formed as a temporary measure

initially

economic

MacDonald and

crisis.

a National

government

cope with a very serious

to

Labour supporters had

a small group of

broken away from the Labour Party to form National Labour and run as a coalition with
the Conservative Party in the 1931 general election.

While MacDonald held the

premiership, the Conservative Party was the dominant

member

means and

India.

ability to influence

Conservative Party

core

won 473

and shape the policy on

seats, polled

55 per cent of the

component of the National Government of the 1930s.

Indian policy depended

upon

therefore important because

from India on a different route
radical

°

changes

in the future.

that

it

in the

total

7h

Thus, the success of any

was not only

Had Baldwin

issue.

different but

lost the leadership

for far

more

of the Conservative Party

norms were important

factors

adoption of a defensive rather than an offensive position, and the

example of

this.

76

Powell 2002, 155.
77

Baldwin’s victory

would allow

construction of the seriously flawed Maginot Line in post-World
strategy is an

vote and formed the

placed Britain’s road to disengagement

Kiel’s 1997 argument that culture and organizational

which resulted

In the election, the

the attitudes of the Conservative Party and the extent to

which the Tory leader could contain any rebellion over the
in this battle is

of this coalition with the

Veerathappa 1976. 100.

77

War French
I

military

in the early 1930s, a distinct probability then, the path

in India

leading to the end of British rule

could have been extremely different, characterized perhaps, by

resistance

from London.

much

greater

S

In the rest of this chapter,

I

examine why and how having the same goal of

holding India to the empire led to such a chasm between the diehards and the reformers.
In other

words,

how

did the

same goal of retaining India produce two

policies

which

were not only extremely different but irreconcilable for the two groups? Why,
critically,

did these differences take the form that they did? Section 2.4 embarks on this

task by first outlining the arguments

I

made by each of

these two groups regarding India.

focus on arguments as they are one of the main processes by which actors

politics attempt to

communicate and persuade others

2.4 Contesting Britishness

2.4.1 Churchill, the

79

and Constitutional Reforms for India

Diehards and An Unchanging India

circles included retired officials like Sir

Sir

world

ol their position.

Besides Winston Churchill, the most prominent of these diehards

Know,

in

in

government

Michael O' Dwyer. Lord Syndenham, Sir Alfred

Reginald Craddock. Professor Charles

Oman

and Lord Lloyd. Members of

Parliament like Henry Page-Croft. William H. Davison. Victor Raikes, the Duchess of
Atholl. Sir Robert Horne. Patrick Donner,

Commander

7S

/

>

Low

P.G.

Agnew

Alan Lennox-Boyd. H. Brendan-Bracken and

and members of the House of Lords

like

Lord Salisbury.

1997, 33.

Crawford 2002. On

the importance of

communicative action and language, see Risse

2000 and Mattern 2005.

78

Midleton. Burnham, Edward Carson, Hartington, Sumner and FitzAlan.

80

These

diehards also formed pressure groups like the Indian Empire Society and the India
1

Defence League
officials, the

to

oppose the proposed reforms.

Comprised mainly of

former’s main activity consisted of publishing

its

retired

monthly journal. The

Indian Empire Review and working with the diehards. This group worked closely with
the Indian

Defence League which had been founded by some Conservative

MPs

image

as an

bolster the effectiveness of their position as the Society had a public

to

organization of administrators and officials with a rigid view on India.

In fighting

Baldwin and the reformers’ proposals

to grant responsibility at the

centre and the transfer of responsibility for law and order to the control of ministers in

made

the provinces, the diehards

would repeat throughout
First, the

all

several

main arguments regarding India which they

of the six years that these reforms were being debated.

diehards insisted that Britain was bound by duty and a historic mission “to

bring peace and good government to India.”

82"

Besides being a necessary part of India's

development, the diehards also made the crucial claim

most important factor
83

and intestine war.”

8(1

81

8

“

in reversing the sub-continent

The noble

sacrifices

that British rule

had been the

from "ages of barbarism, tyranny,

and sense of duty of “four or five generations

Studdert-Kennedy 1998; and Ghosh 1972.

Ghosh 1972,27.
Middlemas and Barnes 1969, 541

81

House of Commons Debates 247. c.702 (26 January
See also the same arguments made by A. Knox, House of Commons Debates.
372 (3 December 93 ); and Marsden. House of Commons Debates 276. c.

Churchill 1931, 30; Churchill,

1931

260.

).

c.

1

1

,

.

1

1755 (22 February 1933).

79

of the best British race" had banished war from India, defended her frontiers against
invasion from the north, controlled famine and developed a system where a district
facing crop failure would be able to draw on surpluses from another, and implemented
the rule of law

where justice was served impartially regardless of race or

Moreover, the British had brought the wonders of medicine and science
population, improving their health and mortality rates.

However,

the diehards insisted that Britain’s

the ‘achievements’ they

had

listed in

caste.

to a 'helpless'

84

work was

far

from over despite

bringing ‘civilization’ to India.

A

all

second and

pivotal part of their arguments rested on their insistence that the facts in India were

timeless and unchanged.

“What

85
In a

speech

are the facts in India?

at the

We

House

ot

Commons.

Churchill insisted:

are told that the opinion of India has changed.

But the facts of India have not changed. They are immemorial.”

What
diehards

?

86

then were these timeless and immemorial “facts' according to the

The most important of these were what

they considered the inherent and

irreconcilable differences in appearance, customs, habits, language and faith of

Punjabis, Gurkhas, Jats. Pathans. and others across the sub-continent.

argued,

was populated by

religion

and with

84

"great

masses of people of utterly divergent views upon

utterly different outlooks

Churchill 1931, 30; and

India, they

upon

life

and

who

are utterly

contemptuous

Ghosh 1972,30-32.

S

Henry Page Croft. House of Commons Debates, 260, c.1832 (3 December 1931 );
Churchill, House of Commons Debates, 260. c. 382- 3; c. 13 14- 13 17 (3 December
1

1931).

86
c.

Churchill 1931. 39-40. See also Henry Page Croft.

1382

(3

December

1931).

80

House of Commons Debates, 260.

of the ways and habits of one another.’*
divisions in India were the cause of

was 'unimaginable*

primitive hate that

“We

They considered

“fierce racial

who have

undeniable that these

it

and religious dissensions” and a

to the British.

cannot easily conceive what these hatreds

neighbours, people
lives,

its

87

dwelt together

There are mobs of

are.

in the closest

who. when held and dominated by these passions,

pieces,

men,

women

proquinity

will tear

all

their

each other to

88
'

and children with

their fingers.”

Therefore, the diehards had a model of South Asian society where communities
S

dominated by systems of irreconcilable religious

beliefs

Henry Page-Croft for example, pointed unceasingly

were constantly

to the

'

in conflict.

Moplah massacres, of Hindus

by Muslims, and the Cawnpore massacre, of Muslims by Hindus, as incontrovertible
c

prool

90

.

,

this.

With these

'facts’

regarding deep and ancient divisions based on caste and

religion in India, the diehards concluded that there

presumption of medieval wars”

91

would be "the immediate

without the British there to maintain peace, order and

87

House of Commons Debates 260. c. 1382 (3 December 193 ); Henry Page
House of Commons Debates 260, c. 1380-1 (3 December 1931 ): R. Craddock,
House of Commons Debates 260, c.l 198 (2 December 1931 ); Colonel A.W. Goodman
House of Commons Debates 260. c. 1354-5 (3 December 1931 and 297. c. 1401-12 (7
February 1935): A. Knox, House of Commons Debates 260, c. 1370 (3 December
1931) and 297. c. 190 (6 February 1935): and Wolmer, House of Commons Debates
276, c.89 10 December 1934).
Churchill.

1

,

Croft,

,

,

,

)

.

.

1

(

See also Studdert-Kennedy 1990, 344-347: Gilbert 1976. 243.
88

Churchill,
89

House of Commons Debates 260.
,

Studdert-Kennedy 1998, 347.

K)

Studdert-Kennedy 1998. 347.
91

Churchill 1931, 35.

81

c.

1297-8

(3

December 1931

).

India, in other

stability.

constitutional reforms

governance
the

in

many

words,

still

needed rescuing from

92
"

areas of Indian

Based on these

life

would be the beginning of a slippery slope

that

second

population

country and

their

demands

for

its

emerged continually

in their

93

94

speeches and arguments was

withdrawal came from an insignificant fraction of the Indian

who were

either “a

few

95

agitators with goat

96

Instead of representing

leaders of Indian

inhabitants

independence was

and

loin cloth"

wielding Western ideas that had “no relation whatever to the

India."

its

and the end of British colonial rule considered far too premature.

'fact' that

that calls for British

rip the

to

and castes, was not and could never be a nation.

The legitimacy of Indian nationalism and

A

would

diehards argued unwaveringly that India, with

'facts’, the

different classes, religions, languages

therefore, dismissed

the proposed

-

and the subsequent withdrawal of British influence and

re-emergence of these differences

apart.

itself

all

of India, the

life

‘

or those

and thought of

members of this

elite,

usually the

Congress Party - merely represented "those Indians who have

acquired a veneer of western civilization, and have read

all

those books about

)_

Studdert-Kennedy 1990, 344. Gilbert 1976. 243: and Churchill, House of Commons
Debates 260. c. 1297-8 (3 December 1931).
,

Churchill, House of Commons Debates 260. c. 1380-1 (3 December 1931 ). See also
Henry Page Croft, House of Commons Debates 260. c. 1380-2 (3 December 1931 );
Croft (1948) and Croft 1932).
^

,

,

(

4

Churchill 1931. 40-2: and Minutes of the Annual Conservative Party Conference. 6

and 7 October 1932.

h

Page-Croft quoted

% Churchill

in

Ghosh

1972. 27.

1931.40.

82

democracy which Europe

is

now beginning

97

to discard.”

believed that the constitutional reforms would only usher

elected, political

enacted, the diehards

If

in a

"well-organized, narrowly

and religious Brahmin oligarchy and caucus.”

ensue would not be

"‘India for the Indians" but “India for a

The diehards

98

Hence, what would

very few Indians."

also insisted without any self-consciousness that the

India needed Britain’s protection from the elite minority

99

masses

who were clamoring

in

for self-

government and independence instead of from them, the colonizers. The sixty million
untouchables

in the

described them

Indian caste system, for example, were invoked. Churchill

as:

“a multitude as big as a nation, men.

women and

of the status of humanity. Their plight

have been taught

to

is

children deprived of

worse than

that

consent not only to a physical but

hope and

of slaves because they

to a

psychic servitude and

„ioo
prostration.

Should the 1935 Government of India Act be enacted and the impartial protection of the
British

removed, the diehards argued

that the

untouchables would be utterly powerless

91

Churchill 1931, 96.
98

Churchill

(

1931: 35). See also Henry Page Crolt.

House of Commons Debates 260.
.

1382-3 (3 December 1931 ): R. Craddock, House of Commons Debates, 260. c.l 192 (2
Dec 1931 ): Wolmer, House of Commons Debates 276. c.89 10 December 1934); and
A. Knox. House of Commons Debates 297, c.l 197 (6 February 1935).
,

(

,

" Churchill
100

1931, 96.

Gilbert 1976, 399-400.

The invocations of

Afghan women during the US campaign in
lines. While this is not an argument that Afghan women

the plight of

Afghanistan follows similar

had been subjugated and treated
been used

like objects,

in this instance for political

it

should not negate the fact that they had

purposes as well.

83

c

“to control or to

make

their

“to a bearable existence

own

affairs

deny them

kp~

all

by the

felt

as the Hindus, they argued,

human

final

their

new

101

The

rulers.’'

“would tyrannize

10

rights.”

in

'

Hence, they insisted again and again

India as

it

was

still

in India

for their

the untouchables, and

that

was

it

plagued by severe issues.

key component of the arguments was the connection

between remaining

latter’s rights

would be swept away once Indians became responsible

morally their duty to remain

The

wishes

that they

made

and Britain’s greatness as a nation. India was central

to the

mark and
organism would pass

“glory and strength of the British empire. The loss of India would

consummate

the downfall of the British empire.

stroke out of
„ 104
recovery.
at a

Without

India,

it

life into history.

From such

The

great

a catastrophe there could be

10

would “cease forever

reforms were considered a catastrophic

to exist as a Great

act

Power.”

'"'

no

The proposed

from which “there could be no recovery,”
107

a 'hideous act of self-mutilation astounding to every nation in the world’

and a

101

See also
Churchill. House of Commons Debates 247. c. 698-9 (26 Jan 1931
comments by Colonel Gretton. House of Commons Debates 260. c. 1336-7 (3
December 1931).
).

,

,
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Gilbert 1976. 356-8.
103

Gilbert 1976, 356-7.

104
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Churchill, House of Commons Debates, 260. c. 1296 (3 December 1931
Page Croft. House of Commons Debates 274, c.1753 (22 February 1933).
,

106
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Middlemas and Barnes 1969, 583.
Middlemas and Barnes

1969. 583.

84

);

and H.

106

‘scuttle’

from Empire
108

was tantamount

would destroy any claims

superiority,

valiant in

to

an abdication of Britain’s leading place in

Leaving India would be cowardly, dishonourable and shameful, an

the world.

that

that

all

elements of

to the country’s morality, courage,

greatness.

its

would

It

forests of his

into

something

former glory.”

that could

now

benevolence, and

turn "the British lion, so fierce and

bygone days, so dauntless and unconquerable through

Armageddon”

act

all

the

agony of

be "chased by rabbits from the fields and

10)

diehards argued that the masses needed the British to provide

In general, the

them with the peace, order and justice
10

narrowly spent livelihood^].”'

The

enabled them to continue “their humble and

that

elite

minority

in India

who were demanding

for

self-government would never bring this about for they were, crucially, depicted and
contrasted against the British by the diehards as being narrowly self-interested,

untrustworthy, incompetent and uncivilized. These elites were "a comparatively small

and

utterly unrepresentative political faction”

of “misgovernment, of deterioration

in

who would

place the masses on the altar

every public service, of religious bigotry of a
1

kind not dreamed of for generations in the West, and finally of

civil

1

Thus, the

war.”

diehards argued that Britain had no right to deliver India into the hands of these elites.

1

1

OX

09

Low

1997. 17.

On

other diehards, see Studdert-Kennedy 1990.

James 1970, 224. See

also

Henry Page

Croft,

House of Commons Debates 260.
.

1384(3 December 1931).
1

10

Churchill,

House of Commons Debates 247,
,

"'Churchill 1931, 78.

85

c. 698-9

(26 Jan 1931

).

c.

Instead, Britain had the duty, responsibility and obligation to create the conditions that

would bring about:
"peacelul existence and progress to about three hundred and fifty millions of
helpless primitive people who are separated by an almost measureless gulf from
the ideas and institutions of the western world.”

Abrogating

this responsibility

would also be

1

12

the beginning of the

end of the

greatness of Great Britain.

2.4.1.

The Indian ‘Other’ and

1

What was
These

the Construction of British Greatness

the basis of these facts

'facts' that the

and arguments brandished by the diehards?

diehards insisted again and again about India, the corresponding

consequences should the British withdraw and the need
itself

and

to rescue the sub-continent

were not based on a complete or accurate understanding of Indian

politics.

A

key piece

in the

diehards’ representation of India

was

from

history, society

that

it

was

a place

of deep divisions, unimaginable primitive hatreds and characterized by ‘barbaric
practices’.

India’s diversity

was undeniable

at that

time.

It

was and

is

an area of great

geographic, economic and social diversity with a large population of distinctive regional

identities,

1

Europe.

1

“

13

languages and vernaculars spread across a territory the size of western

However, Indian society was never

static,

timeless and unchanging as

House of Commons Debates 260, c. 372
(3 December 1931 ); Henry Page Croft. House of Commons Debates 260, c.1384 (3
December 1931 and 274. c. 1753 (22 February 1933); and William Davison. House of
Churchill 1931, 95-6. See also A. Knox,

,

,

)

Commons
113

Brown

Debates. 297

,

c.

1424-6 (7 February 1935).

1998, 426-7.
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1

depicted by the diehards as well as other colonial observers and scholars

-

“what was

seen in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as traditional was often not of
114

Muslims

generations standing.

example of the

inevitability of

in India, often singled out

communal

politics,

many

by the diehards as an

were not calling in the early 1930s

for "a nationhood defined by religion: merely distinctive status needing safeguards in a

political

world where numbers become increasingly important.”

development of an all-Indian Muslim

politics,

1

18

A

simple linear

claiming nationhood for Muslims just did

,116
not, exist.
•

In fact, the British

had played a larger role

social identities of Indians through their

religious identification and

its

own

in constructing the political

understanding of Indians

in

and

terms of

subsequent institutionalization through their
1

implementation of various

One

political processes

and structures which emphasized them.

17

of these processes was in the decennial censuses in India where the population was
1

counted and categorized by religion and by

18

caste.

Besides this problematic understanding of Indian society, the diehards were also

unable to accept or understand that changes were taking place

form of political participation and
Congress as a
114

1

15

116

1

1

1

political party.

Browm

1998. 427.

Brown

1998. 435.

Brown

1998, 434.

Brown

1

the

in

Indian politics in the

development and evolution of the Indian National

The 1919 reforms had begun

to

slowly change the make-

998, 434.

1

This practice

is

sharply different from censuses conducted in Britain.

87

up of the governing and decision-making structures of the Raj.

367 Indian

men

in the

.

1

By

1929, there were

Indian Civil Service alongside 894 Europeans. Indians also

formed a large part of the
echelons of the

1

military, the police force, the courts as well as the

.

.

civil service.

lower

120

Moreover, the enlargement of legislatures

the provincial capitals, the acquisition of a majority

measure of influence over finance ensured
and decision-making, as defined by the

by elected Indians and a large

that Indians

British.

Delhi and

in

had experience

in

government

At the same time, a wide range of

people, e.g. educated professionals, landowners, large and petty businessmen and

substantial farmers

in the

were channeling

their political interests into the

new

political arenas

provinces “because the power on offer there, though limited, was none the less
121

significant.”

A more

democratic, electorally-oriented culture was evolving and
1

would “profoundly influence

styles of successful politics

The Indian National Congress was

in

and

1914, "a loose organization and often

divided federation of local, educated men, predominantly Hindus,

make

limited political demands.”

political party

down

119

120

121

122

123

Its

annually to

attempts in the 1920s to re-organize

were admittedly, unsuccessful. By the

1998. 430.

Brown 1998. 425.
Brown 1998. 430.

Brown 1998.432.

Brown

who met

itself as

with widespread appeal and organizational structures from the centre

to the village level

Brown

123
~

1998. 432.

88

22

political organization."

late

1930s however,

a

Congress had begun “to resolve these problems related

demand.”

formed the governments
and perhaps most

more ideological

125
labels.” "

When compared
is

it

It

and
to

had achieved electoral success by 1937-39,

had “become the natural

in politics

a party of self-interested

politics,

It

seven provinces, assembled a leadership of all-India figures

in

critically,

most Hindus interested

and

^4

1

as a voice of national

to its status both as a party

political

environment

in

which

chose to function, rather than adopting independent or

was

elitist

therefore, quite inaccurate to portray

them merely

as

Brahmins.

such far more accurate renderings of Indian society and

tempting to accuse the diehards of gross distortions and dishonesty in their

polemical reviews of the facts about India and "their hysterical insistence on the
1

catastrophic consequences of granting Indian control

conclusion

is

at

Such a

the centre."

too premature as the diehards, their arguments and their beliefs must be

placed within a larger context. Their views of India were not unique but
within a larger and almost

homogeneous

the twentieth century. This

British

view of India

difference and

assumed

racial superiority

civil lines,

or supremely in

hill

stations

the British

and capacity.

were demonstrated

of residence, apart from their Indian subjects,
of

that existed at the start of

view underlined India’s difference from

“in religion, morals, society and political identity

in

embedded

In India,

in British

patterns

'white town’, in the bungalows

where they took

their holidays in an

environment as nearly like home as they could contrive. These assumptions

were also evident

124

12

"

126

Brown

1998, 432.

Brown

1998, 432.

in the racially

Studdert- Kennedy 1998. 348;

Ghosh

self-contained

life

of the British, whose

1972, 30-31; Ball 1988.

29.

89

1

17;

and Bridge 1987.

standards and hierarchies were policed by the memsahibs as guardians of

English domesticity and gentility. The reverse of
society, particularly

Hindu customs,

a distaste

this

was a

distaste for Indian

which focused on

religion, caste

and the treatment of Indian women. Indian society w as seen as decadent,
irrational, and dominated by religion. In political terms, Indians were seen as
almost irrevocably divided by religion, caste and language, lacking the civic
virtues of Victorian bourgeois England,

sentiment or self-determination.”

and incapable of either national

127

India and other British colonies served as the site of difference against which a

dominant strand of British

identity

were often depicted and portrayed

academic

treatises as

w as

constituted and constructed.

in official reports, the

backward with economic and

British colonies

media, popular books and

political

systems that were either

non-existent, substantially undeveloped or despotic and tyrannical. Socially and

culturally, the inhabitants of these colonies

universal

scheme of things

were often

as barbaric, irrational

classified

and fixed

in the

and childlike with no means of

advancing or progressing without centuries of external tutelage and help. The colonies,
in

other words, were on the lowest rung of the civilizational ladder due to inherently

flawed national characteristics or culture.

127

128

Brown

1998. 425-6.

....

This was no different from other European states with empires during the eighteenth,

nineteenth and twentieth centuries. For a general overview, see

Cooper and

Stoler

1997.

An

on the subject also argues that British identity, first constructed
through shared Protestantism and against the “Other” of Catholic France in a succession
of major wars during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, was further strengthened
influential treatment

through the shared participation of the English. Scots and Welsh (and to a certain
degree, the Irish) in the imperial enterprise which marginalized the differences between

them (Colley 1992, 311).
The literature on the formation of British identity is vast and covers a broad historical
period. For a good review of the different theoretical perspectives in the literature, see
Connors 2001.

90

highlighted the rationality and growing capacity of their

In contrast, the British

stable

and enlightened

political

system, and system of law. Economically, they

contrasted their economic growth, industrialization and high standard of living with the

poverty of their colonies. Their advances in science, technology and areas of medicine

were also held up as proof of
of

women

against

Socially, they contrasted their treatment

their superiority.

some of the

practices in their colonies, and highlighted their moral

leadership in banning the slave trade and encouraging the spread of Christianity through

the

work of missionaries and

129

their civilizing activities.

These economic,

political,

technological, organizational, ideological and cultural differences were considered

proof of their inherent superiority and place on the top rungs of civilization.

Through these Self/Other mechanisms
colonies were the Other, the British Self

conqueror,

humane judge, and

which

in

the less civilized

was presented and constructed

civilizing agent

-

politically,

and developed

as the heroic

economically, socially and

morally exceptional people w ho had an unquestioned and “leading role as an agent of

civilization

and progress.”'

British character

°

Britishness

and ideas and the view

was thus equated with

that they

had

the superiority of

a special duty to fulfill in the

world because history had thrust a certain destiny upon them.'

By

the

middle of the

nineteenth century, for example, this vision of Britain as not only having the right but

the need to

“remake mankind

in its

own image” was

shared by a wide swath of British

129

Powell 2002, 96.
1

°

Colley 1992, 325. The importance of the empire

identity
131

is

in the

formulation of British

widely recognized by historians. See Davis 1999.

Kumar 2003,

196; Powell 2002, 118-19; and

91

Wallace 1991.

society.

and

132
"

later

This was expressed quite succinctly by Lord Palmerston, Foreign Secretary

Prime Minister who

civilization.

Our

Besides

task

this

is to

said:

lead the

mechanism,

“We

stand

way and

there

at

the

to direct the

were other

sustained this construction of British identity.

cultural

.134

twentieth centuries. “

and high culture

and

political processes

the lack of factual

their overseas possessions,

in Britain

which

from the eighteenth

to the

was

at

mid-

Imperial themes were implicitly and explicitly, a vital and

intrinsic part of British art, literature

Stories, images, sounds,

political

march of other nations.”

The empire, despite

knowledge which ordinary Britons possessed about
the heart of “both popular

head of moral, social and

and music, the high culture of the nation.

and sentiments of the empire were also present

everyday things ranging from tea towels, biscuit

tins,

in

135

common,

soap advertisements, young

children’s adventure stories to music hall jingles.

Political processes initiated

by the Conservative Party under Benjamin Disraeli
I

were also important

in

maintaining

this constitution

of British identity.

speech to the National Union of Conservative Associations

L'

'

1

34

Friedberg

1

Quoted

in

Friedberg 1984, 27.

Kumar

2003, 195. See books

136

’

In a

famous

the Crystal Palace in

984. 27.

in the

Manchester University Press edited by John

MacKenzie.
135

at

(

See Said 1993.

Lynch 1999,

13.
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June

1872. Disraeli stated that the empire

was not only one of the

party’s three great

objectives but fundamental to Britain's raison d’etre.

“When you

homes, when you return to your counties and your
cities, you must tell to all those whom you can influence that the time is at hand,
that, at least, it cannot be far distant, when England will have to decide between
national and cosmopolitan principles. The issue is not a mean one. It is whether
you will be content to be a comfortable England, modelled and moulded upon
continental principles and meeting in due course an inevitable fate, or whether
you will be a great country, - an imperial country - a country where your sons,
when they rise, rise to paramount positions, and obtain not merely the esteem of
their countrymen, but command the respect of the world. ..You have nothing to
trust but the sublime instinct of an ancient people. You must act as if everything
depended on your individual efforts. The secret of success is constancy of
purpose. Go to your homes, and teach there, these truths, which will soon be
imprinted the conscience of the land... you will deliver to your posterity, a land
of

return to your

of prosperity, of power, and of glory.”

liberty,

In the years that

followed, they did their best to redeem this pledge with the

expansion and defense of the British empire as guides
policy.

During the

late

expansion

War was
in the

in pursuit

Balkans. In 1878, war

to the

in

foreign and economic

Southern Africa was annexed

of a scheme to create a South African

threatened against the Russians in 1877 to prevent the latter’s

was waged
I

Russian threat

in their

Victorian period, the Transvaal

and war was declared on the Zulus
federation.

137

S

North-West Frontier.

spectacular proclamation of

Queen

against Afghanistan to forestall the

These

policies, together with the

Victoria as Empress of India in

outward projections of a British identity and national

1

876.

became

interests during the late nineteenth

century that was synonymous with a “spirited engagement with opportunities and

1

T.E. Kebbel (ed.). Selected Speeches of the Earl of Beaconfield (London. 1882), Vol.
II,

ns

pp 529-534.
Powell 2002, 107.

93

commotions abroad; rugged leonine
1

patriotism; land a] doctrine of adventure and

^9

pluck."

The diehards' arguments about

Britain’s destiny to extend benevolent

and

enlightened rule to the ’chaotic’ masses of India and to spread civilization and progress

throughout the world was part of a process rooted

argument and rhetoric which

in

contributed to maintaining an idea of British greatness that

was

built

and constructed

against the difference and 'Otherness' of India. Crucially, a key part of being British, as

conceived by the diehards. involved much more than

this.

arguments, the

In their

diehards focused explicitly on the consequences of passing these reforms for what

would mean

The following passage

to be British.

“At present the Government of India

which

is

world.

To

is

is

particularly revealing:

responsible to the British Parliament

unwise and the most democratic parliament

the oldest, the least

in the

transfer that responsibility to this highly artificial and restricted

oligarchy of Indian politicians would be a retrograde

shameful

it

act.

It

would be an

act

act.

It

would be a

of cowardice, desertion and dishonour.

It

would bring grave material evils, both upon India and Great Britain; but it would
upon Great Britain a moral shame which would challenge for ever the
reputation of the British Empire as a valiant and benignant force in the history of
mankind. The faithful discharge of our duty in India is not only a cause, but a
bring

symbol.

It

is

the touchstone of our fortunes in the present difficult time.

cannot do our duty

in India,

require to do

now

is

we

be sure

preserve the vast Empire which

still

to stand erect

shall

centres

If

we

have shown ourselves unworthy

upon

this island.

and look the world

...

in the face,

to

What we
and do our

140

duty without fear or favour.”

There
be measured

is

in

no doubt

that a country’s greatness

certainly something that could

material terms. Churchill for example, did

much diminished Holland of the

139

was

draw a

parallel

between the

twentieth century and a Britain without India:

Holland 1991.

140

Churchill 1931,97.

94

“The

loss

of India, however arising, would be

to be a part of a process

fail

and

final

which would reduce us

Power. Holland, once our equal, was outmatched
sturdy domestic strength, and

became

At the same time. Britain was slowly losing

fatal to us.

longer had the same role

it

had

Britain

With

which then enabled the

the

economic changes,

imports by 1939.

42

Moreover. India no

to

meet her

deficit with

her accounts with other trading partners.

India’s surpluses with industrial nations like Britain

used lor deficits with countries that had become her source of raw materials.
Britain could no longer

depend on

its

current

her

of trade settlements. In the

most of the world was used

latter to settle

all

share of the India market, accounting for

in the international pattern

past. India’s trade surpluses with

of

a small continental state.”

its

total

in spite
141

1

only 30.5 percent of the sub-continent's

world

could not

of a minor

to the scale

in the

It

economic relationship with

were

143

Thus.

India to settle

144
its

deficits with the rest of the world.

Despite these changes, economic issues were rarely brought up

in the

discussions or arguments of the diehards during this period. Their approach to the

severe economic problems in Lancashire

importance

economic
Indian

that they

sector

autonomy

is

particularly noteworthy for the lack of

placed on them. Lancashire, as discussed

in

section 2.3. had an

which was greatly dependent on trade with India but changes giving
to

make

decisions regarding tariffs as a result of provisions from the

1919 reforms adversely affected the relationship. Yet. the diehards did not make much

141

Churchill 1931, 81-2.
142

143

144

Brown

1994, 262-3.

Brown

1994, 262-3.

Brown

1994, 262-3.
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of these issues, an indication here that economic issues or material factors more
generally, are

sometimes only

as important as the political actors

For the diehards, Britain’s actions

in India

were

make them

out to be

instead, significant for they

were a ‘symbol' and a ‘touchstone’ of who the British were. Allowing the passage of
these constitutional reforms were characterized not as an indicator of Britain's material

decline as a world

our strength

is

power

but rather as the decline of will and character: “It

seriously impaired.

We

the victims of a nervous collapse, of a

are suffering

morbid

from

is

not that

a disease of the will.

We

are

145

state of

mind."

These reforms were

other words, due to the “weak-minded and defeatist tendency of our present politics”
147

and the “lack of self-confidence and moral strength."

in

146

Thus, what was necessary was

a “fundamental change in the intellectual and moral attitude of Great Britain and of the

Government of
face of

148

India....”

demands from

This could only be accomplished by standing firm

in the

India and rejecting any proposals for constitutional reforms

proposed by other members of the British government.
Therefore, these reforms were against British interests not only because India

needed

to

be rescued from

perform and

fulfill its

rule to the ‘chaotic’

145

146

itself

but because being British entailed staying there to

mission and duty to extend benevolent and enlightened British

masses of

its

empire.

In

other words, Britain's identity as a truly

James 1970, 224.
Churchill 1931.40-2.

147

Churchill 1931,47.
I4S

Churchill 1931, 76; and Studdert-Kennedy 1990,350.
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great nation of exceptional people and character could not be separated

from

its

actions

vis-a-vis India.

Baldwin, the Refomers and a Changing India

2.4.2

Fighting and leading the other side of the political battle over India were Stanley

Baldwin, Lord Irwin, Samuel Hoare, Oliver Stanley, Geoffrey Dawson, Sir John

Thompson,

Edward

Sir

Villiers. Sir

Alfred Watson, Sir Laurie

Hugh McPherson, Lord Goschen

Brabourne, Sir

Hammond. Lord

as well as the Union of Britain

and

India an organization set up by retired officials with recent experience in India to
,

provide information on the White Paper proposals and counter the propaganda of the
14

’

diehards.

The

actual substance of the reforms that

were being advocated reveal

that there

were certain principles underlying the Indian constitutional settlement. The main
dominant principle

in the report is the

idea that political and social change should be

“ordered, gradual and a direct reflection of the nature of the social system to be

governed.”

150

In the introduction to the

White Paper written by Conservative

1934 Joint Select Committee Report for the

MP

Lord Eustace Percy,

this principle is

very

clear:

14

Ghosh

1972.

experience

9.

Due

in India,

the

to their deliberate restriction

UBI sought

body of experts on Indian
of the intra-party struggle,

affairs.
i.e.,

of membership to

men

with

image as an organization with a
The UBI was very active during the most vital period
to create a public

from June 1933

to

December

1934.

when its speakers
UBI Weekly

addressed on an average almost one meeting a day and published the
Bulletin.
150

Bridge 1976, 179.
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“If, then, the
is

long collaboration of Englishmen and Indians during recent years

to result in the

enactment of a Constitution which

under Indian conditions,

we

will

work

successfully

do well to discard theories and analogies and
instead, to base our scheme on the government of India as it exists today.... The
safest hypothesis on which we can proceed, and the one most in accordance with
our constitutional history,

shall

is that

government of India

the future

will be

successful for an old one. but the natural evolution of an existing government

and the natural extension of

151
its

past tendencies.”

While these evolutionary views of

mean

and constitutional change should

political

the absence of criteria for correctness in constitutions, the framers of the report

did not conclude that India

government.

was completely

free to

develop her

own form

of

Samuel Hoare, during the Round Table Conference and the deliberations

of the joint committee, specified the prerequisites necessary for the formation of a
1

unitary cabinet and self-government.

to

all

^'

The

first of

have a sense of national consciousness. Second,
sectional concerns

which threaten national

indicator of an emergent national identity

unity.

was

the

these requirements

this

A

was

consciousness had
third requirement

development of

for a nation

to override

and an

political parties

divided on broad economic and ideological lines appealing to a relatively homogeneous

electorate.

These prerequisites were
political

really based

on an idealized understanding of Britain’s

development. For the reformers, Britain was able

to "build a strong

1

constitution which both assured national identity and guaranteed freedom"

’

due

15

Report of the Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform
(London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1934). p.8.
152

Bridge 1976. 182.
153

Bridge 1976. 181.
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.

vol.

I

(Part

I).

to its

homogeneous population, small
examining

size,

and freedom from foreign invasions.

the conditions in India, the Conservative constitution-makers

a start toward the development of responsible

conditions had not been reached.

which was balanced by a

154

In

concluded

government had been made but

that

that these

Hence, the devolution of power to the provinces

stable conservative coalition in the centre

1

responsibility to be learned and for these prerequisites to be met.

would enable

“

The

constitutional

reforms for the 1935 Government of India Act were designed and engineered to create

and support the development of the requirements of

While these reforms were not implemented

this

model.

immediate end of

to bring about the

British rule in India, the substance of these reforms also indicate that there

them than a means of prolonging the

British hold

on

India.

was more

to

Notably, the forty-two

meetings conducted by the Cabinet Committee on India were focused on working out
constitutional measures and governing institutions

which were thought

to be

most

1:56

suitable for the economic, social and political conditions in India.

ran counter to the pessimism of the

Simon

report and

it

Declaration of 1917. While

differed from the

Canada

in areas like the

it

was modeled on

was parliamentary and reaffirmed

of the Dominions. Moreover,

Generally, the Act

Dominion

the

the constitutions

Montagu

status of Australia

Governor-General’s retention of power over foreign

defense, these reforms, as noted bv Sir

Thomas

and
affairs

Inskip, the Solicitor-General then,

were

|S4

Bridge 1976, 184.
lx"

I

f
’

Bridge 1976. 183.

CAB

27/520. Cabinet Committee on India (16 March 1932 - 12 February 1935).
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and

Dominion within

“'not inconsistent with the ultimate attainment of the position of a

r

•

Empire.

the

,,,157

In public arenas like

Party. Baldwin.

arguments

parliamentary debates and meetings of the Conservative

Hoare and other reformers defended these constitutional reforms with

that point to different ideas

differences

was

in their

about India.

acknowledgment

place and were irreversible.

158

In

One of

that political

the

most apparent

developments

India

in

an important speech to the House of

had taken

Commons

defending the proposals after the publication of the White Paper against the increasingly
vociferous and unrelenting attacks from the diehard faction of his

own

party.

Baldwin

stated:

“The unchanging East is not unchanging .... There is a yeast at work in the
whole of the East, and India cannot be isolated. The yeast is working there.
not the India of our childhood; it is not the India of our young manhood; it is

new

A

India,

critical part

declared, “a

to

that is the thing

we have

with which

I

to

160
...

as in any part of the world.”

59

reckon."

the

world and running as

Samuel Hoare.

in a

parliamentary

defend the adoption of some of the government’s proposals for India after the

second Round Table Conference

in

1931, ranked nationalism as one of the most

important factors which had to be accepted:

"7
1

Boyce 1999,

93.

sx

Ball 1988. 128.

1

Baldwin. House of Commons Debates 276.
,

160

is

a

of this change was the arrival of nationalism. There was. Baldwin

wind of nationalism and freedom running round

strongly in Asia

speech

and

It

National Union Central Council, 4

c.

December

100

1

135-6 (29

1934.

March

1933).

“It is

wave of nationalism which,

an integral part of that great

particularly in

recent years, has swept over the world from one end to the other.

same movement

we have

that

Czechoslovakia.

is

It

It

is

part of the

seen in Europe, in such countries as Poland and

part of the

same movement

that

we have

seen

in

Asia, in

161

Turkey,

Arabia.”

in Iraq, in

Besides nationalism, there were also other social, political, economic and
technological transformations taking place in the world. For example, Baldwin spoke

of the invention of cars, films, airplanes and the gramophone as revolutionary
technological changes that were creating a

pole with the speed ot light.”

“

In the

change

“causing] a new

burn

in the

when

ideas of Social

intellectual circles,

from pole

to

1904-5) not only as an example but as a

(

whole of Asia."

16
’

Darwinism and racism were

the East for

it

The news of Russia's

and inspired many

the hands of Japan had traveled quickly

period

War

between the West and

in the relationship

spirit to

ideas “Hash

same speech, Baldwin highlighted Japan’s

victory over Russia in the Russo-Japanese

the catalyst for

new world where

in the East.

still

During

was
defeat at

this

part of political and

Baldwin was acknowledging the contribution of

this

event to the

fast

eroding legitimacy of the overtly racial and hierarchical order in world politics. They
realized that these changes

were

altering not only Britain but other countries

and

Britain's relations with them.

161

See
Samuel Hoare, House of Commons Debates 260, c. 1209 (2 December 1931
Samuel Hoare, House of Commons Debates 276. c. 699 (27 March 1933); and
Winterton, House of Commons Debates 276. c. 1063-1070 (29 March 1933).
).

,

also

,

,

I6

“

Baldwin. House of Commons Debates 276,

c.

1

135-6 (29 March 1933).

Baldwin, House of Commons Debates 276.

c.

1

135-6 (29 March 1933).

,

1,1

,

101

A

second

fact for the reformers

was

the arrival

and importance of the ideals and
4

1(

principles of

argued

democracy and self-government

that they

were merely

movement, Baldwin and

Unlike the diehards

in India.

a veneer coating those

heading the Indian nationalist

was

the reformers recognized that this

seeded by the British education of the country’s

elites.

Britain

had sown a hundred years ago as Indians were "asking us for

we have

said time

and time again

The most important

fact

the goal to

is

who

real

and had been

was thus reaping what

that responsibility

it

which
166

which they

are to look forward.”

then for Baldwin and the reformers was that India in the

1930s was no longer the India of the

late

nineteenth century.

not the India that Churchill and other diehards

They argued

remembered from
1

India had departed permanently nearly twenty years ago.

’'

their

that

it

was

childhoods - that

Insisting that India in the

1930s had not changed, as the diehards were doing, was therefore, simply unrealistic

and the paternalistic form of governance associated w ith

it,

a

major mistake. As Lord

Irwin noted:

“The day is past ... when Winston's possessive instinct can be applied to
Empires ... That conception of imperialism is finished, and those who try
revive

1

64

it

are those

who would

"Chairman Draft Report

to

Constitutional Reforms.” See

to

16

fly a

balloon that won’t hold

gas.’'

be Submitted to the Joint Select Committee on Indian

p.

19 in Proceedings of the Joint Committee on Indian

Volume l, Part II. (London: His Majesty’s
House of Commons Debates 276. c. 13515: and Hoare. House of Commons Debates

Constitutional Reform /Session 1933-34],

Stationery Office, 1934). See also Baldwin,

6 (29 March 1933); Halifax 1957.
296, c. 47-48 (10 December 1934).
1

If
’

14-1

Baldwin. House of Commons Debates 276.

c.

1

135-6 (29 March 1933).

Baldw in. House of Commons Debates 276.

c.

1

138-9 (29 March 1933); 249.

,

1425-6 (12 March 1931).
167

Irwin quoted in

Low

1

,

,

166

,

1997. 32. See also Halifax 1957,

102

1

14-5.

c.

For them,

was

it

developments meant

clear that the political

1

was necessary.

realism and not a policy of sentiment”

68

that

“a policy of

Prewar forms of imperialist

assertiveness or what Baldwin “called 'rather sinister' and militaristic meanings of
169

could no longer prevail.

imperialism"

'flag-wagging', "painting the

policy; and ‘riding

map

red',

It

nor about exploitation, selfishness

roughshod over the world'.”

evolutionary process where the empire and

and inanimate

entities.

is

it

own

if

Empire of

components were organisms rather than

party in February 1935:

particularly essential for us in our party

remember, as some of us perhaps
Empire,

it

is

the

anything,

may

is

in the

on

Queen

this side

of the House to

country are apt to forget, that the

a living organism; that the

Jubilee of

first

part of an

Instead of resisting them, these changes should be

absorbed. Baldwin reminded his

“I think

its

in public

170

Baldwin considered these changes natural and

Significantly,

lifeless

was not and could not be “about jingoism,

Victoria.

No man

Empire of today is not the
can see today, however
Empire fifty years hence.

what may be the position of the
an organism and alive, in a constant process of
evolution, a process which is being speeded up every day. Few could have
foreseen, even a few years ago. to what point that evolution would have brought
far-seeing he
It is

be.

no dead matter.

It is

the relations of the great

supposed

that, in this

Dominions with

the

mother country, and

world of evolution, India alone

Instead of the flag-wagging imperialism of old

still

the diehards, Baldwin and the reformers had by 1935, a

l,lS

Baldwin. House of Commons Debates 276.
,

(12
169

March 1931

).

Williamson 1999, 264.

170

Williamson, 1999. 264.
1

1

Middlemas and Barnes 1969. 593-4.

103

c.

1

it

cannot be

171

is static."

brandished by Churchill and

new

interpretation of the empire

135 (29 March 1933); 249.

c.

1425-6

as

something which would evolve

would he a member.
question

in a

way

172
'

that

into a

commonwealth of nations, of which

Thus, British interests were linked

would depend "on good

between India and Great

will,

to a resolution of the India

sympathy, and understanding

173

Britain....”

Like the diehards, references to Britain were also present
focused on observations about the

their

India

speeches were devoted

to

in

these speeches

These rather significant sections of

'facts' in India.

drawing parallels with the social and

political

changes

taking place in Britain. Baldwin, for instance, stressed that Britain had undergone

'three generations of political evolution'

Recalling his

roads and

own

when

it

while wishing for

cherished childhood

was
it

to

difficult to

come

Britain that had "passed and

during World

when

War

174
I

in

these speeches.

Britain had nothing but horses

on country

go beyond a 10-mile radius of one’s home, Baldwin.

back, also

knew

gone forever.”

that

175

was impossible

it

He acknowledged

for this

was

a

these rapid changes in

Britain in a 1933 speech in support of constitutional reforms for India:

"Who would

honourable and gallant Friend the

War began

that in 10 years we would have
would have thought in 1903, when my
Member for Bournemouth and were

have thought when the

universal suffrage in this country?

Who

I

supporting Joseph Chamberlain that

1926 we should have an Imperial

in

Conference when the only threads remaining were threads of gossamer?”
I7

"

1

Williamson (1999: 271

).

Baldwin. House of Commons Debates 249,

c.

Baldw in, House of Commons Debates 276

c.

,

1

4

,

1

^

,

1425-6 (22 March 1931

1

Baldwin. House of Commons Debates 276,

c.

Baldwin. House of Commons Debates 276.

c.l

,

1

176

,

1

1

34 (29 March 1933).

138-9 (29 March 1933).
135 (29 March 1933). Baldwin

referring to the Chamberlain's efforts to convince the country that a Tariff

League involving closer economic connections w
dominions would revive Britain.

104

).

ith

Reform

the rest of the empire and the

is

hcsc

I

liangcs

i

Britain

111

were understood, without question, as inevitable and

1

irreversible.

Baldwin also linked the

In addition.

Baity to

how

the India question

whirling through Britain had

unfortunately,

was

left

resolved,

many

(

and survival

future

argued

lie

ol the

Conservative

that the rapid

ehanges

'onservalives spinning giddily, ami

without the ability to reeoneile themselves to the postwar world and

still

elinging to the ideas, beliefs and praelicesol the pre wat period. Churehill and the

dichards were

mired

still

in the

“Toryism of

and then views on India reflected

m
(

the

I

(

louse ol

'onservaltve

“The

onservalive. as

(

believes

'

I

problem.

ms. Baldw

in

to see

1

m

w

as

1

were young

numerous speeches on India

I

understand him.

no Junker and no Fascist. le is a
who wants to serve his country,

is

I

people contented and happy. There can be no better work

devote themselves

and see what they can make of

to.

this

,*179

en\ isioneil a

progressive reform.

Baldw

ol his

I

constitutional progress,

in

for out party than to

I

)urmg one

"

he and

'ominous, Baldwin look the opportunity to expound on what a

ami w ho w ants

ast

I

when

is.

man who

\

tins.

the times

*"

adamant

In a

(

’onsei v alive party that

world

that

that the parl\

w on Id

be able to enact rational and

was changing, so too must Conservatism.

adapt to the ehanges and align with the forces that

1

Baldwin.

Baldw
1

(I

in.

March

/

louse of ('ominous Debates. 21b.

House

<>/

(
'

ominous Debates. 21b.

1931); ami Baldw in to Davidson. 13

1420-6(12 March 1931).

e.

35 (29 March 1933): 249. e 4
November 1930 in Davidson Memoirs.

e.

I

I

.

1

p.555.
|

f()

Baldwin. Htmse

t>J

('omnitms Debates. 270,

e.

I

<>/

(

'onun<ms Debates. 27o.

e.

I

140(29 March 1933).

mine.
IN

Baldw

in.

Ibms<'

140 (29 March 1933).

I

mpliasis

1

had brought them about as the “party
of being returned

to

power

in this

does not realize

that

country.”

Baldwin

'

decision to follow the route of constitutional reforms

slated very clearly that Ins

“was the only one

India

lot

progressive party - and a party must be progressive to

does not stand much chance

it

live.

I

for a

believed that the other

course led to the destruction of the parly

There was also considerable awareness

that the

changes

being labeled by the reformers as the other great political experiment

promise and fulfillment of self-government for India as embodied
Declaration of 1917

were also taking place

-

in

tandem with
1

complete democracy with universal suffrage
these political developments

century,

it

was considered

in Britain

a precarious

......

hardly been tested and in which Britain

Critically, this

to

how

may

1

82

83

IH4

Montagu

hough

the

in the

new

twenty Inst

,

s

stability

and unity were not guaranteed.

in

its

demands

“more than anything

else

we

shall

Baldwin. House of

Commons

Debates. 260. c.1401 (3 December 1931
5;

Baldwin. House of (ominous Debates. 23

Schwarz 1984.

c.

I

I

to lace,

34 (29 March 1933).

).

See also

and Williamson 1999. 268.

1

12.

106

,

in Britain

for self

have

Debates, 276.

140 (29 March 1933); Jones 1954,

j#4

which they handled these developments

Commons

c.l

ness ol

awareness was accompanied by arguments linking the changes

crucially, understood as

the

and new political situation, one which had

they handled the political developments in India and

was

the

Baldwin, House of

276,
1

I

be hard to fathom

government and independence. The manner
in India

in

time

ol their

the arrival ol full and

83

in Britain.

and what was

in India

c.l

308-9

(7

November

1929).

...

the

supreme

test

of

how

These arguments
differed

fit

in

we

are for democratic conditions under

support of reforms as a

from those made by

understanding of the changes

in India.

The second

reformers, and in particular. Stanley Baldwin,

were handled and

its

means of holding

two substantial ways.

the diehards in

which we have

to

India to the empire

First

was

in their

lies in the vital links that the

made between

the

w ay these changes

consequences for democracy in Britain, the meaning of

Conservatism, and ultimately. Britishness.

In

order to understand

how

it

was even

possible for these links to be made, these arguments have to be placed in the wider

context of an alternative form of British identity that

was being promulgated by Stanley

Baldwin during the Interwar period. The next section of

this

chapter describes and

elaborates on the central principles and elements of this alternate

drawing on secondary as well as primary sources. This
discussion of

markers

2.4.2.

1

its

pervasiveness

in art, architecture,

in Britain

and

is

form of Britishness by

also supplemented by a

through a general look

at

important cultural

literature.

Constructing Unity: Britishness
Constitutionalism

in

Local Places and Democratic

Stanley Baldwin, leader of the Conservatives for most of the 1920s and 1930s.

was one of

the central figures of Interwar Britain

the alternative to the

1X5

dominant form of

and the major

political

proponent of

British identity rooted in superiority

Middlemas and Barnes 1969, 536; Williamson 1999. and

107

Ball 1988.

and

I

Sh

greatness.

In

Baldwin’s vision, ways of being British were conceived

in a less

and more inward-looking manner. He imagined, depicted and

explicitly imperial

emphasized Britain as

a place that

was populated by people who were innately decent,

honest, truthful, honorable, moderate and underpinned by the centuries-old traditions

and

of the British constitution.

political ideals

was embedded

Britishness, according to Baldwin,

1

87

domestic landscape.

was

It

a conception based

(

country”, of

this

whose

“the ‘dust

compendium of

elements

that

soil,

we

are

made

land and people

of,

true

and

and

on the belief

timeless and organic relationship between the land and

England 1924), Christopher Hussey described

in

its

intrinsic to the

that there

was

a deep,

people. In The Fairy

Land of

England as a beautiful "legendary

to

which we

was not only

will return’.”

'

Thus,

a landscape but significantly,

were inextricably and organically linked together. Britishness

in this

conception, was a part of places and landscapes, and their traditions and history. In
other words, there

was “an organic and

active relation

between past and present

already an integral, constitutive and permanent feature of English culture.”

In

one of his most famous and quoted speeches, Baldw in paints

....

189

this picture

of

England:

ISh

Baldwin was leader of the Conservatives and Prime Minister

1935-37.
1X7

Waters 1997. 211; and Sian 1996. 128.
1

88

Potts 1989, 173.

1

Schwarz 1984,

15;

and Sian 1996, 128.

108

in

1923, 1924-29 and

“The sounds of England,

hammer on the anvil in the country
dewy morning, the sound of the scythe against the

the tinkle of the

smithy, the corncrake on a

whetstone, and the sight of the plough team coming over the brow of a

hill,

the

England since England was a land, and may be seen
in England long after the Empire has perished and every works in England has
ceased to function, for centuries the one eternal sight of England. The wild
sight that has

been seen

in

woods in April, the last load at night of hay being drawn down
comes on, when you can scarcely distinguish the figures of
the horses as they take it home to the farm, and above all, most subtle, most
penetrating and most moving, the smell of wood smoke coming up in the
autumn evening, or the smell of the scotch fires; that wood smoke that our
ancestors, tens of thousands of years ago, must have caught on the air when they
were coming home with the result of the day's forage, when they were still
nomads, and when they were still roaming the forests and plains of the continent
anemones

in the

a lane as the twilight

of Europe. These things strike

down

into the very depths of our nature,

touch chords that go back to the beginning of time and the

human

and

race, but they

are chords that with every year of our life sounds a deeper note in our innermost
„ 190
being.

,

•

Rural England, as evoked by Baldwin

critical

component

in his

in that

famous passage above, was a

conception of Britain and Britishness.

It

was

also part of

wider, pervasive and well-established cultural trends rooted in the belief that the

solution to what

was

was perceived and understood

as an industrial, urban
191

to

be found in rural England with

eventually

came

to personify the

its

fount ot healthy stock.

and racial

crisis

The landscape

that

country as a whole was that of rural England,

constructed and idealized very specifically as a place where there were patchwork

fields,

thatched cottages amidst trees, shrubs and Bowers, meadows, village greens and
192

quiet country lanes.

190

191

Baldwin 1939, 66-67.

Howkins 1986,

67.

192

Potts 1989, 72; and Sian 1996, 130.

Though other
vision,

it

parts of rural Britain like the Yorkshire

Moors

had become so emblematic by the early 1940s

109

that

no way resembled this
a government report on the
in

Popular books on the countryside, following H.V. Morton’s trend-setting hi

Search of England 1927) had photos capturing what were depicted as the
(

‘characteristic’ features of the rural landscape like

“chequer-board

fields,

hedgerows,

191

copses and old buildings nestling

in

comforting hollows...”

contributions from authors like George Sturt and

Other

W.H. Hudson were

literary

also important in

establishing these images and ideals of rural England as the personification of the
194

country and

its

people.

Travel guides featuring the countryside as a
also another indicator of the

life

site

of holidays and leisure were

growing fascination and presence of the

of Britain by the end of World

satisfied with patches of green like

War

I.

rural in the cultural

Londoners, for example, were no longer

Hampstead Heath

in the outskirts

of the city

-

the

1

growing

By

ideal

was

to "discover rural

the outbreak of the

England as

it

'really was’, unspoilt

Second World War. hundreds of publications

like

and

95

natural.”

Arthur Mee's

The King's England, and the Shell Guides were being used by an increasing number of
1

people to

visit the

f ’

countryside.

These trends were also reflected

in art

and architecture. The ‘Tudor’

style,

characterized by diamond-paned or bottle-glass w indow's, half timbering, gable ends

revitalization of the rural

(Potts 167).

Potts 1989. 166.

1

1

94

)r>

i%

Howkins 1986.

75.

Howkins 1986.

83.

Howkins 1986.

83.

economy presented

it

as the objective

and true description

and

rustic

porches became the dominant national style of middle-class private

197

Even well-known children’s books

housing.

home

either as a cottage or as

books learned

mock-Tudor

to associate such

world of decency and honesty.”

like the Beatrix Potter series portrayed

style houses.

Generations bred on these

houses as homes as well as with "an earlier and better
198

In art. the paintings ol

John Constable

(

1776-1837)

supplanted J.M.W. Turner’s as paradigmatic representations of the English landscape

early in the twentieth century.

Turner’s work was characterized by dramatic

seascapes and mountain views while Constable’s most well-known and reproduced
paintings like The

Hay Wain and Dedham

scenes of British pastoral

life replete

Vale Morning were of quiet, ordinary, placid

with mills, farmhands, cottages, cows and

200

.

horses.

While Baldwin and

his oft-quoted speech, an aural

Constable painting of words

and sounds, have become the uber representation of the construction of Britain as
England’ during the interwar period, he was not a
consider the idealized landscape and

good things

1

7

>s

Howkins 1986,

73.

Howkins 1986,

73.

Constable,

all

sorts of

harmony, perspective, imagination

in contrast to the “transience, turbulence, tensions,

m Potts 1989,
200

Englander. Baldwin did

of rural England as the symbol of

like “stability, continuity, tranquility,

and honesty”

1

life

Little

‘Little

clamour, pretences.

168.

it

should be noted, was “plucked up from the past, tidied up and tamed,

and then reconstituted as the father of an English landscape vision no one previously
had thought

to

conjure into existence” (Potts 168).

divisions, shallowness,

and materialism of urban

national characteristics that

were

in the

made

Britain great as being

He spoke

found

that rural

its

return."

and continuing ideal” of

It

rural life

could continue to act as the spiritual

where they

way

20
- ?

of life.”

England had either vanished or was

?03

vanishing, and did not call lor

often about the

in the country

purest form, “preserved by an honest and traditional

However, he was deeply aware

tradition,

?oi
life.”

home

was the "inherited memory,

fast

cultural

which he considered important as they

for the urban population.

204

Thus, Baldwin’s conception of Britishness and his vision of Britain went far

beyond

this

205
'

supposed fixation on the England of old."

quite prominently in his speeches because

identity”

and only as “an example

it

was

~

Rural England had figured

part of "his

own

imaginative sense of

?06
of local allegiance for others.”

Critically,

Britishness for him, could be found in each locality, county or region of Britain.

were equally important and had

20

their

own

distinctive virtues,

all

They

of which contributed to

Wiliamson 1999. 248.

202

Potts 1989, 166.
203

204

Wiliamson 1999. 248.

Wiliamson 1999. 248.

205

Williamson 1999, 243. See Martin Wiener’s book which argued that this ruralism
was an overall trend in Britain which contributed to Britain’s overall decline in
competitiveness and ultimately, its place as a hegemon.
206

Williamson 1999, 126. Emphasis mine.

the rich diversity of their national inheritance and to the

‘common

stock'

making up

the

?07

character ot the British race.

Each

local place

had

linking the landscape and

human
While

race."

They

its

its

own charm,

people

the

genius as well as a continuous history

way back

to “the

beginning of time and the

local loyalties

and allegiances were rooted
in

in family,

home, and

to

connect with larger loyalties of town

or county, country and nation, and finally, the empire and mankind.

calls

the twentieth century,

209

Baldwin conceived and

community which were somehow shared by
These different locations

in turn

tried to

persuade others that the most
in locality

210

the entire nation.

produced the ‘national character’ with these

fair play, as

well as respect for law and order.

In

who were

not

various speeches, Baldwin also depicted the British as peaceful people

only great and persistent fighters

208

209

210

and

and values: independence, realism, truthfulness, honor, innate decency, a

profound sense of duty, justice and

07

Rather than the

of class which were the realities facing British politicians early

powerful and natural sources of British identity were those rooted

qualities

locality, they

Baldwin’s view. Instead, they were described as

which widened and radiated outwardly

modern, divisive

?08

thus formed Britons’ “natural foundation ot national values."

were not separate from each other
circles

all

spell,

Williamson 1999, 25.

Williamson 1999,251.

Williamson 1999, 251.
Williamson 1999.250.

if

put to the test but

made

for times of crises

and

in

challenges which they faced with serenity, calmness and cheerfulness. Moreover, they

were

people

'the kindest

in the

world'

who sympathized

with the under-dog and

exhibited brotherliness across classes. Thus, individuality

by a

'spirit ot

The

co-operation' and 'habit of working to

final crucial pillar in this

would always be “tempered

common

emerging construction of

21

principles'.""

British identity

was

principle ot democratic constitutionalism and British institutions ot governance.

the

212

This pillar consisted of a distinct emphasis on the idea that democratic constitutionalism

was

British in origin

and development, evolving out of a unique history of the

“democracy of the village community and
consciousness,

it

a distinctive Reformation.”

213
-

had “a mysterious, preternatural quality, inviting the belief that

been coeval with the land

itself,

born

in

...

'the rich soil

built into the

flesh

211

212

" 12

214

215

.

all

Britons and inseparable from Britishness.

in 'our hearts’,

Williamson 1999: 253.

Schwarz 1984: and Wellings 2002, 100.

Schwarz 1999.

185.

Williamson 1999, 255.

Its

parliamentary government was 'flesh of our

and bone of our bone', and freedom was the

Williamson 1999. 255-6.

has

In other words, the principles of the British constitution

physical being of

innermost core "was carried

it

of culture' with which the

?14

English have been blessed.”

was

In the national

'air

we

°15

breathe’.""

Constitutionalism, as depicted here,

British tradition that

was

was thus an

inextricable part of a centuries-long

?16
a part of their being.”

This conception of Britishness did not emerge from thin

power

in the British political

Instead,

it

its

international role.

developments during

emergence of an

seismic change

in the

this

form of

political rights to

Britain, a

880s when

it

was

217

empire.

Social,

who

domestic

discuss the social and

in Britain that led to the

Britain: International

the world’s leading

economic and

was

-

the arrival of full

women

and the working-class and

its

visited again and again.

and Domestic Challenges

a very different place from the Britain of the

changes were already afoot

when American and German competition began

to successfully chip

a far-flung

in the

away

at

1870s
Britain’s

share of the world market in manufacturing, and especially in the metal industries and

216

217

Schwarz 1984.

Howkins

15.

1986, 65.

a

mass democracy

economic power and possessed

political

was

feared their adverse consequences for the

theme he

Britain in the 1920s and 1930s

1

1

to the

British identity as well as the politics involved

country’s political order

and cohesion of

A Changing

In the next section.

tumultuous period

impact on Conservatism and Baldwin

2.4.2.2

place and

alternative in ideas of Britishness. Particularly significant

which extended voting and

stability

its

and cultural imagination automatic and uncontested.

destabilization of the dominant

in the

nor was

developed out of the very specific context of the challenges

order in Britain and

political

air

918

heavy engineering."
25 percent

Britain’s share of international

to 21 percent

between 1880 and 1900.

commerce,

219

growth

Its

for

rate

percent per year between 1870 and 1913 while the United States and

growing
,

at

example,

had fallen

fell

from

to 1.6

Germany were

respective rates of 5 percent and 4.7 percent annually during that

same

220

period.

There were also other developments which became visible signs of decline
the political elite in late Victorian England.

Huge armies on

with the capacity for rapid mobilization had emerged

( 1

221
'

A

European continent

in the post-

potential threat to Britain’s security. This vulnerability

naval build-up of France. Russia and Germany.

the

was

to

1870 era and posed a

in turn

heightened by the

disastrous start to the Boer

War

899-1902) when the British army was unable to immediately dispense with a ragtag

army of Dutch farmers worsened
military preparedness.

from

the

The

fears regarding the state of Britain’s capabilities

social expectations or notions of success that

dominant perspective of the

and

were derived

British self as an exceptional, superior

and great

country did not meet the experienced consequences of these changing international

economic and

political

developments.

Suspicions, fears and anxieties that

all

was not

as

it

should be was reflected

countless public and private discussions and publications regarding the decline of

9 v
i

Howkins 1986.64.
-1

Friedberg 1984, 24.

Friedberg 1984. 25.
221

Pugh 1999, 42.

1

16

in

Britain. Intellectuals as well as the

governing

political circle, for

example, began

to

reassess Britain's military, financial and imperial capabilities and vulnerabilities vis-a111

vis the other great powers,

and

in particular,

Germany.

government reports on the physical condition of the
that the British ‘race’

their

was degenerating and

might and position

in the

“

There were commissioned

British population

a cause of the

which concluded

growing enfeeblement of

world as a great power and a great empire.

113

Drawing

on Edward Gibbon's enormously popular The Decline and Fall of the

Roman Empire

many

Rome.

other public intellectuals began to compare Britain with ancient

analysis.

Gibbon pointed
124

ol

its

far-flung empire.

aristocratic

~

to the

decay

When

in

Rome

that

Empire, was rotten to the core and leading

and ultimately, the country and

The

its

empire.

In his

as the reason for the decline and collapse

these lessons ot ancient

and military circles concluded

Rome were

applied to Britain,

London, the heart of Britain and the

to the decline

of the British race, character.

225

social expectations or notions of success associated with the

dominant

perspective of the British self as an exceptional, superior and great country were also

upended by domestic challenges of the Edwardian period when Britain’s
political order

was

in great turmoil.

223

~4
225

Rich 1988, 660.

Pugh 1993,106.

Howkins 1986,

social

and

This was a period which witnessed the advent of

universal suffrage and full democracy, an insurgent feminist

222

65.

Rich 1988, 660; and Howkins 1986. 65.

,

movement,

the rise of

Labour, a right-wing Tory rebellion against parliamentary government based on the
opposition to the pre-war Liberal administration's plan to reform the

Home

and the issue of

??6

The campaign

Rule tor Ireland."

of the suffragettes, for

upper-class Edwardian men, “represented one of the most alarming
727

underlying malaise

assertiveness of the working-class

movement invoked

government was under considerable
problems

by

threat

that arose out

this

new

pronounced

the actions of the upper

usurption of the rights of the

Act of 191

the

1

anomaly of

but not least

the

6

227

which

its

was

Commons

in

commons.”

dealt with “the veto

hereditary

2?9
"

Home

April 1912. the third

the

the

2?8
political force. "

There were

of the rejection of the 1909 budget by the
the budget by a large

House "a breach of

the constitution and a

This was partly resolved by the Parliament

powers of the House of Lords” but

membership and

the crisis over

some

fears that parliamentary

House of Lords. The House of Commons, which had passed
majority,

symptoms of

The growth of trade unions and

in British society.’

also the constitutional

House of Lords

230

extraordinary political bias.”"

its

Rule for Ireland. Beginning

Home

“left intact

Rule

Bill

its

Last

passage through

had by 1914, “passed three times

Powell 2002. 121; Pugh 1999: Rubinstein 2003; and Laybourn 1999.

Pugh 1999. 154.
Pugh 1999, 151.

229 Pugh 1999, 157. This w as part of a larger problem when peers, many of whom
were Conservatives, were rejecting bills passed by a large majority in the Commons
regularly since the 1870s. At that time, peers had the right to amend and reject ordinary
legislation.
230

Pugh 1999.

157.

1

18

23

as required

by the Parliament Act.”"

It

was

resisted

by the Ulster unionists and by

January 1914. a number of gun-running episodes put 350.000
private armies against

Home

up of the Dublin Parliament.

rifles in the

hands of

Rule, raising the possibility of a civil war with the setting

232

The combination of suffragettes,

strikes, antagonists in the constitutional crisis

over the House of Lords, Ulster unionists and

Irish Nationalists

challenges to the authority of the British state and

its

posed violent

933
institutions."

Critically,

it

provided the sense that Britain was becoming increasingly ungovernable - a state and
934

society “in the first stages of breakdown."

The Edwardian

David Powell

crisis, as

argues, put Britain in a 'crisis of nationalism' as the state “responded to

perceived as external threats while struggling to preserve

its

unity in the face of the

renewed disruption associated with domestic national discontents.”

The end of World War
efforts after the

system

that

end of the war

I

did not see an abatement of this

to re-establish the core

had placed the country

at

what were

235

components and

the centre of the world's

Determined

crisis.

pillars

economy

in the

of a

pre-1914

era failed due to unrealistic policies that were based on inaccurate and ultimately.

231

232

233

234

235

Pugh 1999.

157.

Pugh 1999.

158.

Pugh 1999,

151.

Pugh 1999.
Powell 2002, 121; Powell 1996; and Brooks 1995.

wishful understanding of the state of the British economy.

series of other

problems

like the disruption

systems, growing nationalist feelings

in

of

its

236

These, together with a

international

economic and

financial

her colonies, mass enfranchisement of the

working-class and the possibility of socialist government only served to continue and
?37

confirm the shakiness ot

same

period, there

electorate that

was

were

its

domestic

fears

stability

and international power.

and anxieties about whether mass democracy with an

largely poorly informed, and overwhelmingly working-class

approve “policies which were

difficult to

more

of voters”

and be “dissuaded from succumbing

seriously,

which might involve material

.

able to return to
939

power.

social

and

.

these developments unfolded,

its

pre-World War

I

it

sacrifice

from a large number

?38
to irresponsible stunts.””
.

become apparent

conditions of prosperity, progress, and imperial

These dramatic changes and challenges

to

its

political order created an increasingly visible

w hich

~' h

”

”

in the

domestic and international

gap between reality and the

It

became

clear to

public sphere that previous arrangements, assumptions, and expectations on

ideas of Britain and Britishness were based were incongruent with

For more on these economic issues, see Pugh 1999.

7

Williamson 1992,

11.

Williamson 1992.

15.

Williamson 1992.

1.

S

” 3)

would not be

that Britain

heroic and imperial-based British identity that had been so dominant.

many

would

comprehend, which lacked a sensational

appeal, or

As

During the

120

w hat they

?40

were experiencing.

While these doubts converged

into the

growing realization

that

fundamental readjustments were necessary, there was no obvious consensus of what
they should be.

2.-L2.3

The
As

Politics of

Conservatism and the Emergence of Baldwin's

New

Britain

discussed earlier, an alternative conception of Britishness which emphasized

and constructed a united Britain based on the uniqueness and yet //btr-normality of
places and landscapes throughout the British isles and the principle of democratic
constitutionalism dominated public

part,

life

during the interwar period. While reflecting

in

an already existing nostalgia and heartfelt longing for an idealized and largely

unknown

?41

rural past.

the

emergence

of this alternative and

its

eventual pervasiveness

cannot be separated from the politics and difficulties experienced by the Conservative
party during the Interwar period or

Politically, a series

from

the rhetoric and actions of Stanley Baldwin.

of changes appeared on paper

the future and survival of the Conservative Party.

The

to

first

have dire consequences for
of these transformations was

the arrival of universal suffrage with the passage of the Representation of the People’s

Acts of 1918 and 1928. These acts expanded the electorate more than threefold

between 1918 and 1929. Second was the growth and expansion of the Labour Party
which was not only offering radical solutions for the nation’s

compete successfully against the Conservatives and
Conservatives had experienced election defeats

~4

°

241

Williamson 1992,

11.

Ball 1988.9-10.

121

in

ills

but beginning to

the Liberals. Third, the

1905. 1923 and 1929. Across

postwar Europe, there was revolutionary

Due

totalitarianism in 1930s.

instability in the

changes and developments,

to these

were apprehensive about democracy and believed
?42

collectivist

and

socialist

governments.

In other

the arrival of universal suffrage and full

or even rationalizing

base that

how

now included

it

1920s and the emergence of

many

that universal suffrage

Conservatives

would

lead to

words, the party was disoriented by

democracy with no ready means of explaining

would be able

to

win elections with a national

the working-class as well as

women.

electoral

243

Despite their apprehension and fears regarding the consequences of universal
suffrage, the Conservatives

managed and enjoyed considerable success

party during the Interwar period. For

1

as a political

7 of the 20 years of this period, the

Conservatives were in office, either independently or

in

governments which they

?44

dominated.

For

all

these

1

7 years, they also enjoyed huge parliamentary

945

majorities.

'

Explanations for this success range from the fact that they were fortunate

not to be governing

when

the 1929 depression hit to the argument that voting
?46

Conservative was the natural thing. These explanations are lacking."

The

latter for

example, runs against pre-1914 and post- 945 voting patterns when a Conservative vote
1

242

Jarvis 1997, 132.
244

Jarvis 1997, 131.
244

24>

246

McKibbin

1990. 260.

McKibbin

1990. 260.

McKibbin

1990. 262.

was

otten not the normal vote.

if

would have had

it

247
-

Arguments based on

same impact on

the

assumption

the fortunes of Labour.

on

structural

changes or some mysterious force

that the

All these explanations

Conservative Party was the passive recipient of

are based

the

the depression cannot ascertain

seemed

that

to be guiding the electorate to

vote Conservative.

The

party

was not

a passive recipient of the social and political changes brought
?48

about by universal suffrage or international developments.

were a significant catalyst
well as a

new

this struggle

fears

in

Conservative attempts

vision for Britain.

was

in the

One

to re-define their party’s goals as

of their most concerted and forceful attempts

249

to British imperial decline.

turning Britain into a global

power by linking

economic and trading

Such

bloc.

protect British industry

it.

a system with

its

its

Tariff

reform was aimed

program was

in

at

colonies and dominions into a single

protective duties,

it

was envisioned,

and the working-class from competitors while

simultaneously financing social reforms such as old age pensions.

the

changes

form of the Tariff Reform League which emerged out of the

and anxieties related

would

Instead, these

the imposition of import duties on food and

An

essential part of

raw materials which was

950

necessary lor the overall success ol fiscal reform.
the party between those

247

who found them

an anathema and others

McKibbin 1990, 264.

24S

Jarvis 1997, 135.
249

250

Schwarz 1984,

These proposals however, divided

4.

Ball 1998.2.

123

who

considered them

251
-

the “only living thing in politics.”

Ultimately, these proposals were unpopular with

and the empire-based platform collapsed electorally. ideologically and

the public

-:i-

organizationally.

Under

the leadership of

beginnings of a

stability

shift in the

Andrew Bonar Law

'

at

home and

abroad.

253
'

there

the nature of the

was

Austen Chamberlain

more consensus on

again,

change

in the party.

who

the

While Bonar Law realized

Conservative Party would “never have a future

?54

country.”

was

Conservative Party towards an emphasis on tranquility,

and a return to normality

that the old

in the early 1920s, there

in the life

of this

the need for change rather than over

For example, there were top Conservatives

insisted that "the threat of socialism

like

had rendered the
?55

traditional party

system defunct and

In contrast.

in

need

of

permanent

Stanley Baldwin responded to the changes by portraying that “same

system as a symbol of British democratic values

extremism and dictatorship.”
elections and therefore,

2

"

?56
~

fulfill its

He

world increasingly dominated by

would

'national' responsibilities if

-:i-

2 "'

in a

realized that the party

Ball 1988.2.

Schwarz 1984.

political realignment.”

4.

Rubinstein 2003, 132.

254

Jarvis 1997. 143.
2:0

Jarvis 1997, 143.
2Ml

Jarvis 1997, 143.

124

it

not be able to win

were

to ignore the

changes

that

had created new

?57
political realities in Interwar Britain."

Through

all this.

Baldwin was conscious of the necessity of transforming Conservatism and the
Conservative party to one which could absorb "the democratic and ethical values he
58

tried to exemplify.’'"

Politics aside, this

Britishness, with

emphasis on equating Conservatism and

harmony,

unity, tranquility,

critically.

moderation and democratic

constitutionalism was also due to Baldwin's great concern over the issues of social and

political

cohesion in Britain. The incorporation of democratic constitutionalism as one

of the key principles
identity

was

Baldwin’s vision of Britain and his construction of British

a central part of this effort to create the necessary conditions to ensure that

British politics

This

in

is

and

political parties did not

significant as Baldwin,

descend into chaos, paralysis or extremism.

when

principle of democratic constitutionalism

-

he became leader of the party, raised this

where “the Conservative Party

abide by the constitution, to establish a working concordat with Labour

through the debates and committee business of parliamentary
not the citizen

- then

at least

the voter and public opinion”
259

centrality rather than dismantling

the past, this position

257

288

259

Williamson 1999. 219.

2-3.

and

order to get

to represent

to a position

-

that

if

of absolute

Vastly different from Conservative policies

was based on the conviction

Williamson 1999,219.

Schwarz 1984,

it.

-

life

in

sets out to

democracy "equaled

in

the right to

vote in regular elections and the possibility that in the rotation of parties, the
260

independent representatives of Labour might take their turn in governing the nation.”'
Overall, the main components in Baldwin’s conception of Britain and

Britishness provided the

means

to portray the nation as

one

that

had been and was both

harmonious and united, bound through time on the basis of the same principles and

The

values.

nation

w ith

politics

qualities presented in this conception of Britishness provided a divided

an understanding of themselves that would "soothe aw ay the sores of class

and industrial conflict”

integrate

261

and support and emphasize “the nation’s

and tolerate diverse groups within

its

ranks”

26 °"

ability to

in a difficult period.

Thus, the inconsistencies between the social expectations of the British identity
based on greatness and the experienced consequences of the domestic and international

changes of the turbulent Interw ar period prov ided the space for alternative forms of
Britishness to arise.

However, Baldwin's alternative also emerged out of the specific

conditions arising out of the developments and changes within Conservative Party and

British politics.

British identity

recognized by

Despite

its

ascendance and the challenge

it

posed

to the

dominant

based on notions of greatness, the former was by no means accepted and

all.

The question of

India

was very much

identity contestation as well as the battle for

As discussed

earlier, the

its

a part of this process of

recognition.

diehards constructed their conception of Britishness

against the Indian ‘Other’ and critically, insisted that British greatness could only be
_6 °

Schwarz 1984.

3.

261

Williamson 1999. 248; Smith 1986; Wiener 1981; Sian 1996;
1986.
_6_

Williamson 1999, 248.
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and Cunningham

sustained

if

they remained on the subcontinent to

'responsibilities'.

fulfill their 'duties'

The next section places the reformers’ approach
context of Baldwin's vision of a

change

in India within the larger

2.4.2.4

Change, Democratic Constitutionalism and India

The

and

to the issue of

new

Britain.

introduction to the Draft Report submitted to the Joint Select

Committee on

Indian Constitutional Reforms began by addressing the issues raised by the diehards

directly:

"We

cannot indeed complain

if

those

whom we

the possible consequences of another policy.

It

fail

to

convince lay stress upon

has been, and will be urged that

no Dominion has ever been faced within its border at one and the same time
with all the problems that India has to deal: with the ever present risk of
hostilities on her frontier; with the cleavage between communal interests; with
innumerable differences of race and speech; with a financial system largely
dependent for its credit on centres outside India; and with a vast population in
every stage of civilization."

Critically, the

acknowledgement

that "all these things are true" did not

mean

following the path of resistance to Indian demands advocated by Churchill and
the diehards:

“[A]nd yet even the sum of them does not seem to us to conclude the argument.
An answer has still to be found to the questions asked a century ago bv a great
servant of India, in a speech of which it was said that to have heard it might

members of the House for never having heard Edmund
we can give the people of India knowledge without
awakening ambition? Or do we mean to awaken ambition and provide it w ith
no legitimate vent?” The answer has now to be given: and we hold strongly that
it is more consonant with the dignity of Parliament and with the traditions of the
British people if. when the time has come for Parliament to share its pow'er with
console the younger

Burke:

"Do we

think that

,

-63

“Chairman Draft Report

to

be Submitted to the Joint Select Committee on Indian

Constitutional Reforms.” See p. 19 in Proceedings of the Joint Committee on Indian

Constitutional Reform

I Session

1933-34/, Volume

Stationery Office, 1934).
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1,

Part

II.

(London: His Majesty’s

whom

those

has sought to train the arts of government

it

should do so not

it

14

ungraciously nor

The

in

any grudging

spirit.'"

report goes on to say:

“There are moments

in the affairs

of nations when a

way

is

opened for

the

removal of long-standing differences and misunderstandings for the
establishment between people and people of

new

relations

more

in

harmony

with the circumstances of the time than those which they replace. Adjustments

of this order, when they involve a transference of

political power,
755
’
inevitably provide a sharp test ot national character;...

In justifying the reforms that they

were advocating

must

of criticism from

in the face

Churchill and the diehards. the report not only acknowledged that there was a growing

nationalist consciousness

handle

was

it

the

was

way

to share

and movement

befitting the dignity of Parliament,

traditions and of the British people.

The manner

changes was

test

in itself a

fundamental

traditions, these dignities of parliament

character? After

all.

that the

only

way

to

power once responsible self-government was possible because

was consistent and

that

concluded

in India but

in

and the

test

it

to the

made

to these

What were

was providing

Churchill and the diehards had also

importance of rejecting these reforms

and the

which they adjusted

of the national character.

it

these

to the national

direct links

between the

maintenance of what they argued w ere

specifically British characteristics.

In his first

major address on India. Baldwin stated

that the

way

handled the India question was “the supreme, the acid, and ultimate

in

test

which Britain

of

how

fit

we

14

Ibid.

Emphasis mine.

'’65

“Chairman Draft Report

to be

Constitutional Reforms." See

p.

Submitted to the Joint Select Committee on Indian

19 in Proceedings of the Joint Committee on Indian

Constitutional Reform /Session 1933-34/, Volume
Stationery Office, 1934).
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I,

Part

II.

(London: His Majesty's

7

are for

...

democratic conditions.”

one hand Labour readiness

to

^

According

to

Williamson. Baldwin meant "on the

countenance imperial government, and on the other

Conservative recognition oi the inevitability and advantages of reform.”

words,

how

the issue of India

was handled was

267

In other

crucial for reconciling the arrival of full

parliamentary democracy and Labour as a political party and force on the political scene

with the maintenance ol imperial administration.

These reforms were therefore not
Baldwin's efforts
during the

first

to

fashion a

new

distinct

268

and separate from

Britain in the face of

all

British politics.

the tumultuous

In

changes

decades of the twentieth century, the principle of democratic

constitutionalism was particularly important. However. Britain’s political development

and constitutional order hardly unfolded continuously and harmoniously throughout
history.

During the modern period, especially

century, constitutional politics

was

Democratic constitutionalism and

in fact,

its

in the first three

decades of the twentieth

under siege from both the right and

270
settled state until the 1920s.“

House of Common Debates 229,
,

267

c.63 (2 July 1929).

Williamson 1999, 268.

Williamson 1999, 268.
269

270

Schwarz 1984,

?69
left.

taken-for-granted association with modern

Conservatism, modern British politics and Britishness did not begin

66

3.

Schwarz 1984,2. See also Ball 1988; and Williamson 1993.
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its

to acquire its

While Baldwin may have depicted
outcome, through long centuries, of the

who have always

English people,

and talking shops

fighting,

British parliamentarism as “‘the natural

common

sense and the good nature of the

preferred committees to dictators, elections to street-

to revolutionary tribunals,”

he was very aware and terrified
?7

that “‘street-fighting

widely quoted and revealing 1927

letter to a friend,

arrived at a gallop in England and

I

them

[the

mass

is

to the

that sense

have not

had time

ends they would be the

a race for

life.

Can we educate

”"?72

might be, there are
develop a keen political sense themselves.

away by

last to desire

really skilful
if

in Britain

that these

w as

And

and clever propaganda

in

new developments

advance of

“'had brought
274

their cultural status.’”

therefore, “a struggle between the innate

sense and political quietism of her people and the lure of the fantasies induced

bv lack of education and demagogues.”

Schwarz 1984,

275
-

This fear and identification of anarchy as the

15.

97 ?

Quoted

in

Schwarz 1984.

12.

See Williamson 1999 and Middlemas and Barnes

1969.
273

274

they

... to
">73

they realized what those ends were."

our people and other peoples to a political status

The advent of mass democracy

1927:

in

you must remember that,
large masses in this country who

Baldwin was extremely concerned

" 7I

is

to

are only too prone to be led

common

it

a surer political sense: but

however innate
yet

time

Cambridge University Conservative Association

no people with

...

feel all the

In a

Baldwin wrote: “’Democracy has

before the crash comes?

of the electorate]

As he explained
“There

j

and revolutionary tribunals were just around the corner.”"

Baldwin, quoted

Schwarz 1984,

in Jarvis 1991.

12;

486.

and Jarvis 1991.487.

27:1

Jarvis 1991.487.
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other side of the coin of mass democracy was something which featured prominently in
?76

his public speaking throughout the course ot his career.

Far more crucial were his attempts to counter and reconcile what he considered

were the potentially negative consequences of these domestic

political

through influencing and changing Britain’s political culture as well as

developments
that

of the

Conservative Party through the promotion of what Philip Williamson has called a
'public doctrine' based on a set of shared principles in national

life that

would promote

both harmony and unity and become the source of the country’s and his party’s
277

salvation.

Baldwin and

were inextricably linked
Britain played a

his narratives ol the national character

to the landscape, history, traditions

dominant

and way

ot life that

and cultural memories of

and erasing the ruptures and conflicts

role in writing out

in

Britain’s political development, and eventually succeeding in rooting and linking
278

Britishness to constitutionalism in an idealized history.

These

efforts alone

were insufficient

to

ensure that such a form of British culture

and Britishness would take hold. For Baldwin, these principles of democratic
constitutionalism had to be demonstrated in actual practices in the very conduct of

Conservatism and British

politics.

Politically, this

based on moderation and constitutionalism where
Conservative Party

775

77

27S

all

Schwarz 1984,
Schwarz 1984,

the parties, especially "the

by the constitution,

to establish a

working

“Democracy and the
The Authentic Note of Democracy’ and "Freedom and Discipline”.

His published speeches include "Democracy and

Spirit of Service’,

”

sets out to abide

took the form of building a culture

14;

3;

Its

Task’,

and Williamson 1993.

Williamson 1999, 212; Jarvis 1991 and Ball 1988.
;
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concordat with Labour
parliamentary
279

opinion.”

and

life

in

order to get through the debates and committee business of

to represent

-

if

not the citizen

The norm of moderation and

Labour

Britain's

i

The

voter and public

in his reactions

India question, seen as

towards the

it

was

new

British

as the test of

democracy, was another situation which would require the parties to be guided

,

by these norms.

It

party.

at least the

constitutionalism, quintessential elements in

Baldwin’s vision of Britishness was reflected
electorate and the

- then

280

was only

in acting this principle

of constitutionalism could Baldwin’s

construction of Britishness be recognized by fellow Britons and sustained.

understanding and response to the developments

what was seen

as

its

It

was

new Conservatism

India were heavily influenced by

significance for the fundamental requirements of the British

domestic politics and
Conservatism.

in

Baldwin’s

his vision for the character

also inseparable

but a

new

of Britain. British politics and

from Baldw

in’s attempts to construct not

British political identity in a period of

only a

tremendous flux

and turbulence.
This

is

evident

in his

approach

to other crucial issues he faced as leader

Conservatives. These included the Conservative Party’s break w

had formed with David Lloyd George’s Liberal Party
the issue of the political levy

7)

280

Schwarz 1984,

imposed by

3.

Williamson 1999. 267; and Ball 1988.

in 1922.

ith the

of the

coalition they

Baldwin's position on

the trade unions in 1925 in opposition of the

?81

majority of his party, as well as the abdication crisis of 1936.“

“chose to appease, using

in the interests

of

that

stability,

He succeeded by

and had become a
defending....
,

i

it

in the

all

these issues, he

sense of reconciliation rather than concession”

peace and tranquility.

all

“democracy ceased

word

In

282
- -

counts as
to be

state

something Conservatives would simply have to accept,

of affairs they were principally responsible for

was even becoming synonymous with Englishness and

national

«-283

character.

As Schwarz

argues, “the Conservative articulation of people and nation

was

°84

constitutionalized.”

In

also, at

summary,

these domestic political debates, while ostensibly about India, were

another level, fundamentally about different visions of Britain and British

identity.

However, these arguments over

the reforms also point to the need to perform

certain actions in other to sustain or maintain an identity.

British exceptionalism

and

its

role as a great

The diehards’ argument

power with a world

role

retained if they stayed in India to continue performing their mission

that

could only be

was

part of a

process to maintain their construction of Britishness. Similarly with the reformers,

handling the developments on the basis of democratic constitutionalism was the only

way

281

in

which they could pass

Schwarz 1984,

their

own

test as a full

7.

282

Ball 1988. 12.
283

Jarvis 1997, 132.
284

Schwarz

1

984,

6.
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democracy.

Thus, different visions of Britain and identity principles can be invented and
constructed through different processes like Self/Other mechanisms or the active

narratives of politicians.

identities

have

to

However, they cannot simply be declared

into being.

be accepted and recognized by others as well. Part of

These

this latter

process involves performing actions that are consistent with such an identity. The battle

between the reformers and
question was in

the diehards

part, a battle to

over their different approaches

to the India

ensure that their particular idea of Britishness could be

enacted into being.

2.5

Parliamentary Institutions and Contested Territorial Policies
Samuel Hoare admitted to the then Viceroy of

In 1934,

that “there

were 'no more than

the Bill, that the great

mass

is

thirty’

Conservative

MPs

India,

Lord Willingdon,

'genuinely keen to go on with

very lukew arm and that a very strong minority

is

actively

?85

hostile.”’

'

While the dissenters did not form a majority

they did span

its

entire

any section of the Party,

spectrum from three previous Conservative Secretaries of State

for India to retired Indian civil servants

and army or police officers who were active

figures in their local Conservative associations.

as this formidable

in

Moreover,

this

cleavage was very real

combination of diehards and rebels w as focused on “capturing these

key regions of Conservative support as the means of stampeding the Party.”
Contestation on the issue of India, however, did not lead to a quagmire or a

bloody and violent end

2S "

in this particular

phase of the struggle

Stewart 2001, 177.

:s(
’

Ball 1988,

1

19-120.
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in British politics.

Why

was

even though the

this the case

battle

was

the longest

and most

bitter struggle that

had

ever been fought over a colony in Britain? This section examines the proposition that

domestic

institutional structures also affect the

dynamics through which

the processes

of contestation are played out. More specifically, democratic governments w ith few
veto players will have greater latitude to change territorial policy.
Generally, the British political system has been classified as one where there

only one veto player."

Its

is

unitary government and parliamentarian system where the

executive and legislative branches are functionally linked, the supremacy of the laws

from parliament, the lack of judicial review and the dominance of the House of

Commons

over the House of Lords create a system where there are no constitutional

veto points. Partisan veto points are also largely limited, usually to one, due to single-

member

and

districts

‘first-past-the-post’ electoral rules

which have generated

a largely

two-party system for a greater part of the twentieth century. These electoral rules and
the two-party system also ensure that parties attempt to be ‘catch-all’ parties in order to
->88

cater to multiple constituencies to gain the relative majority."

agendas and interests

that are

Hence, parties with

focused on narrow issue areas are less likely to be

politically viable.

Parliamentary systems are also characterized by a great deal of party discipline

which minimizes rebellion or deviations from the party
and deference, a third crucial factor which contributes

line.

Besides the party whip

to discipline is the possibility of

7X7

Tsebelis 2002, 4; and Spruyt 2005, 132. This description of the British system

draws heavily on Spruyt 2005, 132-4.
2SS

Spruyt 2005,

1

32.
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new

elections and electoral defeat should challenges to the governing party lead to

its

">89

Since there

fall.

policies that are far

own

is a

likelihood that the party that

worse or

290

into

power may have

radical than those at the root of one’s defection

party, disagreements within a party

muted.

comes

may

be voiced but they are ultimately

Thus, the prime minister and cabinet

govern with considerable leverage over their

combination of factors creates

just

from one's

in the British

own

system are usually able to

party and the legislature. This

one partisan veto player and therefore, one decision

point in the British system.

As noted above,

there

is

usually

one veto player

in the British

system. The

period examined in this chapter however appears to be an exception to this rule.

1929 general election gave the Liberals 7
791

As

Labour, 288 seats.
Party

was

the other

it

two

was vulnerable
parties

and

The 1929 Irwin

260 seats and

such, a minority Labour government dependent on the Liberal

power between May 1929 and 1931

in

the system,

seats, the Conservatives,

The

to

.

While there was one veto player

no-confidence motions

therefore, heavily

Declaration, the

that

in

could have been initiated by

dependent on them.

first

controversial measure of the period,

was

supported by the vulnerable minority Labour government. The Conservative leader,

Baldwin supported the Irwin
dissension from significant

initiative but

men

within his

he faced tremendous misgivings and

own

2S9

Pinto-Dischinky 1972. 13-16.
290

Spruyt 2005, 133.
291

Butler 1986. 36-7.
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party with

some experience of

India

affairs,

ol

Lloyd George and others

in the Liberal party,

some

liberal leaders in the

Lords, Irwin's predecessor as Viceroy, Lord Reading, and from the Daily Mail.

While Baldwin was extremely persuasive and successful

Commons
join the

this

in his

same

hostile

lobby as Lloyd George

was avoided because "the

speech during the

Party’s hands

?93

il

a division had been called."

were largely
294

if

had been only personal.”"

it

tied

995

and the instinctive aversion
the issue to bring

and therefore,

down

to halt

the

to disunity.”

'

The attempt here by

to the Party leader

in Britain’s India policy failed

follow along. However, their failure

is

leader, for Baldwin’s decision

the issue as

much one

because the Liberals

2 '’ 2

Ball 1988, 111.
294

Ball 1988. 111.
294
10.

295

Ball 1988, 111.
296

Ball 1988,

1

10.
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in

and frontbench

enormous personal

gave his followers

of confidence

?96

1

...

the Liberal Party to use

“a clear indication of the

support for Irwin.”

Ball 1988,

in

Labour government by plotting with Conservative diehards,

any change

manoeuvre by making

However,

Moreover. "Baldwin succeeded

as strong as their ability to persuade the Conservative leader

power of the Party

to

by Baldwin's

keeping discontent under control by exploiting the loyalty owed

were only

?92

Debate on the Declaration, diehards within his party appeared prepared

commitment, even

to

House

little

room

for

himself as leader as of

Even

in the early

over India, he was able

months of 1931, one of lowest points of Baldwin’s position

to contain the dissenters

of his position as Party leader, and the

Men

like

trust

by drawing on "the prestige and power

and loyalty

297

to

which he would appeal.”"

Hailsham, Austen Chamberlain and Lord Salisbury

who

could have
?98

potentially led the revolt but chose not to out of party and personal loyalty.

repeated in the parliamentary ranks of the party. For example, only five

hundred
the

were present

that

Commons
?99

position.

at

MPs,

This was
out of the

a meeting of the parliamentary India committee held after

debate of 12 March, voted against a resolution approving Baldwin’s

The

rest,

especially the Party centre

who may have

support of his India policy were, as Churchill noted ‘“are

all

been hesitant

in their

afraid of being labeled

300

disloyal’.”

In

August 1929.

the minority

a severe financial

and

political crisis led to the resignation of

Labour government but Ramsay MacDonald was persuaded, with support

from the Conservatives and Liberals,

to

form what was intended

to be a

temporary

National coalition before a general election which would be fought separately by the

parties.

However, almost

the entire

Labour party went immediately

into opposition

while the other parties decided to contest the election as a National government w
candidates of each party withdraw ing

in

favor of the sitting

21,7

Ball 1988. 125.
2 )S

Ball 1988. 124.
200

Ball 1988. 125.

°°

Ball 1988, 125.
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MP. This

ith

election resulted

in the

Conservatives winning 471 seats, the Liberal Nationals, 35 seats, the Liberals, 33
'

seats

and National Labour, 12

coalition,

In the

Therefore, the National government, while a

was one which was dominated by an overwhelming Conservative

Labour had

four, the Liberal Nationals,

two and

finally, the Liberals,

After a year, the Liberals withdrew from the coalition but

Prime Minister

until 1935.

MacDonald remained

Despite the number of parties in the National coalition

government, there was really only one veto player - the Conservative Party.
only one that mattered as

all

altering the Conservatives’

From 1931
and attempted

the other parties could

have

left the coalition

to 1935, the diehards turned to the

to influence public

in the

which

Butler 1986, 47; and Stevenson and

304

Cook

Butler 1986, 45-7.

Ball 1988,

1

without

it

was

the only

means

First, the

the associations sent

Here, they targeted the Central Council, the governing body of the

National Union of Conservative Associations as

W

the

Conservative constituency associations to gain

control of the organs of the party caucus to
304

was

base of the Conservative Party

opinion when they realized that

diehards tried “to use their support

representatives.”

It

overwhelming majority.

of "breaking the solidarity of the parliamentary consensus over India.” °

°2

majority.

Cabinet, the Conservatives held eleven out of twenty positions while McDonald's

tiny National

three.

01

seats.

14.

Stewart 2001, 168.
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it

was

1994,

1

the platform

19.

from which a

direct

power challenge
using “activity

At the

to the party leadership could be

in the

launched. Second, the diehards tried

constituencies to influence the voting intentions of their

first test

MPs.”

3<b

of the effectiveness of their campaign amongst party activists, a

meeting of the Central Council on 28 June 1933, the diehards failed by a large margin
to reject a

motion from Baldwin

that delegates

should not intervene on the issue of

Indian reforms until the Joint Select Committee had ended their deliberations.

306

Despite their opposition to the constitutional reforms for India, the delegates, as the

Conservative

MP. Cuthbert Headlam

leadership because

it

would “run

The diehards’ attempts
continued

at the

it

the risk ol destroying the National

"by 737

was not competent

to

Neville Chamberlain

comment on

For observers

who argued

challenge to the Government.

that discussions

309

year.

Once

307

this failure but

again, they failed as

follow the

now

familiar

party policy until after that policy had

at the

conference, the reformers were saved by

that the diehards’

motion represented

a direct

Similarly, a dissident attempt to overturn the motion

and interventions on the issue of Indian reform should only take place

305

Stewart 2001, 168.
306

Stewart 2001, 170.
307

Stewart 2001, 170.

Stewart 2001, 171.
300

Ball 1988;

same

to .344 (with 121 abstentions) to

308

already been settled."

Government."

begin to reverse the changes did not end with

Party conference in October that

the conference decided

line that

to

noted, were not going challenge Baldwin's

and Stewart 2001.

140

of the Joint Select Committee

alter the deliberations

March 1934

failed because of the "impression

revolt against the party leadership

Overall,

it

was

and thus, the

a Central Council meeting in

that a call for a

stability

debate was a direct

of the government

the leaders of the party and the frontbenchers

on Front Benches come

that decision will in fact operate.

greatly influences and

No

who were

Government

reality is that the decision about Indian

here in England; and that the real sovereignty of India
ten persons or thereabouts

110
itself.”

As commented by Lord Hugh

responsible for the direction of Indian policy.

"The main

...

at

to

lies

here

Cecil:

will be taken
...

I

suppose

any decision about

if

India,

doubt public opinion on some questions

sometimes overbears Front Benchdom: but

at

present,

at

1

any

With

rate,

public opinion

is

not excited.”

the party leaders standing firm,

it

was

clear that

change could only come

were repudiated. Part of the price of such a challenge would be the

government and

summon
do

their

sufficient support

they

of the National

overwhelming majority. The diehards were never able
from the top echelons of the party or even from

to

its

base to

so.

Therefore, the leverage of party leaders over their

electoral defeat that could arise

deciding factors

in

own

from challenging one’s own party were ultimately

who were

in

favor of constitutional reforms for India

engendered remained within the party.

carried the

day while the

From 1929

to 1935. the leadership of the Conservative Party

members

in

bitter differences

a direction which

it

many of them may

Stewart 2001, 172.

Ball 1988,

1

party and the fear of

ensuring that Baldwin, Irwin. Hoare and the small group of

Conservative frontbenchers

310

fall

if

14.

141

was able

to lead its

not have wanted to go instead of a

quagmire precisely because of the
its

2.6

structural proclivities

of a parliamentary system and

consequences for a party's electoral fortunes.

Conclusion
During the

late

century, Britishness

was associated with

was an imperial-based
socially

nineteenth century and the

identity

first

two decades of

superiority, exceptionalism,

emphasizing

that Britons

were

the twentieth

and greatness.

politically,

and morally exceptional people who had a special duty

It

economically,

to fulfill in the world.

During the turbulent interwar years however, international and domestic developments
created an increasingly visible gap between the expectations associated with this

identity

and the

reality

on

the ground, providing the space for alternative

conceptualizations of Britishness to emerge.
heroic and imperial-based British identity

The main

alternative to this

emphasized Britishness

dominant

as being rooted in the

places and landscapes throughout the British isles and the principle of democratic

constitutionalism.

While

it

reflected in part, well established cultural trends

and an

already existing nostalgia for an idealized and rural past, the emergence of this identity

was also inseparable from
particular, its

the turbulent political

consequences for the

and social conditions of the time and

and difficulties experienced by the

politics

Conservative party. The leader of the Conservatives for most of the Interwar period,
Stanley Baldwin, was particularly important

in the

Baldw in, greatly concerned about the

of mass democracy and the problems of

social

and

political

cohesion

emphasized harmony,

unity,

arrival

in Britain,

construction of this identity.

provided a conception of Britishness that

and the timelessness of

142

its

principles and values.

The

in

emergence of

however, lead

this alternative did not,

to the

and disappearance of the imperial-based identity from

Between 1929 and 1935, these

identities

were

automatic marginalization

politics or political discourse.

politically contested

through the

long battle fought by the diehards and the reformers over constitutional reforms for
India.

Spelling out Britishness

was however, only

second half focused on what being British would

and the diehards, the constitutional reforms had

would lead

to the

the

first

half of these arguments.

entail vis-a-vis India.

to

be prevented

at all

The

For Churchill

costs as they

abrogation of British responsibility but more importantly, the end of

Britishness that they associated with greatness, superiority and exceptionalism. Being

and

critically,

staying British, entailed remaining in India and performing

and civilizing mission, a mission

that

would continue

to

benevolent

its

confirm and sustain

this

conception of Britishness. For Baldwin and the reformers, the importance of

democratic constitutionalism for their conception of Britishness necessitated that the
very conduct of British politics should follow and abide by the rules of a parliamentary

democracy. This drove

by the determination

their

approach

to the question

to follow principles of

of India which was characterized

democratic constitutionalism.

After six years, this battle over India and British identity concluded with the

passage of these constitutional reforms. Baldwin's position as the leader of the

Conservative Party

in a

parliamentary system had provided the structural conditions that

enabled him to guide and lead his party to a position which the majority did not support.

The

structural conditions of the British political

between the two factions, ensuring

system constrained the contestation

that opposition to the

143

reforms remained within the

confines of the party.

bogged down

in a

It

also ensured that their differences over India did not

quagmire.

144

become

CHAPTER 3

FROM INCORPORATION TO DISENGAGEMENT: EAST TIMOR ANI)
MAKING INDONESIA,

1975-1999

3.1 Introduction

For twenty-four years, Indonesia retained a firm and unyielding grip on East

Timor

as

its

twenty-seventh province. This intransigent policy which had been

primarily focused on protecting Indonesia from the threat of 'communists’ and 'security
disturbing mobs’ gave

when an
more

offer of

radical step

own

their

came

way

in a rather

autonomy was made
was taken

this chapter,

-

I

later, in

Timor

June 1998

January 1999 when a

the opportunity to decide

Timor however,

the Indonesian military and Indonesian-backed militias left

wake of Indonesia’s withdrawal from

focus on the following three questions:

and constituted by

twenty-four years even

why

Timor, and

first in

future in an indirect referendum. Self-determination for East

at a great price

of,

to East

to give the people of East

violence and destruction in the

proud

sudden and unexpected way

its

in the

Why did

the territory.

Indonesia, a country

anti-colonial history, annex East

Timor and

retain

face of widespread international condemnation?

did the policy change in 1998 and 1999

marked by so much violence especially

In

come about? And why was

it

How

for

and

the withdrawal

after a decision to allow the indirect

referendum

had been made?
Section 3.2 provides a background of this relationship through a chronological

development and evolution.

description of the events that have played a major part in

its

Section 3.3 then proceeds to examine various factors that

may provide

understanding of the difference

in

approaches between Suharto’s

145

a better

New Order period

and

the transitional

government helmed by

Habibie from 1998 to 1999. Section 3.4

B.J.

Timor during

focuses on the Indonesia’s view and position on East

the Suharto period

while section 3.5 examines the shift leading to a resolution of the issue in 1999. The
of this chapter takes on the task of examining

final section

disengagement from East Timor was so violent even

why

Indonesia's

after the decision to allow the

referendum had been made.

3.2

From Incorporation To Disengagement
Timor became

East

a Portuguese colony in the sixteenth century

so until the 1974 Carnation Revolution brought

ushered

new government

in a

that

was committed

remaining colonies. Distantly located
East

Timor responded

to these

down

in the

the

to the

and remained

Caetano regime

in

Lisbon and

decolonization of Portugal’s

eastern half of the Indonesian archipelago.

developments by

initiating processes that

would lead

to

self-determination. Indonesia’s military and intelligence services however, believed

that

an independent but vulnerable East Timor, together w ith the presence of the

popular but leftist-leaning political party

Freitlin

(

Frente Revolucionara de Timor Leste

Independente), would turn East Timor into a beach-head for subversive communist

activities in the

middle of the Indonesian archipelago and threaten

1

and unity.

In

August 1975, the

fragile union of Freitlin with the

Democratic Union) party disintegrated due

to the

intelligence services. Subsequently, a civil

war between the two

its

security, stability

UDT (Timorese

machinations of the Indonesian
parties broke out only

1

Schwarz 2000, 201; and Taylor 1999.
In contrast, the

member

Indonesian Foreign Ministry declared

in a letter to

Jose Ramos-Horta, a

of Freitlin that East Timor’s sovereignty as an independent nation would be

respected by

its

largest neighbor in the first

few months

became known.
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after

Portuguese intentions

to

end three weeks

later with a Freitlin victory

and

its

unilateral declaration of

independence on 28 November 1975. Within nine days of
invaded East Timor.

A

this declaration,

Indonesia

year after the invasion. East Timor was formally incorporated

into Indonesia as its twenty-seventh province.

Over
the East

the next twenty-four years, the Indonesian military attempted to eradicate

Timorese resistance

200,000 people, a

third of

in a brutal

its

campaign which

between

left

1

20.000

pre-invasion population, dead." Within East Timor,

resistance to Indonesian rule continued and intensified during this period.

governmental organizations

in the U.S., Britain, Ireland

Timorese by disseminating information about human

governments

to stop

to

and Portugal supported the East

rights abuses

supporting the Suharto regime and

Non-

and lobbying their

its activities.'

In Indonesia, a

small but growing group of radical university students, intellectuals and activists

were also

affiliated with the country’s

self-determination tor East Timor.

4

who

pro-democracy movement favored and supported

For them, the democratization of Indonesia was

inseparable from the support for East Timorese opposition against Indonesian

occupation and

its

self-determination. Intellectuals like

George Aditjondro as well as

others from the government research institute LIPI (the Indonesian Institute of

Sciences) and

ICMI

(the Indonesian Association of

began

to evaluate the rationale, cost

Timor

in their research,

publishing

Muslim

Intellectuals) for

and consequences of Indonesia’s policy

some of their conclusions

in

example,
in

East

books and newspaper

2

Cotton 2000,

3.

1

Smith and Muetzelfeldt (2000).
4

Uhl

i

n 1997, 197-8;

Fukuda 2000, 24; and interviews with Rachland Nashidik on 21

July 2004; Munir on 21 July 2004; and Wilson on 27 July 2004.
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columns/

While they were by no means

Indonesian involvement

in

East Timor,

in full

agreement on the issues surrounding

many began

to

contemplate the need for major

policy changes.

At the very top levels of the Indonesian government however, new departures
policy were vetoed as the half-island

was considered an

in

integrated part of Indonesia and

an indisputable component of the archipelago’s sovereignty." President Suharto refused

to

contemplate changes, brushing off

East

Timor

all

requests to review Indonesian policy towards

despite significant international condemnation from states as well as non-

governmental organizations during the 1990s.
original planning, invasion,

The

in

1975

that the potential

Timor threatened Indonesia remained throughout

its

8

slightly different form.

which was involved

in the

original conviction of President Suharto, and the

Indonesian military and intelligence services
East

military,

and the subsequent task of integrating East Timor, was also

similarly against any changes.

in

The

Critically, the Indonesian military

of

communism

occupation albeit

was

in a

also convinced that the

majority of the East Timorese wanted to be Indonesians. They concluded that the East

Timorese resistance who fought

for

independence either with guns or through political

and diplomatic means were either communist-inspired diehards or a small group of

Interview with Dewi Fortuna Anwar, 21 July 2004; Interview with Indria Samego, 19
July 2004. Also, see Crouch 2000, and Tapol Bulletin no.151 (March 1999):
,

2.

6

Cotton 2000,

4.

Ali Alatas, Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, had brought

East

Timor

in the early

up the idea of autonomy

1990s. See Alatas 2006, 99-104.

8

Schwarz 2000. 201; and Taylor 1999.
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for

frustrated

and uneducated East Timorese susceptible to the former’s influence.

9

Hence,

continued resistance to integration could only be due to generous but poorly

implemented integration and development policies or the actions of a small but vocal
10

and ungrateful minority.
In

June 1998,

B.J. Habibie, the

man who had just succeeded

Suharto as president of Indonesia, told Reuters and the
ready to consider giving East Timor special status.

1

own semi-autonomous

In

BBC

in

the disgraced

an interview that he

mid-June, this offer, which

entailed giving East

Timor

increase

freedom, was formally confirmed by Ali Alatas, Indonesia’s

in political

Foreign Minister,

at

its

a meeting with the

UN
1

Portuguese government representatives.

level talks

?
~

was

administration and a significant

secretary-general, Kofi

During the next

six

Annan and

months when

ministerial-

were held between Indonesia and Portugal on the former’s proposal for East

Timor’s autonomy, the Indonesian government did not consider any suggestions or
proposals of a referendum as a viable option.

1

'

Instead, they maintained that a

referendum was unnecessary because the East Timorese had already opted for

'

Moore 2001 and McRae 2002.

10

See

official

Indonesian publications

like East

Timor: Building for the Future: Issues

and Perspectives, 2nd Edition (Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia,
1996).

1

'Greenlees and Garran 2002, 25.
1

9

Portugal and Indonesia had been locked in fruitless diplomatic talks for

decade due

to

Kammen

a

disagreements over fundamental parameters for a negotiated settlement.

See Alatas 2006.
1

more than

2001, 173; and Marker 2003.
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integration in 1976.

14

In addition. Indonesian diplomats

referendum would result

in the

and

officials also

emergence of pro- and anti-integration

argued

that a

factions, civil

war and the possible division of East Timor.
In late

January 1999, these previous refusals

put aside. President Habibie

Timor's path

to

made

independence.

On

a

move

that

was

to

contemplate a referendum were

surprising but critical to East

January 27th. the Habibie government announced a

'second option" where East Timor could choose between autonomy and independence.

In

March, further diplomatic negotiations led

would be ‘consulted’ through

a direct ballot

mean independence. On August

to the

where

agreement

the rejection of

31 1999. the people of East

independence when they rejected the option of autonomy

What accounts
by Suharto’s
indirect

New

for the

wide differences

in

Order and the Habibie period?

referendum come about? Over the

last

that the East

in

Timorese

autonomy would

Timor voted

for

overwhelming numbers.

approaches to East Timor exhibited

How

few

did the decision to allow the

years, several accounts, usually

focusing on either the efforts of a transnational network of activists or the significantly

different

economic and

the rupiah

political conditions

and the economy began

under which Indonesia had

their freefall in 1997.

have contributed

understanding of various facets of these events. The next section turns
factors

and evaluates the

3.3 Alternative

to operate after

to

our

to these various

relative significance of each.

Explanations

Great importance has been attributed to the contributions of the transnational

network of
14

The

activists

selection

who

took up the East Timorese cause after the 1991 massacre of

was marred by

interference from the Indonesians.
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unarmed

civilians

by Indonesian military forces

the occupation, the East

Timorese were unable

their fight for self-determination

During the

in Dili.

to garner

much

More

and suppress the issue of East Timor

importantly. Indonesia

in international

forums

the support of countries like the United States and Australia.

at

erasing the East

Timor

issue

November 1991 when video footage smuggled
indiscriminate massacre of civilians

Dili, the capital, to

commemorate

who were

at

keeping

was able

like the

United Nation with

16

out of the country

at the

showed

in

the

Santa Cruz cemetery

the death of a pro-independence supporter.

capturing the brutal nature of Indonesian rule in a

way

it

manage

to

was however, reversed

gathered

years of

attention or support in

due to Indonesia’s successful efforts

physically isolated from observers.

This attempt

first fifteen

in

16

In

that previous reports trickling out

of East Timor never could, this video documentation of the Santa Cruz events

galvanized international attention and

in particular, that

of transnational activists.

In time, these activists were able to produce two crucial changes which

argue were pivotal

the issue of East

17

in

"bringing about political change

Timor

alive in the international arena

governments and regional

institutions like the

arena, transnational activists

Congress,

15

who

118-9.

1(1

Cotton 2000,
17

I

EU.

in East

3.

Simpson 2005, 453.

s

Smith and Muetzelfeldt 2000, 272.

Timor.”

First,

they kept

by lobbying national

IS

In the U.S., a singularly

were particularly effective

from the mid-1990s, voted

Ambrosio 2002,

some

in

persuading

to cut off various

important

members of

forms of aid and training

19

In 1993, the U.S. supported a resolution passed by the

for the Indonesian military.

UN Human
East Timor.

Rights
20

1

Commission censuring Indonesia

for

its

poor human rights record

Other countries and international aid agencies signaled

Second was

by either reducing or suspending their aid programs.”
broadening the narrow public focus on human rights

to

in

their disapproval

their success in

encompass self-determination
77

through framing

it

"in the discourse of unfinished

using persuasive moral arguments.'

3

While the transnational East Timor
contributions and

European colonialism"' and by

was an undeniable and

solidarity

critical

network did make these crucial

actor in this story, explanations solely

focused on their role must be tempered by an important consideration

regime was immune

Timor within

to their efforts while Habibie

his first

week

in office.

-

the Suharto

chose to offer autonomy to East

Suharto for example, responded to growing

pressure and signals from a U.S. Congress that had been heavily influenced by activists

by rejecting the ‘expanded' version of
civilian control of the military,

1

IMET which

focuses on

human

rights

and

and halting a proposed US$250 million purchase of

’

Simpson (2005) and Cotton (2000: 4).
it was not entirely successful as

However,

the Congressional ban

on

IMET

had been

sidestepped by allowing Indonesia to purchase the training and the continuation of

US-

Indonesia exercises. Throughout the Clinton administration, Indonesia was considered
strategically

and economically more important than East Timor (Nevins 2005. 61

See also footnote 37 for U.S. support of the Indonesian military
20

Schwarz 2000, 233.

21

Cotton 2000.

~
23

4.

Simpson 2005. 467: and Smith and Muetzelfeldt 2000. 277.
Simpson 2005, 472.

in

1999.

).

American
would

F- 16 jet fighters. In his letter to President Clinton, Suharto “stated that he

not accept restrictions on military transters based

transnational East

Timor

network

solidarity

may

on human

?4
rights.”"

Hence, the

have partially cleared and paved the

path for ending the Indonesian occupation by refraining the issue but these efforts

would have remained inadequate

in the face

of continued resistance from Indonesia. In

other words, processes within Indonesia cannot be discounted and are an important part

of the equation.
Realist-based approaches which do take Indonesian agency into account argue

that

it

was

the drastic

change

financial crisis of 1997

interest.

More

in the

which was

country's material circumstances during the Asian

pivotal in forcing a recalibration of the country’s

specifically, this perspective argues that the currency crisis,

which had

deteriorated rapidly into a full-blown financial crisis of failing banks, non -performing

loans and technically bankrupt conglomerates, quickly eroded Indonesia’s resistance

because they produced two broad effects. One. Indonesia found that
negotiating

power with

on self-determination

international donors bent

Second, the cost of occupying East Timor had magnified

had

left

27.8 million Indonesians unemployed

living in poverty and an

cent of

GDP

in

economy

that

at

it

the

was expected

in a

had limited
for East Timor.

country where the

crisis

end of February 1998. 79.4 million
to shrink

by between 10 and 20 per

1998 alone.

4

Scheiner 2000, 122.

This argument

The
It

is

is

made by Kivimaki 2003. See

p.229.

from Robison and Hadiz 2004, 150. and Schwarz 1999. 4.
also interesting to note that Simpson 2005 acknowledges that this change was
figures are

important.
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In the face of

assume and conclude

such overwhelmingly

difficult

questions have to be addressed.

and the

EU

Was

at

little

it

easy to

is

choice but to initiate the

such a conclusion, the following

there international pressure exerted by the

on Indonesia

to

was exerted, how did Indonesia respond?

become

had

that Indonesia, acting rationally,

changes vis-a-vis East Timor. Before arriving

the U.S., Japan

economic conditions,

change

its

East Timor policy?

26

If

IMF.

pressure

Finally, did the cost of the occupation

a factor?

In the

1990s, Japan

was Indonesia’s most important

trading partner, largest

(ODA).

foreign direct investor, and largest supplier of official development assistance

disbursing for example, $496.9 million to the latter in 1997 and $828.5 million in

1998.'

Despite

its

any pressure on the

to

and

considerable economic leverage over Indonesia, Japan did not place

latter

regarding the issue ot East Timor."

after Suharto’s fall,

stability

27

economy back on

track either

Australia, though an influential actor in these events,

influence

Timor

priorities

of Indonesia and the region rather than East Timor.'

into getting the Indonesian

26

Japan did not veer from past

was non-material and came from

its

In the

is

’

period leading up

which centered on the

For Japan,

this translated

by emphasizing the necessity

not included in this

list

as

its

past support of Indonesia on the East

issue.

Germany,

the next largest donor, disbursed $1 15.2 million to Indonesia in 1997

$212.8 million

in

1998.

The U.S.

in contrast,

did not disburse any

ODA

funds

and

to the

Indonesia from 1992 to 1997.
Tg

See Nevins 2005. 67. Note

bloodshed
29

that

that this

was however,

followed the August 1999

different after the violence

and

ballot.

Gorjao 2002. 757.

In fact,

Japan differed from the G-7 countries regarding

IMF policies

towards the Asian

countries embroiled in the financial crisis. See Blustein 2001, and Lee 2006.
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IMF

of compliance with

IMF

outside the

framework.'

Like Japan, the
than

human

conditionalities or providing special financial assistance

EU

0

was also

rights protection in East

future stability of Indonesia, and

indicator of this concern

ASEM

II

was

the crucial

the political

in

the

whole

ASEAN

economic support which

1

region.”'

it

An

pledged during the

London on 3-4 April 1998."
were the other two key international actors with

the United States

power and economic leverage

Timor. The former,

issues rather

Timor. The former was considered central to "the

by extension,

(Asia-Europe Meeting)

The IMF and

more concerned about economic

far

to influence

Indonesian policy on East

Indonesia as a means of restoring market

initially invited to

confidence, imposed orthodox austerity measures like tight monetary and fiscal policies.
Pressure exerted by

members of the IMF board representing western

industrialized

countries also led to the imposition of unorthodox ones which went beyond the Fund’s

These measures, aimed

mandate.

(or korruption,

at

curbing the corruption, cronyism and nepotism

kronyism and nepotisme,

KKN) endemic

in the

Indonesian economy,

included amongst other things, the phasing out of import and marketing monopolies

0

Gorjao 2002, 759. At the same time, Ryutaro Hashimoto, the Japanese Prime

Minister, had also promised Indonesia aid during a

providing
1

32

it

Ward and Carey 2001,

52.

Ward and Carey 2001,

66.

play here

during

-

mid-March

visit to Jakarta,

thereby

with another source of aid.

the

UK

Domestic

interests

of

EU member countries

were also

at

and France for example, continued their arms trade with Jakarta

this period.

33

Blustein 2001, 101

.

According

to Blustein, the U.S. representative

particularly assertive.
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on the board was

held by

BULOG.

foodstuffs and

When

agency responsible for the distribution of many key

the state

raw

34

materials.

Suharto resisted the IMF’s plan

in several

ways, the

latter, citing

lack of

progress in the implementation of the program, postponed the payment of the second

US$3

billion tranche of

its

bailout package planned for

down and adhere

Suharto was forced to back

certainly a clear reflection of the ability and

to

impose

problems
crisis.

its will,

to press for a

The

no indicators

there are

change

in

to

IMF

the

that the U.S.

State Department, the Pentagon and

°

15.

Subsequently,

conditionalities.

power of

Indonesia’s East

March

IMF and

While

through

it.

this

was

the U.S.,

attempted to use these economic

Timor policy during

the height of the

some members of the National

Security

Council were against making any moves, including pressing for political reforms, “that

smacked of
in the

4

6

trying to

undermine Suharto.”

in

February 1999. some key players

U.S. State Department and positions of influence in Washington, D.C. were

Blustein 2001, 106. However,

it

must also be noted

responsible for the negotiations did not balk
a

Even

at

Indonesians

the conditions as

means of tackling long-standing economic problems

efficiency, waste

that the

that

still

who were

some of them saw

it

as

had been a source of

and corruption.

° Robison and Hadiz 2004. 158. The World Bank and the Asian Development Bank
followed suit and withheld US$1 billion and US$1.5 billion respectively.
6

Blustein 2001, 229-30. See also Nevins 2005. 61 &. 115.
The Clinton administration, in fact, continued to back the Suharto regime in the second
half of 1997 and early 1998. William Cohen. Secretary of Defense went to Jakarta in
January 1998 where he did not call upon the Indonesian military to exercise restraint in

responding to
In

street

demonstrations.

1999. this support continued even

when

militia activity in East

Timor had been

racheted up. Senior U.S. military officials like Admiral Dennis Blair and Admiral

Clemins, for example, offered Indonesia new military assistance

in the

form of U.S.

training programs. See Allan Nairn's congressional testimony published in “U.S.

Support for the Indonesian Military. Congressional Testimony.” Bulletin of Concerned
v. 32, nos.
and 2 (2000): 43-47.

Asian Scholars

.

1
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looking into alternatives to a referendum

was exerted by

the Treasury

in East

Timor.

Department for reforms

in

37

Moreover, the pressure
order to restore market and

investor confidence did not extend to the realm of Indonesian foreign policy.

Now.
addressed

us consider the possibility that the issue of East

let

in direct

conversations between the U.S. and Indonesia through

Even

had been the case. East Timor was never mentioned by Suharto during his

there

in office

38

Timor had been

representatives and envoys sent to Jakarta and President Clinton himself.

months

that

even as the financial

was no automatic

crisis

reached a peak

in his last

last

months

if this

few

in office

-

recalibration of Indonesian interests in relation to East Timor,

contrary to what realists would expect.

In contrast to Suharto.

Timor within
economic and

his first

political

autonomy grew
rejected

week

in

Habibie floated the possibility of autonomy for East

power w hile facing what were

essentially the

problems as his predecessor. Seven months

to include the

autonomy within

option of independence

the Indonesian republic.

if

same

later, this offer

the people of East

Timor

Instead of being integral to the

security and sovereignty of Indonesia. Habibie and his advisers considered East

'historical baggage’, an issue that

economic

had

to

of

Timor

be resolved for the country’s political and

health.

For

realists,

Habibie, unlike the increasingly out-of-touch Suharto,

acting rationally in the interest of Indonesia.

More

specifically, this

was merely

argument

is

based

These views were apparent during a working dinner hosted by Madeleine Albright for
5.
a group of Indonesia scholars. See Nevins 2005,
1

1

Blustein 2001, 228; and Rubin 2003, 248-49. For example, Rubin states that they

were not pressing

for

Suharto ouster.
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on the assumption

economic

aid

from western donors led

advisers that East

was

in the throes

Timor could
of an acute

number of reasons.

made

in

of the occupation, and the dependence on

that the cost

First,

it

Such an argument however,

his

is

problematic due to a

unable to fully account for the offer of autonomy that was

June 1998, their persistent refusal

six months,

by Habibie and

easily be sacrificed for the benefit of an Indonesia that

crisis.

is

to the rational conclusion

much needed

and the sudden change

that

independence was also placed on the

to

consider any other options during the next

took place

table.

in

January 1999 when the option of

Since aid from the

IMF was

being

dispensed after July 29 1998 and material circumstances did not undergo any further
deterioration during this six-month period, this

puzzling.

why was

It

there

state interests are

one policy

in

change

based on calculations

June 1998 and another

in

policy

in

ol

especially

is

power and

material wealth,

January 1999?

In addition,

were there contrasting responses from Suharto and Habibie since both

why

men were

confronted by the same material circumstances?

These questions indicate

that the

impact of Indonesia's economic

crisis

understood within a theoretical framework based primarily on a unitary state acting on
the basis of cost-benefit calculations

and pre-given national

account for how' these events unfolded. Here.

I

am

interests cannot fully

not arguing that the dire economic

conditions faced by Indonesia were completely irrelevant. Instead,

I

will suggest that

an account that situates these material difficulties in a larger social environment will be
able to provide

more

More

insight into these differences.

these material difficulties can be better understood

if

specifically, the impact of

they are also

embedded

in

39

For a chronology ol the

crisis,

see http://www.usembassyjakarta.org/econ/crisis.html
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processes and mechanisms that take the social into account. Section 3.5 will provide a

more thorough and in-depth discussion of this
The next

section begins the task of

examining the considerable differences

approaches between Suharto and Habibie by

arguments made during the

New

point.

first

in

outlining and examining the

Order regarding the need

to

invade East Timor, the

nature of the East Timorese resistance to integration with Indonesia, and the

corresponding conclusion to dismiss them throughout the
Section 3.5 will then turn

its

shelf-life

of the regime.

focus to the changes initiated by Habibie and

some of his

advisers between 1998 and 1999.

3.4 Suharto’s

New Order and

During the

New

East

Timor

Order. President Suharto and

had control and power over the country’s security
the case of East Timor,

whose annexation and

ABRI.

the Indonesian military,

40
policies.

This was no different for

integration had been planned and

executed by Major-General Ali Murtopo, General Benny Murdani. Yoga Sugama,
Suharto, Harry Tjan, and

Liem Bie

41

Kie.

While

by other high-ranking military and intelligence
four year occupation,

40

Suryadinata 1996;

all

this initial

group of men was replaced

officials during the course

of the twenty-

of them equated an independent East Timor and the East

Anwar

1998; and Dassel 1997 on the importance of the president

and the military and their beliefs in the making of foreign policy during the New Order.
Dassel though argues that organizational imperatives and interests were the factors
underlying the policies of the
41

Cablegram

801/13/1
f

NAA; A

to

1/1, x].
1

1443,

New

Order.

Canberra, 24 Feb 1975. “Portuguese Timor”

[NAA;

Doc 95 in Way (ed.); and Letter from Furlonger
|1]|. Doc no. 12 in Way (ed.).
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A

10463,

to Feakes, 3 July 1974.

Timorese independence movement not only with communism and

mobs’ but more importantly, with the

‘security disturbing
4?

threats that they

posed

to Indonesia’s security.

Between 1974 and 1975, Murtopo. Murdani, Sugama. Suharto, Tjan, and Liem
were concerned about the
having to share a

common

rise

of leftist-leaning Freitlin. In particular, the prospect of

border with a Freitlin-led independent state generated "deep
43

apprehension

at

a possible threat to the security of the Republic."

insisted repeatedly in

that

Second, they also

documented conversations with Australian government

officials

an independent but economically poor and militarily weak East Timor would be

extremely susceptible

to external sources

of communism.

Whitlam. the Prime Minister of Australia and a trusted

44
In a

meeting w ith Gough

friend, Suharto laid this out:

Timor were to become independent, it would give rise to
was not economically viable. It w ould have to seek the help of
another country but [it] would be of interest only because of its political
importance. There w as a big danger that communist countries - China or the
4^
Soviet Union - might gain the opportunity to intervene.”
“If Portuguese

problems.

42‘

On

;

It

the pervasiveness of

communism and

‘security disturbing

discourses on East Timor, see Cabral 2000: and

McRae

mobs’

in

Indonesia’s

2000.

43

Leifer 1983, 155.
44

Suryadinata 1996, 54:

Van Der Kroef

Simpson 2005, 286; Schwarz 2000,

1976, 471;

201: Lloyd 2000. 84: and Taylor 1999. See also Dispatch to Willesee, 2 June 1975,

“The Portuguese Timor Problem as seen from Jakarta" [NAA: A 1838, 3034/10/6/9. i]
Doc 137. in Way (ed. ); Record of Conversation Between Tjan and Taylor. 10 March
1975. [NAA: A10463, 801/13/1 1/1. viii]. Doc 109 in Way (ed.): Cablegram to
Canberra, 24 Feb 1975. “Portuguese Timor” [NAA: A 10463, 801/13/1 1/1, x]. Doc 95
in Way (ed.): and Letter from Furlonger to Feakes, 3 July 1974. [NAA: A1 1443.
]],
[

Doc

no. 12 in

Way

(ed.).

Record of Meeting between Whitlam and Soeharto. 6 September 1974, [NAA:

A 10463,
East

801/13/11/1,

iii].

Timor was known

Doc

no.

26

in

Way

(ed.).

as Portuguese Timor while
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it

was

still

a Portuguese colony.

1

Yoga Sugama

-

the

head of Indonesia’s intelligence services and regular

chairman of the Special Committee on Portuguese Timor which brought the men
involved

in this

policy together under one umbrella

communism and
Australian

its

consequences for Indonesian security

Ambassador

verbatim by Woolcott
“there

'too

is

to Indonesia,

cablegram

in a

much

to

Canberra,

We

stake for us.’

at

conversation with the

at

length and almost

Sugama was quoted

as saying:

cannot permit an Angola situation on
itself in the issue

Indonesia would

which Kennedy had found himself

also be in a position not unlike that

Cuba

in a

R.A. Woolcott. Reported

our doorstep... If the Soviet Union involved
time of the

also expressed this fear of

-

at the

46

crisis.”

Therefore, the Indonesian military and intelligence services viewed the possibility of an

independent East Timor with great alarm during the Suharto period. This alarm was
turn, rooted in the conviction that Freitlin's leftist political leanings

Timor

into a beach-head for

activities in the

communism and used

would turn East

as a launch pad for subversive

middle of the Indonesian archipelago.

In the late 1970s, 1980s,

in

4

'

and 1990s. East Timorese claims for self-determination

continued to be associated with the threat of communism.

ABRI pronounced

all

resistance to integration with Indonesia and calls for independence by the East Timorese

as the

work of the remnants of communist

Pengacau Keamanan/Freitlin

GPK/Freitlin ( Gerombolan

Freitlin or

or ‘security disturbing

mob/movement’).

AA

Cablegram
801/13/1
47

48

to Canberra. 14

Doc 166

1/1, xi],

in

August 1975. “Portuguese Timor” [NAA:

Way

48
Freitlin.

A 10463,

(ed.).

Schwarz 2000, 201; and Taylor 1999.

McRae

2000, 40-1; and Moore 2001,

12.

See also “Menunggu Hasil Komisi

Tempo 30 November 1991; and “Suasana
Berdialog.” Kompas 13 Desember 1991.

Djaelani"

,

,

161

Natal Sangat Tepat

Untuk

while a greatly reduced force, was

security

still

considered a dangerous threat to Indonesian

which not only required continued vigilance but

example, Indonesian

officials,

justified military action. For

while acknowledging that Indonesian soldiers were

responsible for the shooting and deaths of East Timorese demonstrators in the Santa

Cruz massacre

in 1991. also pointed to Freitlin as the

puppet masters behind the

demonstration and therefore, ultimately to blame tor the tragedy.

49

Instead ot

questioning their policies in East Timor, their conviction that Freitlin was pulling the

strings

behind the demonstration led

security

to the

conclusion that even greater vigilance and

was needed from ABRI forces stationed

What however,

°

there.

did Indonesia have to secure itself against? For Suharto and the

military elite, the danger

overthrow governments.

came from

the intention of

communists

51

Thus, the potential presence of

was considered a serious security

threat

because

it

communism

in

and

East

Timor

would jeopardize Indonesia’s

“prolonged and continuing struggle tor national unity and

communism was

to subvert

5?
stability.”'

More

generally,

considered a threat to national unity, social order and Pancasila, the
'

philosophical basis of the Indonesian nation.

49

“Belangsungkawa
"

di

Santa Cruz,” Tempo 21, 39 (1991

"Lupakan masa dulu dan

,

lihat

ke

):

24.

masa depan,” Angkatan Bersenjata 28 Desember
.

1991.

M
5^
"

Leifer 1983, 155.

Cablegram

801/13/1 1/1,

^ Anwar

to
xi].

Canberra. 14 August 1975, “Portuguese Timor”

Doc 166 Way

(ed.).

1998. 478.
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[NAA: A 10463,

In the 1990s. the Indonesian military also gave a great deal of credence to the

ability

of Freitlin or GPK/Freitlin to manipulate the larger population whose

clamourings for independence had become increasingly visible and apparent. These
calls for

result

independence from large sections of East Timorese society were viewed as the

of Freitlin-engineered manipulation of what they considered was a mindless,

gullible

and

apolitical population.

and external forms of

In both internal

communication, the military unfailingly described the East Timorese resistance as
consisting of easily influenced and impressionable

merely "naughty children" (anak naked ) venting
educated.'

In an internal military report for

young people and students who were

their frustrations or just poorly

example, resistance

to integration

was

depicted as the result of the lack of understanding from these individuals regarding:
“integration and the

meaning of independence, whether

as a result of being left

out of the integration process or lack of proper explanation,

youth and high hopes and desire for a better

life,

in

addition to their

they are easily influenced by

issues and propaganda so that consciously or unconsciously, they
anti-integration demonstrations.”

These arguments were repeated even
anti -integration

demonstrations

in the

want

to stage

55

in the

months

face of

many pro-independence and

after Suharto's fall

from power.

Internal

Indonesian military reports attributed the numbers to a small number of misguided

youth and gullible people

4

who had

McRae

either "been manipulated by the pro-independence

Menjawab Roberto
Dakrus,” Berita Buana 16 Desember 1991, and "LSM Yg Bekerja Untuk Negara
Asing, Menjual Negara,” Angka tan Bersenjata, 16 Desember 1991.
Moore 2001.

30; and

2002. 28 and 45. See also "Pangab

,

55

Moore 2001,

12.
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clique during an economic and political crisis”
57

resistance.”

ABRI's response

to these

or forced “at gunpoint to support the

demonstrations even

demands

the ballot indicate that East Timor’s

56

for independence

as the result of the manipulation of a small group of

mobs, and

therefore, an unreliable

in the last

were

months before

still

being viewed

communists and security disturbing

and inaccurate reflection of the

true wishes of the

people of East Timor.

Was

any basis for their arguments regarding the impending

there

communism from
communism and

East

Timor

into Indonesia in 1975. the presence

'security disturbing

movements’

infiltration

of

and threat of

there in the 1980s and 1990s, or the

portrayals of the East Timorese desire for independence as the behavior of an ignorant

and gullible population?
During the mid-1970s,

one

that

Freitlin

was gaining popularity

in

may

have been a leftist-leaning party but

a small territory

was

not sponsored by any major powers

-

occupation, Freitlin

and fought

in fact, resisted

far

it

57

58

Moore 2001,

12 and 30.

Moore 2001,

37.

it

was

over the course of the twenty-four year

its

Indonesian occupiers on

its

own;

in

the

The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). one of

Indonesia’s most effective political organizations, was physically annihilated
56

was

more powerful. Moreover,

Within Indonesia, there were also few signs of a communist revival whether
1970s, the 1980s or the 1990s.

was

whose population was preoccupied

with economic and social development. Hardly able to defend East Timor,
unlikely to pose a danger to Indonesia which

it

Cotton 2001. 127.
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when

8

500,000 communists were killed
remnants of the party

to

months following

in the

the 1965 coup/

re-group in 1968 were also crushed.

By

6

Attempts by

the 1970s, the

few

remaining members of the PKI had either been killed or imprisoned. During the 1980s

and 1990s,

its

few survivors "did very

preoccupied with a

that

pitiful struggle for

little to

simple survival.”

China, believed by Indonesia to be

subversion,

was supporting

a

disturb the state and were usually

its

communist

60

There were also few signs

most dangerous and

likely external source of

revival in the archipelago.

61

Contrary to the

constant warnings of Indonesia’s military and intelligence services in the 1970s, China

no longer had any

links with the

communist movements

What about

PKI/

significantly

no doubt

had also decreased

by the mid-1970s.

6

its

support for regional

’

questions regarding East Timor’s ability to remain viable as an

independent state and the nature of

is

It

that East

Timor was

its

independence and resistance movements? There

relatively

undeveloped when Portugal declared

its

50

Cribb 2001,233.

The scholarly

literature

on

this

important part of Indonesian history, one of the worst

massacres of the twentieth century,

New

is still

small as

it

was

a closed subject during the

Order. Cribb notes that the killings have been misconceived by

for personal

had a

grudges rather than

political

political in function.

He

some

also argues that

dimension as “the Communist Party had been so successful

as reprisals

most grudges
in

taking

sides in social conflicts across the breadth of the archipelago. All the evidence that

have indicates
peoples
of the
60

61

62

63

whom

that the killings

the

Communist

army

were precisely directed against the broad category of
is, the members and close associates

identified as enemies, that

Party...” (2001: 234).

Roosa 2003, 315.

Sukma

1999, 138.

Sukma

1999. 200.

Sukma

1999, 200.

we
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intention to begin decolonization processes for the remnants of

nationwide development plans

in

its

empire. However,

areas like education, health and politics in which

indigenous society and culture had central roles were already being formulated and

implemented

in

Besides these plans, Freitlin's literacy campaign that

East Timor.

promoted Tetum as the lingua franca of East Timor was also helping
and build a
fully

common

,0

identity.

Finally, Freitlin's

economic

to forge a nation

strategies

and policies,

if

implemented, were also creating "the infrastructure for a successfully planned

economy, based on
indications in the

mid-1970s

that East

institutions, nationalist ideologies

political,

Wl

1

the indigenous needs of the population.”

economic and

Timor was a

Hence, there were clear

society with newly established

and aspirations for independence, as well as the

social structures in place for

its

development and survival as a

h

viable sovereign state.

Moreover, the tenacious resistance movement in East Timor, contrary to the
depictions of the Indonesian military, did not just consist of a few hold-outs from the

mid-1970s and
Instead, East

part

64

number of susceptible and

frustrated

members of

Timorese nationalism had grown stronger under Indonesian

the population.

rule,

fueled in

by the brutality of the military, the lack of economic opportunities and the absence

See

Hill

movement
65

a small

2004

for details

on these plans as well as information on the nationalist

that existed at that time.

Taylor 1999. 65.

66
Ibid.

67
Ibid.
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of desirable employment.

had reshaped

itself into

68

The

resistance,

an urban-based, non-violent

encompassed and united

all

tactions under

In the face of these realities in East

tempting to conclude

which had begun

that these

New

as a guerrilla

movement

movement.

that eventually

one nationalist umbrella.

69

Timor. Indonesia and the region,

it

may

be

Order arguments regarding East Timor was part of

an elaborate but absurd propaganda front masking and justifying what some argue was
really a land grab.

However,

disturbing mobs' in East

the regime’s convictions that

Timor were

communists and

a threat to Indonesian security

‘security

were very

real

during the twenty-four year occupation. In 1975. R.A. Woolcott, the Australian

Ambassador

to Indonesia stated that fears of

communism:

“existed] and [were] held by President Soeharto and by other Indonesian
leaders, particularly in the powerful military

1980s and 1990s, these convictions, as discussed

In the

disappeared. While they

communism
human

military

68

in

may appear

was

earlier,

70

had not

particularly doubtful after the collapse of

1989, a huge cache of Indonesian military documents found by the

rights organization

that there

and intelligence communities.”

Fukuda 2000,

in

East

to differentiate the private

little

from what

Yayasan Hak

Timor

and

after the

internal

1999 referendum show

communications of

the

71
it

told the outside

world regarding East Timor.

19.

69
Ibid.

70

Dispatch to Willesee, 2 June 1975, “The Portuguese Timor Problem as seen from

Jakarta”

[NAA: A 1838.

3034/10/6/9,

i]

Doc

137. in

155.
71

See analysis by Moore 2001
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Way

(ed.).

See also Leifer 1983,

In fact, the

security and

its

New

Order’s pre-occupation with the general issue of internal

obsession with the dangers of
72"

communism were

specific to

its

relationship with East Timor.

defined by

its

permanent pre-occupation with domestic

especially the threat ol

communism.

73

Instead, the

New

neither unique nor

Order w'as noted and

threats to

its

security and

Indonesians, even as late as the 1980s and

1990s. were constantly warned by the state regarding the constant and latent danger

communists who were said

(

bahaya

(

Organisasi Tempo Bentuk or

laten) of

OTB)

that

to be part of formless organizations

were constantly lurking about and plotting

to

sabotage economic development, create political instability and destroy the unity of
74

Indonesia.

As

the chances ol a

were virtually impossible
fears of

communism

was

power.
76

tool.

~

75

Indonesia after 1965.

regime argue

However.

I

how

then can

we understand

these

that the constant invocation of

argue, following Ariel Heryanto that

are

weakened by

its

it

communism

as a

legitimacy and remain

was

in

not merely a political

the implicit assumption that witch-hunts are a

See Heryanto 2006: and Roosa 2006.

1998: Alagappa 1995a: Sebastian 2006: Schwarz 1999: and Vatikiotis 1998.

Heryanto 2006 covers

this in great detail.

van Langenberg 1990. 128: and Roosa 2006.

° For example, anti-communism reached
within the ruling
76

alone a communist revolution

let

a tool used to repress political dissent, maintain

Such arguments

Anwar

4

revival

as a threat to Indonesia’s security?

Critics of the

threat

in

communist

13.

a peak in 1988

when

there

were divisions

elite.

This section draws heavily on Heryanto 2006. See also Bubandt 2005.

168

means of transforming

weak

a

state into a strong

immense

population.

Besides requiring

effective, they

do not necessarily benefit the
8

counter-productive.

Moreover,

its

one through the terrorization of a

state strength in

Critically,

anti-communism

tool of the elites in

the

end of the

New

some

Polls,

fear of

had taken a

life

communism and

of

knell

newspaper headlines and

regarding the dangers of

communism.
the nature of

own

Indonesia, even

in

81

its

its

if

79

victimization.

it

own.

had begun as an instrumental

Among

on the belief

that

Indonesians, even

communism was

letters to the editor

Perhaps most telling

is

were unremitting

modus operandi had become

part of the

common

language which reveal, as Idith Zertal argues, “the mentality of a given group,

77

78

79

80

8

82
“

Below

are

two quotes

a

the extent to which the

conceptual discourse and language of Indonesia's secondary elites or

image and conceptual discourse.”

been

in fact,

depend on collaborators and

perpetrators also

Order did not put a death

80

security threat.

cases,

long-run and have

state in

therefore, the active participation of victims in their

order for them to be

people, a

its self-

that illustrate this:

Heryanto 2006, 168.
Heryanto 2006, 168.

For more, see Heryanto 2006. 168.

McGregor 2002. 409; Zurbuchen 2005.

15:

and Van Klinken 2005, 243.

Heryanto 2006. 49.

example, was ranked number one for the question: “What is
the single most important domestic threat to Indonesia?” in polls conducted in 1984 and

Communist resurgence

for

1985 by Tempo, the highly respected Indonesian news magazine
82

Zertal 2006. 109. See Heryanto

communism was

2006

for an in-depth discussion of

part of the conceptual discourse of Indonesians.
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how

anti-

“It’s not

when

easy to recognize the behaviour of communists. This

comma

they operate ‘underground’ [inverted

is

especially so

in the original].

Under

unfavorable circumstances, while they are vulnerable, they can reportedly

transform themselves into chameleons, or
take on two
their

faces... they take all

ends justify their means.

infiltrate

means

to

become wolves

In real operations,

no longer secret they

is

it

organizations or institutions that they can use to advance their

endeavours. This

is

the so-called 'cell system' that they adopt

before they take control of them: political parties,
forces,

sheep's clothing, or

in

achieve their goal. In other words,

government

institutions

...

mass

is

in all arenas

organizations, the

and move underground. Then before you know

they restore their power.

it.

After G-30-S/PKI was defeated for instance, they adopted the tactics of

(Gerakan Tutup Mulut,

‘silent
S

armed

they disappear, disguise themselves, infiltrate

movement’) and

OTB

(

GTM

Organisasi Tanpa Bentuk,

'

‘formless Organizations’)."

“because

it's

not easy to recognize the behavior of communist’, so the logic

goes, one should neither underestimate the danger, nor be too sure that

Because communists are good

there right next to us.

never assume that the danger of communism
it

is

around

watch
is

at “infiltration”

somewhere

at

is

not

one should

a distance.

In fact,

possible that they might turn out to be innocent-looking people around one’s

home, or work

it

is

it

community.
message suggests.

We must

place, or

us, so the

If

be ever-vigilant about everything

necessary,

we must

take the initiative to

and perhaps take action against these insidious threats, before
Finally, because of their strategy of being “silent” and “formless”,

for, suspect,

too

late.

we must

not trust our

own

intellectual capability or

recognize their existence. Mercifully, the

New

our

own

perception to

Order has anti-communist

intelligence to keep us alert, as recently reported in the media, and will
that

is

necessary to protect us from the calamity that

we have

do

all

failed to

comprehend. As the Minister of Defence and Security, General L Benny
Moerdani stated, ‘following the elimination of the physical force of the G-30S/PKI. what next deserves our attention is those movements that continue to be
carried out by the residual G-30-S/PKI,

whitewash

How
in the

New

did

their traces

and

namely those movements

communism assume

such

ability,

Order imagination? More generally,

and defined by

this

power and more

importantly, danger

New

Order characterized

why was

the

pre-occupation with domestic threats to

its

security?

Tempo, 12/11/1988: 28, quoted in Heryanto 2005, 36.
G-30-S/PKI refers to the 1965 coup attempt which will be discussed
section 3.4.
84

that attempt to

84

to infiltrate’....”

1.1.

Suara Pembaruan, July 19 1988. quoted

in

170

Heryanto 2005. 36.

in greater detail in

3.4.1

Narratives of Indonesian Nationhood, National Security and East Timor
History, as noted by

many

scholars of the Indonesian military and Indonesian

security policy, had a pivotal role in the

More

New

Order’s conception of national security.

specifically, they argue that the military’s experience with events like the

Revolution

(

War

1943-1949), the Madiun uprising of 1948. and the attempted coup of 1963

shaped their understanding of what constituted the gravest threats to Indonesia.'
insightful accounts are

These

however, incomplete as the significant question of how these

experiences influenced security concerns have been

specifically,

of

left

More

unaddressed.

what were the processes and mechanisms linking these events

to security

concerns?

During the

New

Order, these specific historical events were interpreted,

organized and cohesively connected into a narrative regarding Indonesia’s origins,

life

o/

history

the

and nationhood.'

means

More

significantly, this narrative provided Indonesians with

to "locate themselves within a shared or

congruent storyline,” and imagine

themselves "within a constructed historical space, and a space that

85

For work focused on national security doctrine in Indonesia, see

Sebastian 2006. For

work on

the Indonesian military, see

is

distinct

Anwar

from the

1998:

Sundhaussen 1982; Said

1991; and Kingsbury 2003.

For more on the role of the Indonesian military

in

Indonesia’s political structure, see

section 3.6 of this chapter.

For a comprehensive treatment of the role of history
building, see

McGregor 2002. See

in

Indonesia’s efforts

For the most current and comprehensive treatment on this subject, see
2002. See also Zurbuchen 2003;

at

nation-

also Reid 1979.

Van Klinken 2003: Van De Kok

2002; Schreiner 1997; and Reid 1997.
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et al

McGregor

1991. Schreiner

7

storyline that defines other nations and collective communities.’"*

narrative

was an important

Indonesia that was based

part of the process

In so doing, this

which constructed an

identity for

on interpretations of historical events.

in turn

narrative of Indonesian identity which

88

Crucially, this

bound Indonesia’s emergence as

a state in the

twentieth century with danger, also simultaneously constructed the dangers and threats

that

enervated the regime’s national security concerns.

The next section

turns

its

attention to this narrative,

and how

constructed both

it

an identity for Indonesia as well as security threats to the country. This will involve
outlining the historical events that were a part of the narrative, the

New

Order

interpretation of these events, and a discussion of the constructed Indonesian identity

and security threats
discussion of

how

that

the construction of this threat shaped the

of national security, and

3.4.1. 1

everyday

88

its

approach

to East

New

3.4.

1

.2

follows with a

Order’s understanding

Timor.

Narrating Indonesian Nationhood, Constructing Danger

The

*

emerged out of these processes. Section

New

Order narrative of Indonesian nationhood was
89

life

of Indonesians.

It

was

told

and retold

in

a constant in the

dioramas

in a

network

ol

Barnett 1999, 13.

On

narratives and stories in the construction of identities, see a

ranging from the work of IR scholars
political scientists like

like Barnett

body of literature

1999 and Dunn 2003.

Rogers Smith 2003, and sociologists

like Till v

to that

of

2002 and Somers

1994.
Sy

McGregor (2002:

49).

History in the service of nation-building did not

Monumen

Nasional, or the National

start

with Suharto. During Sukarno’s

Museum Sejarah
Monument History Museum Museum Monas), the

time in office, he was heavily involved

in

planning and setting up the
(
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museums,

90

commemorative exercises held on

91

books,

street

names, films

like

national holidays, popular history

The Treason of G30S/PKI,

92
~

courses like “History of

the National Struggle" in Indonesian elementary and high schools,

first

museum

in

stories regarding

Indonesia to present a progressive and visual narrative of the country's

history

(McGregor 2002:

located

at

The

49).

Museum Monas which was
Monument in Jakarta had a national
criteria set by the monument committee

history presented at

the base of the obelisk-shaped National

purpose and was directed

at

“fulfilling] the

monument should ‘contain Indonesian identity’” (McGregor 2002: 49). A
member of the committee responsible for the selection of material for the museum
that the

“we wanted

said:

improve historical awareness for the purpose of nation building,
for our unity and integrity. That was it, we chose scenes according to this goal,

to give

to

people

spirit.

an academic matter,

[Quoted

in

Certainly
it

was

it

could be said to be subjective but

this

was

not

a certain mission, history as an instrument only."

McGregor (2002:

58)]

90

The most prominent are Museum Monas Museum Monumen Pancasila Sakti (Sacred
Monument), Museum Pengkhianatan PKI (Museum of PKI Treachery),
Museum Keprajuritan Nasional (National Soldiership Museum), Museum Waspada
Purhawisesa (Museum of Constant Vigilance). At the Museum Monumen Pancasila
Sakti for example, there are there are 37 three-dimensional dioramas which portray
scenes of communist cruelty during the 1965 coup as well as a series of earlier events
involving them since 1945.
,

Pancasila

91

McGregor 2002; and Leigh

1991.

Indonesia (A Concise History of the

Sedjarah Singkat Perjuangan Bersendjata Bangsa

Armed

Struggle of the Indonesian Nation) was one

of these texts.
92
'

The Treason of G30S/PKI, was not only compulsory viewing tor students across
when it was first released but also screened annually on the state-owned

Indonesia

television station, as well as

For an analysis of this film,

on the night of 30 September.
see Heryanto 2006. For the role of films in the New Order,
all

private stations,

see Sen 1988; and Sen and Hill eds. 2000.
93

Leigh 1991.

Education during the

New

Order was focused on "Indonesian language and

literature,

and Pancasila education. The subject “history” is focused
on Indonesian history and includes material covered in the more specific subject
"History of the National Struggle". Each of these subjects places an emphasis on
history, religious education

Indonesia as a newly independent nation with a moral imperative to respect the unity of
the nation

above

all else.

This imperative operates with regard to history, the co-
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94

certain Indonesian heroes,

Panglima Bescir Sudinnan)
Sudirman, during

and even a walking pilgrimage (The Napak Tilsas
tracing the journey of one of their greatest heroes. General

his battle against the

Anchoring one end of
Revolution

(

1945-49)

impose colonial
of their

life

rule

Dutch

this narrative

was

when Indonesians fought

on the archipelago

1948-49.

in

the very important four-year

the

after the

Dutch who were determined

end of World

history. Indonesia’s success in battling

War

War

II.

of

to re-

In this narrative

and finally driving out

their

more

powerful Dutch colonizers to emerge as a sovereign state and people was a seminal
event.

rule

The emphasis

was however,

that

also

was placed on

accompanied by

the success of their struggle against colonial

the equally significant

theme of danger

sovereignty and independence. Here, two episodes that occurred

this

danger.

The

first

w as

the

95

19

December 1948.

civilian leadership

1948 represented

Madiun uprising of September 1948 when communists

proclaimed a rebel government

re-conquer the archipelago.

in

to this

in

East Java

at a

time w hen the Dutch were preparing to

The second episode revolved around

their capture

of Sukarno,

Mohammad

the

Dutch attack on

Hatta and the rest of the

and the decision of the Indonesian army and

its

commander. General

ordinating. cohesive event being the Indonesian revolution against the colonial Dutch

power” (Leigh (1991,

24).

94

Schreiner 2002.
95

Sebastian 2006, 33.

Madiun began when armed clashes, catalyzed by insurmountable policy differences
between the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and the Sukarno-Hatta government,
broke out between communist irregulars and regular troops. The PKI argued that their
actions were a means of preventing Sukarno and Hatta from signing away full
independence in their negotiations with the Dutch.
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Sudirman,

to

engage

internal threats

-

in a guerrilla struggle instead

first,

by communists

in

of surrendering.

Madiun. and shortly

resolve of civilian leaders during the Dutch attack of 1948

-

96

In both episodes,

after that, the lack of

almost jeopardized their

heroic struggle for independence.

This overarching theme of threats to

dominated the

New

its

survival as a sovereign state also

Order's interpretation of the ‘Old Order'

fifteen years of Indonesia's

(

1949-1965), the

first

independence. During the parliamentary democracy period

of 1950 to 1959. Indonesia was characterized by a "kind of permanent round-the clock

politics in

which mass organizations competed with each other

level without there being

any

97

real resolution."

Governments

at

every conceivable

with alarming

tell

frequency and there were regional rebellions ranging from the Islamist revolution
generally

known

Darul Islam on

as

the island of Java to others

waged by

the

Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (Revolutionary Government of the
Republic of Indonesia - PRRI) on West Sumatra, and the Piagam Perjuangan Semesta

Akim

(Universal Struggle Charter

- Permesta)

in

North Sulawesi.

98

Despite the obvious complexity of these early years of nation- and state-

building, this period

was summed up

“The Age of Survival".
that time,

96

First, liberal

in history courses, textbooks

and other

democracy, the system of governance

was described by a senior Education Department

official

in place at

during a 1984

Six months alter the attack, the Dutch withdrew their troops and began the

negotiations which culminated in Indonesia’s formal independence in 1949.
97

Schwarz 2000,

1

1

S

Aspinall and Berger 2001, 1006.
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sites as

guidance session for prospective teachers of the compulsory “History of the National
Struggle" course as:
“a system of government which was not in tune with the character of the

Indonesian nation which gave

rise to instability

constantly changing cabinets which

became apparent. Domestic

of government marked by

made development very

difficult.
99

Divisions

security disturbances occurred.”

Besides the failure of liberal democracy, the narrative also focused on the
100

regional rebellions and ‘security disturbances’ across the archipelago.

importantly, this narrative stressed that Indonesia’s existence as a nation

safe nor secure during

its first

decade of independence. Instead,

its

More
was

neither

survival and

security continued to be threatened by domestic threats such as separatists. Islamic

radicals

and

liberal

democracy, a form of government

that

was

alien to the traditions

101

and national character of Indonesia.

The

last six

years of the Old Order. Sukarno’s

Guided Democracy, was

similarly

plagued by chaos and instability despite the implementation of the 1945 constitutional

framework which provided

for a strong presidency.

In the

New

Order’s narrative, the

increasing turmoil and political factionalization of the period and the risk that

to Indonesia’s unity

99

Quoted

in

was

attributed not to the political

system but

it

posed

to its incorrect

Bourchier 1994, 53.

110

Bourchier 1994, 54.
101

Bourchier 1994, 53. While

clearly tumultuous, the

were clearly directed

at

I

do not debate

that this

period

examples highlighted and the issues
supporting this theme of danger.
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in

that

Indonesian history was

were marginalized

implementation, the “corrupt [ion] by Sukarno’s personal ambition and the persistence
1

of ideologically driven party politics.”

In the narrative, the

history climaxes

the

New

sites that

Order

02

Old Order, depicted

on the night of 30 September 1965.

that

it

was committed

Monumen

a night considered so important

by

to the national imagination through a plethora of

included such prominent ones as

complex, the

as a disastrous time in Indonesia’s life

own

its

monument and museum

national

Pancasila Sakti (Sacred Pancasila Museum), an annually

screened movie. The Treason of G30S/PK1, and an annual commemoration day, Hari
10

Kesaktian Pancasila (Sacred Pancasila Day).
important events

in

Indonesia’s history by the

’

As

New

it

was considered one of

Order,

I

shall discuss

it

in

the

most

some

detail.

On
by which

it

30 September 1965 or G30S/PK1 (Gerakan 30 September/P KI), the acronym
is

known

in Indonesia, six senior generals

and one lieutenant of the

Indonesian military were kidnapped by a small group of middle-ranking officers in
Jakarta and later killed

Hole).

104

at a

place which

became known

as

At some point during the night and for reasons

chair of the

Communist

Lubang Buaya (Crocodile

that

remain unclear, Aidit.

Party of Indonesia (PKI) and President Sukarno were also

present. Calling itself the

30 September Movement and announcing

that

it

was

representing the Revolutionary Council during a 7 a.m. government-run radio
102

Bourchier 1994, 55.
10 ^

For more details on the complex and Hari Kesaktian Pancasila see McGregor
,

(2005).
104

This description of the events of 30 September 1965 draws heavily on Heryanto

2006.
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broadcast, this group explained that

it

had acted

in

order to pre-empt a coup d'etat by a

group from within the right-wing and American-backed Council of Generals. Within
hours however, this attempted coup collapsed after Suharto,

took control. In the months that followed, almost 500,000

that time,

PKI and

who was

its

little

known

at

members of the

sympathizers were killed across

affiliated organizations as well as

I<b

Indonesia.

Despite the mystery and controversy surrounding the politically and historically
significant issue of

the night

whom

and which organizations were responsible for the events of

and the pogrom, G30S/PKI was portrayed as a coup attempt by
106

communists.

In

events associated with the commemoration of Sacred Pancasila Day.

dioramas and the has relief

at

the

complex

at

the Sacred Pancasila

who were

kidnapped Indonesian generals were depicted as heroic figures
sexually debased and mutilated by the PKI and

women's group. Gerwani before being

Heryanto 2006.

The

killings,

killed

Museum,

the

tortured,

members of the communist-aligned

and

their bodies,

dumped

into a disused

8.

w hich were

especially concentrated in Central and East Java and the

islands of Bali and Sumatra, resulted in the obliteration of “one of the three ideological

and social streams w hich had competed for domination of the idea of Indonesia since
the early twentieth century” (Cribb 2001, 237).

It

altered the balance of

country’s political landscape fundamentally and paved the

way

power in the
power of

for the rise to

Suharto and the developmental ist army.
106

Heryanto 2006.

In scholarly
little

7.

research conducted

consensus on

this

in this area over the last thirty-five years, there has been
matter - the chief suspects featured have ranged from the PKI

and factions with the military,
and

A

McVev

recent

to

Sukarno and even Suharto. See Dake 1973; Anderson

Wertheim 1970.
monograph by John Roosa suggests
1971. and

directly involved in the coup, he

that

while Suharto

may

and the military took advantage of

(2006).
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not have been

it.

See Roosa

107

well.

Additionally, the real victims of the massacres, the Indonesian

Party and

killings in

its political allies,

were somehow made responsible

1965-66 and the chaos and disorder of the period

There are three major themes or threads present
representation of what

Indonesia’s history.

in

it

it

huge scale of these

for the

1

that

in the

followed.

New

08

Order’s

had consistently portrayed as one of the most important events

First, the torture,

unspeakable honors and death associated with

epitomized the Old Order’s instability and danger. Second,

heroic,

Communist

it

was

the “spontaneous,

and interest-free” Suharto-led military counter-attack which “rescuefd] the

nation-state not only
104

disintegration.”

from a communist take-over, but also from chaos,

Third, the peipetrators

in 'betraying’ the nation,

were the

evil

terror

and social

and immoral communists

who

seventeen years after Madiun, confirmed their anti-national,

power-seeking and traitorous behavior. Hence, communists were not only villains
this tale but

more importantly,

the threat extraordinaire to the unity, security

survival of the fragile and vulnerable collectivity that

However,

the horror

and betrayal of

history ends in the narrative with the

this day,

dawning of

defeat in this narrative of Indonesian identity.

107

Drakeley 2000,

3;

For an analysis of the

1

was Indonesia.'
one of the worst

in

and

10

in the nation’s

October 1965. the day of the coup’s

The most important

date in the annual

and McGregor 2002, 42.

New

Order’s untruthful depictions of the sexual perversions

performed by the Gerwani women, see Drakeley 2000: and Wieringa 1988.
I(,s

van Langenberg 1990, 126-7.
109

1

10

Heryanto 2006.

9.

See McGregor 2002. 50; Heryanto 2006: Goodfellow 1995; and van Langenberg

1990.
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calendar of state commemorations,

was, according to Suharto

October 1965. designated Sacred Pancasila Day.

1

1967 speech:

in a

“a day on which people’s certainty in the truth and kesaktian of the Pancasila, as
the only

life

view which can unite the entire nation and Indonesian people, was
1

1

strengthened and instilled.”

In

other words,

1

October 1965 was the day

that Indonesians rejected

confirmed Pancasila, the five principles of Indonesian nationalism

first

1

Sukarno

in 1945, as the basis ot their

peoplehood and

The New Order regime 1965-1998),
(

narrative,

by casting

communists,

its

itself as the

12

critically, situated itself

and national

enunciated by

their identity.

nation’s savior from destruction

restorer of order, truth

communism and

within this overall

at the

hands of the

unity, the ‘guardian of Pancasila*

and the authentic heir of the values and goals of the 1945 Revolution and their battle for
independence. More specifically,

this translated

very concretely into upholding

Pancasila as the philosophical basis of the state and nation which Suharto believed,

would enable Indonesia
1

at its

to put

13

fabric in the past.

(pembangunan )

away

the ideological and religious conflict that had torn

The New Order

also situated

its

main goal

ol

development

as just part of the process involved in fulfilling the original goals of

McGregor 2002,

44.

On

its

importance

in the

annual calendar of state rituals, see

Bourchier 1994, 54.
11

^

The

discussion of these five principles, see
1

13

In

Bourchier and Hadiz 2001.
order to ensure

this, the

Organizations where
to

democracy

five principles are Indonesian unity, humanitarianism, Indonesian

through consultation and consensus, social justice, and belief

make

Ramage

in

God. For

a detailed

1997.

14.

Suharto regime pushed through the law on Mass

“all social

organizations and political parties were legally required

Pancasila their sole principle, or asas tunggal" in the mid-1980s

1998. 95).
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(

V atikiotis

1

14

Moreover, the

associated with their battle for independence.

that the political

system

that

New

Order also argued

had created based on ideas of integralism paralleled

it

indigenous structures of authority and modes of social organization found within
traditional Indonesian families

more important than

As

and orderly villages where

social obligations

were

1

1:>

individual rights or constraints on the powers of government.

such, the authoritarian political structure built by the

returning Indonesia to a system that

other words, the regime

was Indonesian

was claiming

that the

New

New

Order regime was merely

in scope, content

and practice.

merely a restoration of the system

to

how

it

Therefore, this

personification of what

was

a narrative

was

should be. In doing do. the regime was
1

itself as the

In

Order way of ordering Indonesia

philosophically, politically and socially reflected the Indonesian character and

representing

far

it

meant

to

1(1

be Indonesian.

which consisted primarily of a

series

of historical

events where Indonesia’s survival as a state and nation was endangered by internal
threats ranging

from Islamists, advocates of liberal democracy

to the

most dangerous of

114

Schreiner 1997,

1

10.

The Suharto Government was
"Development Cabinets'.

On

Pancasila’s

1

1

fifth

^ Bourchier
U>

yang

known

as the

"Development Order’ and its cabinets.
development entailed achieving

a practical level, national

a higher standard of living for

society (masyarakat

also

adil

Indonesians and in that process, a just and prosperous
dan makmur) w hich was also the fulfillment of

all

principle of social justice (keadilan social) (Bertrand 2004. 39).

1997. 160; and Bourchier and Hadiz eds. 2001,

8.

van Langenberg 1990. 127.

Singapore and Malaysia are two other states where there
identity.

is

a conflation of

regime and

See Ganesan 1998 and Nathan 1998. For an interesting theoretical exploration

of this which examines the link between security and nation and state-building

developing countries, see

Ayoob

1991.
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in

1

communists.

evil

all.

was

this

17

Explicitly

summed

a narrative of Indonesia's origins

i

up as a “History of National Struggle

and

life

history

which located Indonesians

within a constructed and distinct historical space where they were

for survival against a range of dangers and threats.

S

,

Through

this

in a

continuous battle

shared storyline,

Indonesians were able to imagine themselves as a community, albeit a community with

an identity that had been constructed and constituted as a state
Critically, the construction of an identity that

by a range of domestic threats and especially
sites resulted in a

collectivity.

in

constant peril.

w as inseparable from danger posed

communism

across a broad spectrum of

process which simultaneously constructed threats to the Indonesian

Therefore, the

New

Order's threat assessment and conception of national

security did not just arise from the military’s experience

Madiun uprising of 1948.

w ith

specific events like the

the regional rebellions of the 1950s and the 1965 coup.

Rather, the inclusion of these events in the narrative of Indonesian identity created a

process w here specific threats to Indonesian security in the form of communists,

and extremist Muslims were constantly constructed and reproduced. As the

separatists,

identity

was constructed and produced, so too was

the danger to the

community which

119

,

represented.

117

1

Van De Kok

et. al.

This was the

title

1

had
I

1991. 84.

to take

through

of a compulsory course on Indonesian history

all

w hich

all

students

grade levels.

19 r .

Both Bubandt 2005: and Heryanto 2006 allude
do not explore it.

182

to this connection but unfortunately,

it

3.4.1.2 Fast

Timor:

Communism and

For the entire period of

its

National Security During the

existence, the

New

New Order

Order regime headed by President

Suharto was guided by threat assessments that were underpinned by danger to the
collectivity than

had been constructed

extremists and communists.

or National Resilience,

economy and

PO
“

Its

form of

internal threats like

Muslims

longstanding security doctrine. Ketahanan Nasional

was designed

military that

in the

to

develop a strong national identity, society,

would remain

mostly internal threats.

resilient against

PI

Besides these resilience-building measures, the military also undertook more direct

means

in the

form of

‘internal operations’

Combat Operations and

which included Intelligence Operations,
and eradicate internal threats

Territorial Operations, to contain

1

to the unity

of the nation and the territorial integrity of the

Communists, through the narrative of Indonesian
large as an evil, dangerous

the Indonesian people.

and insidious

threat

The contours of this

??

state.

identity,

loomed especially

which required constant vigilance from

threat

and the appropriate response was

institutionalized in the Indonesian military in various ways. At the beginning of each

soldier's career for

example, he takes an oath "to uphold principles exemplified by the

120

Vatikiotis 1998a, 65.
121

Anwar

1998, 478.

122

Sebastian 2006, 70.

Such operations usually begin with intelligence operations

that

encompass

activities

and

measures ranging from the collection of information and data, the creation of a
situation or climate needed for the achievement of the desired objective to taking

oppose or frustrate the operational arrangement of enemy intelligence. ” If
effective, they would move on to territorial operations which were geared towards the
political and ideological consolidation of the affected area. If they were ineffective, the
measures

1

to

military undertook

combat operations

in

order to eliminate the threat.

183

crushing of the treacherous communists

This

call

was not

left

after the

1965 coup when A.H. Nasution. the most influential

theorist during the early

decades of Indonesia’s independence, “called for the

unheeded particularly

ABRI

123

Madiun...”

at

elimination ot the

In the

PKI 'down

1

to its

few short months

very roots so that there will be no third Madiun."'"

after the coup,

24

approximately 500.000 communists were

massacred. During the course of the New' Order, hundreds of thousands of other
Indonesians

who were

communism were

accused, whether rightly or wrongly, of having
1

either imprisoned or killed.

^

Others

lost their jobs,

other personal and professional relationships because they or

w'ere suspected of

its

external relations, tear ot

suspension ot diplomatic

In

members of

their family

or having personal involvement in

ties

communist subversion

in

same response

1975 or

resulted in the

with communist China from 1967 to 1990.

East Timor, the possible presence of

mobs, whether
the

communism

spouses and

?

6
the PKI. “
In
1

being influenced by

ties to

in the last

communism

months leading up

to contain or eliminate the

danger

1

11

and security disturbing

to the

that they

1999 referendum, evoked

posed

to Indonesia’s

security and unity through the use of the New' Order’s standard 'internal operations’.

1975. the threat posed by the potential presence of

communism

to

Indonesia’s security

Vatikiotis 1998a, 64.
124

McGregor 2002.

146.

van Der Kroef 1976. 463: Cribb 2001, 237: and Heryanto 2006. 35.
1

1

“ (1

27
‘

Goodfellow 1995, 26: and Heryanto 2006; 36.
For an analysis of Indonesia’s relations

w ith China,

184

see

Sukma

In

1999.

and

its

“prolonged and continuing struggle for national unity and

1

">8

stability”

were

considered so great by Suharto and his key advisers that they were willing to invade
East

Timor

Indonesia’s

in

order to contain

own

despite the consequences of such an action on

it

support for the principle of self-determination and

its

international

129

image.

Communism

and

Freitlin continued, in the 1990s. to be perceived as threats to

Indonesia with the attendant consequences. The Santa Cruz massacre was understood

as the inevitable

outcome of demonstrations

that

had been deliberately organized and

engineered by Freitlin to incite disturbances and disorder.

Commander

of the

“If people

Armed

who
If

In its aftermath, the

Forces, General Try Sutrisno commented:

have been led astray continually disturb society, then

the duty/obligation,

sovereignty.

130

all

over the homeland,

the area is not safe,

it

to protect

ABRI

has

and uphold Indonesian

must be pacified.

We

are

aware who are

1

causing disturbances.”

1

s

Cablegram

801/13/1

to Canberra. 14

1/1, xi].

Doc 166

)

See also Cribb 2002, 231

August 1975. “Portuguese Timor” [NAA:

Way

in

;

A 10463.

(ed.).

and Anwar 1998. 32 on

this fear

and the response

it

engendered. See also Record of Conversation Between Tjan and Taylor. 10 March
1975.

1

°

[NAA: A10463, 801/13/1

Original quote:

1/1, viii].

Doc 109

in

Way

“Semua pihak menurutnya menyesalkan

(ed.).

terjadinya peristiwa tragis

dengan sengaja merekayasa bagi timbulnya kerusuhan,
kekacauan dan keresahan masyrakat) dengan menvulut. menhasut, menjerumuskan dan
menipu serta membakar emosi sebagian rakyat. khususnya para pemudanya, sehingga
timbul peristiwa yang sama sekali tidak kita inginkan bersama itu.” from "Lupakan
masa dulu dan lihat ke masa depan,” Angkatan Bersenjata, 28 Desember 1991.
See also Dua Jenderal Diganti Karena Peristiwa Dili.” Editor, no. 16. 4 January 1992.
itu.

kecuali

mereka yang

telah

131

“Pangab Menjawab Roberto Dakrus,” Berita Bnana, 16 Desember 1991. See also
“LSM yg Bekerja untuk Negara Asing, Menjual Negara,” Angkatan Bersenjata. 16

Desember 1991.
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Wherever it takes place, if the
overcome the situation.
consequences. The result has now has been

“In the end. their behavior could not be tolerated.
security apparatus

With whatever
controlled.

We

is

attacked, our last measure is to

takes despite the

it

are not willing to stand aside

when

the security

and order of the

132

nation

disturbed...”

is

Perhaps most indicative

Command
Timorese

is

Officer in East

at the

the reply of

Timor

Santa Cruz

in

Rudolph Samuel W'arouw, Operational

in 1999.

When

an interview,

Warouw

“But what glasses should we be looking
Freitlin.

If for

asked about the deaths of the East

at

result

a tlag apart

from the

133

demonstrations for East Timor's independence w^ere viewed as the

of devious manipulation by the GPK/Freitlin. Once again, the military adopted

"internal operations” procedures to counter

problems rather than

real

Original quote: "Tugas

demands

ABRI

w hat were considered

139

Interview with

November

internal security

1

for

4

independence from the East Timorese.

These

seluruh tanah air mepunyai kewajiban melindungi, dan

di

menegakkan kedaulatan Indonesia. Kalau daerah itu
kita sadarkan pada pihak-pihak yang menganggu.”
“

through? They [the deceased) were

example you were marching under

Indonesian one, what would you expect?"
In 1999. the

it

replied:

Commander of

the

Armed

tidak

aman

ia

harus diamankan.

Forces, General Try Sutnsno,

Tempo 23
,

mereka tak bisa
keamanan sudah diserang, tindakan terakhir kita
harus bisa mengatatsi keadaan. Dengan apa pun risiko yang teijadi. Walhasil, sekarang
sudah bisa dikuasai. Kita tak rela kalau keamanan dan jetertiban masyarakat diganggu

ditolerir.

1991: 24-25. Original quote: “Ya. akhirnya tingkah

Di

man

pun. kalau aparat

oleh sekelompak
1

”

1

Interview with Rudolph Samuel
military officer in East

Timor

at

Warouw. Operational Command

Officer, the top

the time. Original quote: “Tapi harus dilihat dari

kacamata mana. Mereka itu Freitlin. Kalau misalny anda berjalan di bawah salah satu
bendera yang bukan Merah Putih, bagaimana.” In Tanggungjawab Saya': Wawancara
dengan Warouw,” Tempo 21. 42 1991 ): 39.
,

1

4

(

For more on the nature, scale and scope of intelligence

activities

undertaken by the

Indonesian military, see chapter 2 of Sebastian 2006 as well as Tauter 1991
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).

procedure included the use of counter-intelligence activities

convince the East Timorese that "the army remained firmly

like the use

in

of militias to

control and that

Timorese were solidly behind the army.” ° Major-General
1

their fellow East

Damiri, the regional

wrote

in

commander of the

Timorese [had] bec[o]me

many

The unchanging response of the Indonesian
independence movement over twenty-four years
in a nation

in Dili

on April 17 1999 "that

loyal supporters of Indonesia

they could see that the pro-integration side had

understanding them differently

Adam

area that included East Timor, for example,

an internal report after the militia show of force

the majority of East

many of

...

because

6

1

supporters.”

military to Freitlin and the

reflect the difficulty of

imagining or

where the processes which constructed

Indonesian identity through narratives of internal threats

in the

form of the especially

malignant and dangerous communists also constructed them as dangers to the
collectivity.

For the regime to change

its

policy on East Timor,

see the East Timorese independence and resistance

one

different lens,

that did not arise

from processes

it

would have had

movement with
that

a fundamentally

were intimately related

construction of an identity based on a narrative regarding constant threats to

In the

next section of this chapter,

challenged the

New

in

May

when regime change

136

survival.

its

influence on the

took place after Suharto’s

fall

1998, and the changes engendered by the Habibie administration on

Indonesia’s policy towards East Timor.

135

its

to the

focus on the processes and mechanisms that

Order's narrative of Indonesian nationhood,

direction undertaken by Indonesia

from grace

I

to

Moore 2001,

30.

Moore 2001,

37.
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3.5 ‘A Line of Separation

from the New Order’: Habibie, East Timor and Re-

Making Indonesia
Between 1998 and 1999.
by

Habibie

B.J.

a

who had become

resign in the midst of a terrible

new approach

East Timor issue was initiated

to the

economic

crisis

and mass mobilizations on the

Jakarta and other major cities across Indonesia. In June

Timor autonomy within

1

and Portugal under the

half of 1998.

was supplanted

six

Timorese

in

January 1999. These

non-governmental organizations,

initiatives

were nothing short of unexpected

states like Portugal

and Australia

Indonesian diplomats like Ali Alatas and Nugroho Wisnurmurti.

been deeply involved

in

shaping the East Timor issue over time

In his important accountability

Representatives

all

as well as top

actors

who had

ways.

in varied

speech to the Indonesian House of

(Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat ) on September

21

2000 when he had

explain his decision to allow the 2-ballot option. Habibie began by arguing that

necessary for Indonesia to do so since “no less than 8 resolutions of the

Assembly and 7 resolutions of

the

UN

Security Council on East

adopted, which demonstrate that the international

East

137

months

by the even more radical offer of independence should autonomy be rejected by

the East

for

last

streets of

which became

the Indonesian republic. This initial proposal,

auspices of the United Nations during the

to

998. Habibie offered East

the focus of ministerial-level talks held betw een Indonesia

later

was forced

President of Indonesia after Suharto

Timor

188

was

General

Timor have been

community has

not

as part of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia."

Singh 2000. 321.

UN

it

to

all

1

'

recognized

Continuing

to

maintain the status quo vis-a-vis East Timor would only lead to Indonesia’s isolation by
the rest of the world.

1

lS

Habibie and his advisers also stressed that the world was no longer dominated

by the Cold War. Instead,

it

had been radically transformed

increasing attention to issues of

human

Timor question was an unavoidable
where “Indonesia’s claim
1

hold ground.’’

the East

Timor

to

and democracy.

rights

one dominated by
In such a world, the East

part of the international agenda.

that the East

Timor

It

was

also

one

issue has already been solved could not

'

Implicitly, this

'

issue

was an acknowledgment

was now very much

specifically, they realized that the East

tied to

Timor

human

that Indonesia’s

rights

handling of

and democracy. More

issue had resulted in international

perceptions of Indonesia as an illiberal and non-democratic country which flouted basic

human

rights.

convinced

a

In order to “ restore Indonesia's

that they

manner acceptable

had “no other choice but

to the international

image," Habibie and his advisers were

to try

and solve the East Timor problem

community.”

140

Habibie and his advisers wanted to restore Indonesia

was

a nation and state that

mandated by
Anwar,

'

the

Preamble

a political scientist

was oriented towards pursuing
to the

1945 Constitution.”

and an influential

14

Singh 2000, 325.
139

Singh 2000, 322.
Singh 2000, 322. Emphasis mine.

141

Interview with

Dewi Fortuna Anwar,

"

141

to its “true intent”

"its original

According

member of Habibie’s

48

140

21 July 2004.

142

Singh 2000, 295.

189

in

to

which

course, as

Dewi Fortuna

inner circle,

who

later

became

the Assistant Minister/State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and

spokesperson on foreign

affairs,

they wanted to renew and restore Indonesia to the

conception or original vision of the founding fathers of Indonesia and the 1945
14

constitution

which

Many

stressed

democracy and

skeptics have rightly thrown doubt on Habibie's claims regarding his

ambitions for remaking Indonesia into a democracy.

member

"

justice.

First,

he had been a faithful

of Suharto’s cabinets. Second, his position as President, acquired by sheer

virtue of the fact that he had been Vice-President

precarious as forces that had brought

when Suharto

down Suharto continued

for elections, military reform, democratization,

and an end

resigned,

to

demonstrate and

a result,

who merely

it

is

feasible to conclude that Habibie

who was

“cast himself as a reformer

times and stronger aspirations for democracy.”

It

that

is

however, also quite feasible

democracy was the

that

call

.144

to the corruption, collusion

and nepotism that had characterized the Suharto period, especially

As

was

in its later years.

was an opportunist and

a survivor

capable of reading the sign of the

145

Habibie could have, quite simply, decided

right path for Indonesia to take.

After

all.

Habibie and his team

did not form and determine their preferences and actions in a social

vacuum

but in an

environment where democracy and human rights were increasingly the norm.
Interactions with other actors and the social

143

Interview with

Dewi Fortuna Anwar.

environment may very well have provided

21 July 2004.

144

Aspinall and Berger 2001. 1009.
14:1

Robison and Hadiz 2004, 173.
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them “with models
Schmitz points

“What

for self-definition

and appropriate behavior.”

146

As Hans

Peter

out,

precisely

the source of uncertainty that

is

moves them

to

choose

democratization and not another course of action? Democratization cannot be

reduced to a mere exchange of strategic information among
requires parties to

make normative

their self-identifications

and changes

in their

political

spectrum

in

groups;

fundamental preferences.”

Moreover, resolving the East Timor issue was unlikely
Habibie across the

elite

it

also

choices and expose themselves to shifts in

Indonesia.

It

147

to score points for

was not high on

the

agenda of

the

different opposition groups at the peak of their demonstrations and protests against the

Suharto regime. These actors were mostly concerned with political and economic

reforms within Indonesia. Moreover, two important actors
of the political spectrum
time

New

Order

Timor was an
vehemently.

-

pillar, the

the

pro-democracy

Indonesia military

integral part of Indonesia

I4N

leader,

-

who

Furthermore, most Indonesians

in

Schmitz 2004,418.
Schmitz 2004.418.

I4S

Taylor 1999,

opposite ends

Megawati Sukarnoputri, and long-

were both

utterly

who

convinced

that East

East

did not have basic and accurate

Timor due

blackout, believed that East Timor’s incorporation had been

147

at

and opposed Habibie’s proposals

information about Indonesia’s involvement

146

stood

xviii.
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at

to

censorship and a news

the latter’s

own

141

request.

Unlike the
1

of colonization.

act

Here,

is

it

rest

Ml

important to note that

was acting

heart or that he

of the world, they did not see their East Timor policy as an

in his

own

I

am

was a democrat

not arguing that Habibie

As

self-interest.

at

pointed out above, both

scenarios are quite feasible. Rather than speculating endlessly about his motives which
are impossible to prove or disprove at this stage,

what we do know.

First,

is

it

far

more important

Habibie’s time in office was marked by a flurry of domestic
1

political

reforms which

democracy

More

set

had been made between

this

did this image for Indonesia

In

in

to

Second,

issue for Habibie and his advisers.

be identified with democracy, and the link that

come from? And how

the East

Timor

did East Timor

issue.

come

to

Where

be linked to

such a different way?

order to understand

in 1998.

Timor

image and the resolution of

how

how and why democracy assumed
Indonesia

1

were concerned about the importance of Indonesia’s image, the

need for both Habibie and Indonesia

Indonesia’s fate

^

Indonesia on the transition to democracy.

also featured strongly in the East

specifically, they

to begin with

The next

this

developed,

it

is

important to

first

understand

such significance to the identity and politics of

three sections of this chapter will take on this task.

Section 3.5.1 will outline the alternative vision of Indonesia and Indonesian identity

based on democracy

how

149

IM)

it

emerged

to

that

was being voiced

challenge the

Anwar 2000,

18.

Anwar 2000,

18.

New

in the

1970s, 1980s and 1990s and discuss

Order's construction of Indonesian nationhood

See Hosen 2003 for a more detailed discussion of these reforms.
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and identity over a long gestation period. Section 3.5.2
examination of the conditions surrounding Suharto’s
transition to a nascent

3.5.1

An

fall

from power and Indonesia’s

democracy.

Indonesia Based on

By

will then provide a brief

the late 1980s

Human

Rights and

Democracy

and 1990s. there were increasing challenges

to the

New

Order’s construction of Indonesian identity which was based on a narrative emphasizing
the threats to

its

existence as a sovereign and independent state, the prioritization of

Pancasila as the philosophical basis of the state and nation, and the argument that the

regime’s authoritarian features were inherently Indonesian. In particular,

this

Indonesian identity that was becoming increasingly conflated with the regime’s
characteristics

was being contested by an

democracy and inclusionary

alternative conception based

interpretations of Pancasila.

While by no means monolithic,

there

were certain themes

discourses on democracy of this alternative conception.
restrictions in the arbitrary nature of the state

l:>

law.

"

152

153

activists

who demanded

First, there

1X1

fair elections.

"a considerable reduction of the military’s political

views of radical pro-democracy

that

dominated the

were

and the implementation of

Second, there were demands for free and

conservative views

on the ideals of

who were

calls for

the rule of

Third were calls for

power” and these ranged from
strongly anti-militaristic to

a “limitation of the political role of the

Uhlin 1997,148.

Uhlin 1997.149.
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the

more

armed

154

forces.”

Particularly important to

~

all

was

the issue ot

human

rights,

whether

in the

realm of individual, political or collective socio-economic rights. They shared the
perspective that

human

rights as well as basic democratic principles and values

universal rather than culture and context-specific.

influential

human

rights are ‘freed

its

rights

from

core, called basic

thought

in

By

all

lawyer and

human

the mid-1990s,

(human

of the

New

cultural, religious, political

Order, stated that “when

and ethnic differences

[

human

there] rests

1:0

demokrasi (democracy), keterbukaan (openness) and hak

rights)

groups but as “key themes

an

rights, for instance, right to life, right to express one's

speech or writing.”*

asasi manusia

critic

Adnan Buyung Nasution.

were

in

had emerged not only

at

the centre of the agenda of these

public debate, [that were] discussed and promoted by the

media, academics, a wide range of semi-oppositional political groups, and elements

from within the government

itself."'

It

had also spread out beyond highly populated

areas like the island of Java to other parts of the archipelago.

How
come about?
political

did this challenge to the dominant construction of Indonesian identity

In the

1970s, 1980s. and 1990s, intellectual developments as well as

and economic changes slowly created widening disjunctures between what was

being experienced and the social expectations derived from the

New Order’s

construction of Indonesian-ness based on danger. Pancasila and authoritarianism. These

154

Uhlin 1997.148.

1:0

Nasution quoted

in

Uhlin 1997. 145.

156

Aspinall 1996,228.
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disjunctures created the conditions and opening for a viable alternative of Indonesian
identity to emerge.

Significant intellectual challenges

came from
1

'

View of the

State.

fact,

which

the

studies of Indonesian

In his 1989 thesis, Hegelian Elements

Marsillam Simanjuntak examined the constitutional

debates of 1945 closely and debunked the

constitution, on

new

7

postcolonial history from Indonesian scholars.

in the Integralist

critical

New

Order’s contention that the 1945

regime was based, was a realization of integralism.

Marsillam pointed out

of political rights

that the inclusion

1945 negated the validity of such an argument.

1

S

In

in the constitution in

159

Another crucial challenge came from Adnan Buyung Nasution’s massive study
of the debates of the Constituent Assembly from 1956 to 1959. His study was
revealing “the depth of

commitment
160

to political rights

and freedoms among the elected

delegates to the assembly.”

These debates were instrumental

Order's claims “that notions of

human

rights

in

countering the

this period,

"S

Bourchier 1997, 168.

Bourchier 1997, 168.

1V)

Bourchier 1997. 168.
160

Bourchier 1997, 177.
161

161

prominent human rights lawyer, Mulya Lubis also added

these counter-histories. In his doctoral thesis,

17

New

and democratic checks on executive

authority d[id] not have a legitimate basis in Indonesian history ...”

During

critical in

Bourchier 1997. 177.

195

Lubya not only argued

to

“that the concept

of universal

was

that "it

human
the

tights

New

was widely accepted

mid

to late

Order’s preoccupation with order and

fundamental incompatibility between
popular rights

in the

come under

human

sustained attack

1960s” but maintained
than any

stability, rather

which saw

rights and indigenous culture

at

both the ideological and political levels
169

during the tenure ol the Suharto government."

In

fair

showing

that the liberal ideas

and peaceful elections, a

and system of

free press, politicians

a respect of

human

intellectual

developments provided those

rights

were

in place

a mostly independent judiciary,

committed

to

democratic values, and

and favored during the 1950s and 1960s, these

who were promoting

based on democracy and human rights with the basis

to

an alternative Indonesia

argue that these concepts and

principles were not alien to the character, history or tradition of Indonesia.

'

1

Besides these intellectuals, students and activists also challenged the

of the regime’s interpretation of Pancasila and
during

this period.

Activists like

propounded by Suharto and
one

that

the

its

Order

in order "to

was against colonialism and imperialism and

integralist

hegemony

construction of Indonesia nationalism

Munir consciously deconstructed

New

’

the nationalism

focus or frame nationalism as
1,4

for justice.”

Instead of the

and nativist elements which had taken on increasingly authoritarian features,

these activists were consciously

expounding a new

history and origins that differed

from the dominant narrative disseminated by the

military and state.

l(

’~

163

They presented

interpretation of Indonesia life

a vision of and for Indonesia that

Bourchier 1997. 178.

Uhlin 1997.221.

164

Interview with Munir, 21 July 2004.

196

was

"related to

justice,

humanitarian issues,
1

history.”

to Indonesia’s principles at

independence and Indonesia’s

66

Economically, the government’s development program had
rising prices,

by the 1970s,

to

and the displacement of many medium- and small-scale indigenous

166

businesses.

led.

It

was

also characterized by

mismanagement, corruption and wasteful

extravagance. Later, the patrimonial and oligarchic elements of the regime also became

far

more pronounced

own

private

as Suharto’s cronies

economic fiefdom.

167

single infrastructure project that

By

In

between

was awarded

economic

fair

means

to participate in the

disparities that had

country. Typically, Suharto’s

crisis,

in

them without

they had connections with

from Pancasila's principles of social

justice,

and

many non-governmental

organizations initially formed

modernization of Indonesia were pointing to the

developed out of the regime’s development policies as

well as the arbitrary actions of

its

state

agencies as a contravention of Pancasila's

166

Interview with Munir, 21 July 2004.

Aspi nail 1996, 219.

16

Aspinall and Berger 2001, 1008; Robertson-Snape 1999.
168

almost every

and efficient economic development with what was actually

taking place. In the late 1970s,

166

in

168

social expectations derived

economic

in the

Indonesia as their

Indonesia, these economic changes were leading to widening differences

promises of rational,

as a

For example, they were involved

the time of the 1997

hundreds of companies.

to treat

would enjoy a 10-15 percent stake

children, acting as local agent,

paying for them.

and children began

Schwarz 2000, 314.
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principles of social justice, and consultation and consensus respectively.

1980s.

many of these NGOs were arguing

that "political

and

social

1

"
'

By

the

mid-

problems were a

product of deep inequalities which called for more than mere policy adjustment, but

rather fundamental reconstruction of government, society, and the

economy."

1

"

By

the

1990s. the regime’s increasingly pronounced patrimonial and oligarchic elements as
well as the worsening of inequalities already present in Indonesia’s social structure

magnified

in

vivid

ways

the disjunctures that existed

ideals of an identity for Indonesia based

by Pancasila. worked together towards

between

the stated principles

and

on an integrated family where everyone, united

common

goals of social justice and equality and

what was actually unfolding.

Changes

in

the political arena also enlarged these discrepancies.

Sukarno’s daughter. Megawati Sukarnoputri
in the

in the

The

rise

PDI (Indonesian Democratic

of
Party)

mid-1990s was one such significant development. For many Indonesians.

Megawati was closely associated with her

now

father,

1

President Suharto and the New- Order regime.

1

a

symbol of opposition

to

Unlike Suharto and the increasingly

coiTupt and nepotistic conditions of his rule, Sukarno and by association, Megawati,

were perceived as devoted

to

and a part of the people

positions to enrich themselves or their families.

corruption and social and economic injustice

1

"

made

169

Jetschke 1999. 146.
170

Aspi nail 2006.91.
171

Eklof 1999, 27.
172

Eklof 1999. 27.
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who would

never use their

Megawati’s own repeated attacks on
her the representative of the poor.

When

were suggestions

there

that

Megawati should be nominated

for President

of Indonesia, the regime reacted by engineering her overthrow as head of the PDI. a
position to which she had been popularly elected.

credible threat to Suharto

underscored
1

1

minor.

that there

174

little

control of the popular process, the regime’s reaction

would be no tolerance of such

political challenges,

Her unjust removal was conceived “as symbolic of

injustice in society"

as

who had

Despite the fact that she posed

however

a general pattern of

by her supporters. Moreover, the regime’s efforts to portray

itself

one that was based on ‘Indonesian-style’ democracy and the principles of consensus

and consultation was also debunked
Finally, the

fall

in a highly visible

communism

momentous changes

still

posed a

in the international

communists and other

these events.

of the Berlin wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the

restoration of Indonesia’s diplomatic ties with

the claims that

manner by

China

in the

1990s called into question

real security threat to Indonesia.

These

system challenged the regime’s obsession with

"security disturbing

mobs’

that

had resulted

in the

massacre of

500.000 Indonesians between 1965 and 1966. the extrajudicial killings of an estimated
3.000

to

5,000 petty criminals between 1983 and 1985, the deaths of 2,000 alleged

members of the Acehnese

separatist

movement between 1989 and

of more than 200,000 East Timorese.'

undermined

173

the

New

° More

34.

174

Eklof 1999, 49.
1

importantly, these developments

Order construction of Indonesian identity

Schwarz 2000, 323; and Eklof 1999.

15

Jetschke 1999, 139.
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1991, and the deaths

that

had been

constituted through a narration of nationhood under constant threat, particularly through

communism.

the specter of

While these new developments posed considerable challenges
and integrity of the

New

Order's representation of Indonesian identity, the fusion of the

authoritarian regime’s characteristics with this identity

challenge to

it

would

to the credibility

meant

that part

of a successful

also require a successful challenge to the regime. Despite the

impunity of the military and the growing excesses of Suharto, his coterie of family

members and

close aides, this

was by no means automatic or guaranteed

reasons. First. Suharto had been able to

draw strength from

had enjoyed steady economic growth and improvements
1

government had restored order and purpose
ineffective system. Third,

it

to

unity.

in living standards

Second, the

a chaotic

to foster a greater sense of

According

to

Adam

under his

New Order

what had previously been

had also been able

which had strengthened national

the fact that Indonesians

f>

leadership, a sharp contrast to the Sukarno period.

for three

and

nationhood

Schwarz, many

Indonesians “would say that an extended period of restricted political activity and

circumscribed press freedom -

animosities are not

A

great

many

freedom

in

challenges

177

which public expressions of ethnic and religious

welcome - has helped lower

177

the temperature in sensitive areas."

Indonesians had therefore, been w illing to pay the price of less political

exchange

for

economic growth,

may have remained

convergence of a
176

in

set

political stability

challenges in a long line of challenges

of conditions that lined the path to the

Schwarz (2000:

41).

Schwarz (2000:

41).

and order. Hence, these

200

fall

if

not for the

of Suharto. The next

section discusses these conditions as they are particularly important for understanding

how

the alternative conception of Indonesia based

democracy and human

3.5.2

rights finally

emerged

on the ideals and principles of

as the

dominant option.

Regime Change: Exit Suharto; Enter Habibie
During the

effects of the

last

months of 1997, Indonesian society began

Asian financial

crisis.

When

the Indonesian rupiah lost

value within a six-month period, poverty levels escalated.

economic
measures

crisis did not

in

to feel the acute

In the

58 percent of

its

beginning, the

appear insurmountable as the Indonesian government had taken

August and September

that

were widely praised internationally. This was

short-lived as Suharto’s unwillingness to take concrete actions against the corruption

and nepotism of his regime led

to a gradual but

continuous erosion of public and market

confidence. Despite rising unemployment and poverty rates, Suharto put up fierce
resistance against the dismantling of the business empires of his family and cronies.

During the

first five

months of 1998, Suharto faced growing opposition

form of many small groups which, although ready

hampered by

to challenge the regime,

Obvious national figures

like

Eklof (1999).
*

who opposed

who
180

Suharto.”

Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Sukarnoputri never

l7s

17

were

the lack of unity and the absence of leaders with a national profile

could have “become a symbolic rallying point for people

in the

Aspinall and Berger 2001.

180

Aspinall 2005, 214.

201

1

adopted

8

Hence, organized opposition remained weak despite the

that mantle.

increasing opposition to the regime between January and

In the end,

1

82

As

impasse.

it

was

protests in university

March 1998.

campuses across Indonesia

these protests escalated and students

became

determined center of a broad middle-class coalition, some

Amien

Rais began to speak openly about mass

others publicly withdrew their support from Suharto.

on

May

12,

to bring

of the regime like

about change while

The climax of these

protests

came

1998 when 4 students of Jakarta's Trisakti Univerity were shot dead by

snipers, sparking off

what were

at that

1

experienced by modern Indonesia.
mobilizations took place

in cities

184

almost

broke the

the voluble and

elite critics

movements

that

all ol

the ruling elites.

time,

two days of

8^

In the

week

the

most serious rioting

after the riots, very large student

across Indonesia and Suharto

On May

was abandoned by

20. 1998. he resigned and

was replaced by

B.J. Habibie.

Since the

fall

of Suharto took place within a year of the worst economic crisis

Indonesia had ever experienced,
a direct cause of Suharto’s

1

8

Aspinall 2005, 215.

fall

Wahid

it

is

tempting to conclude

and regime change

for example,

in

that the

economic

crisis

was

Indonesia. While the acute effects

remained publicly reconciled with Suharto

while Megawati remained preoccupied with invalidating the leadership of the man who
had replaced her as party chairman with the machinations of the New Order through
legal means.
18 ?

Aspinall 2005, 229. For

more on

the role of students in the fall of Suharto, see

Aspinall 2005.

Aspinall 2005, 232.
184

Aspinall 2005, 235.

202

of the economic crisis in the form of escalating employment and poverty drove a range
of social and political forces into action and was important

is

unable to explain the

critically for the

way

purposes of

in

hastening Suharto’s

it

which Suharto was driven from power. Second and

in

this chapter,

why was

Suharto's

fall

followed by a

democratic transition instead of a reconstituted version of authoritarianism
.

fall,

like in

.-,185

.

Malaysia?

In Indonesia, Suharto

who abandoned him
former

in

in

was brought down by

loss of support

power escalated when

the

May

riots

and student mobilizations which brought

‘

When

between abandoning Suharto or escalating unrest, the
their support.

Why

confronted by a stark choice

elite

chose the former.

187

Suharto knew that he was no longer able to hold on to power.

however, was Suharto's resignation followed bv a democratic transition?

The most important factor here was
rights

elite

increasing numbers as the costs associated with having the

Indonesia to the very edge of serious violence.

Without

from the ruling

the fact that the alternative discourses

on human

and democratization, themes propagated by opposition groups over the 1990s

regarding Indonesia, had “slow

ly but

perceptibly shift[ed] the terrain of legitimacy

‘

under the government’s feet.”

1

XS

Aspinall 2005, 252

&

209.

'

During the 1990s,

Burma

is

this shift in the official political

another example.

186

Aspinall 2005, 232.
187

Aspinall 2005, 235.
188

Aspinall 2005, 258.
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sphere in Indonesia could be discerned
189

i

i

behavioral, rhetorical and communicative

at the

levels.

In

1993. for example, a National

As Anja Jetschke

Indonesia.

in

the part of the Indonesian

Commission on Human Rights was

points out, this

government

for

the Indonesian state, a clear illustration of

1

these

norms

in its

domestic context.

90

it

was

was

its

established

a highly significant concession

institutionalizing

human

rights within

growing receptiveness and acceptance of

At the rhetorical and communicative

Indonesia began to openly acknowledge that

on

it

had

a

human

international foras like the United Nations after years of

rights

making

problem

levels.

in

culture-specific

counter-arguments, invoking the principle of non-interference, and questioning the
legitimacy of international jurisdiction. After the Santa Cruz massacre in 1991 for

example, members of the Commission on
delegates arrived

at

a

and developed ways
the

UN Human

benefit

19 ?

~

description of the

Rights

human

(CHR) and

rights situation in Indonesia

191

to address

it.

In 1992. the

Indonesian

Indonesian

human

rights delegate at

Rights Commission stated that their motivation was "to learn and

from such a

Indonesia."

common

Human

visit in

order to minimize,

if

not eradicate, the practice of torture in

This statement was significant for two reasons.

Indonesian government’s

first

Firstly,

it

was

the

public acceptance of allegations of torture in the

IS9

Jetschke 1999, 141.
19<)

Jetschke 1999. 158.
191

Jetschke 1999, 159.
192

Jetschke 1999, 159.
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193

Secondly,

country.

it

was an acknowledgment of

norm. Moreover, discussions were

later

the validity ot the international

conducted on the basis of the consensual norm

of human rights and consequently, on matters of norm compliance and
194

implementation.

that

Rhetorically, regime leaders were also “routinely

.195

demokratisasi was unavoidable by the mid-1990s.”

human

rights

‘

were becoming increasingly legitimate norms

In short,

at all

acknowledging]

democracy and

levels of Indonesian

society.

Critically, the opposition’s

broad demands for democracy and

could not be avoided by the surviving ruling

Democracy became
1

be

the only

game

left in

elite

human

rights

once Suharto’s presidency collapsed.

town and substantial democratic reform had

to

>(1

initiated.

Politically

however, the emergence of alternatives based on ideas of democracy

and human rights did not result

in the

immediate emergence of leadership from the

opposition ranks. Instead, the dispersed and fragmented state of the opposition created
a situation where

it

was impossible

for the opposition to coalesce around a central figure

or a single political platform to represent a viable alternative government.

of this as well as his “offer to hold free and

fair elections as the

143

Jetschke 1999, 159.
144

Jetschke 1999, 160.
145

Aspinall 2005, 48.
146

Aspinall 2005, 258; and Berger 1997.
147

Aspinall 2005, 218

& 228.
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way

197

As

a result

to resolve the

198

political crisis,”

Habibie was

with the reins over Indonesia for this transitional

left

period.

When

he began the process of governing, one of the

to tackle

was

the resolution of the East

why

this

change took place.

and

3.5.3

Timor

issue.

In the

first

matters Habibie chose

next section,

I

examine how

The Habibie Interregnum: East Timor and Re-Making Indonesia
By

came

the time Habibie

significance of the East

he was placed

in

Timor

199

During

issue.

charge of global

he met foreign leaders.

into power, he

affairs

Moreover,

his

known from

their connections

the

time as vice-president of the country,

and East Timor was always raised whenever

his chief advisers

were Dewi Fortuna Anwar. Indria Samego and
he had

was much more aware of

Umar

w ith 1CMI and

while he was vice-president

Juoro, academics and intellectuals

its

think-tank.

C1DES

(Centre for

200

Information and Development Studies).'

Anwar and Samego
Timor policy

in particular,

in their private

Samego had been personally

had already been

critical

of Indonesia’s East

capacity as academics before Habibie’s rise to power.

critical

and skeptical of the government’s reasons and

justification for the integration of East

Timor

into Indonesia.

While many

in the

New

Order saw East Timor as Indonesia’s twenty-seventh province. Samego understood East

198

Aspinall 2005, 271.
199

D.F.
?oo

Anwar, personal interview,

Anwar was

was Assistant

21 July 2004.

Assistant to the Vice-President for Global Affairs while Indria

to the Vice-President in the area of Politics

2001: Greenlees and Garran 2002; and Tapol Bulletin

on Habibie.

206

Samego

and Security. See Crouch

who

also point to their influence

Timor

to be “culturally, historically

and from the perspective of international law, not

?01

related to Indonesia.”'

In an op-ed,

Samego

wrote:

“In order that the decolonization of East

Timor

is

considered suitable for

universal standards and Indonesia’s intervention can be met well,

advisable to weigh East Timor’s wish to decide
better lor us.

’

its

own

fate.

it

Maybe

will be
this will

be

2(p“

Anwar had conducted

research on East Timor and other conflict areas in

Indonesia while she was with the Center for Regional and Political Studies

?03
'

at

LIPI.'

There, the researchers had concluded that the root causes of the conflict in East Timor
arose from the fact that historically. East

Timor had never been

part of Indonesia but

had been incorporated into the republic through what Anwar described as a problematic
military intervention that had never been internationally condoned. Moreover, they

recognized that the continuing East Timorese resistance only resulted

domination and repression.
cyclical situation

It

in greater military

had evolved into an increasingly violent, untenable and

where resistance led

to military repression

and human rights abuses
9()4

which
LIPI.

in turn

invoked more resistance as well as international criticism and so on."

Anwar and

her colleagues had already concluded that

it

was

cycle of violence. Self-determination had also been discussed. At

also

coming

201

Indria
202

203

to similar conclusions.

November

end the

CIDES. they were

Various studies conducted on East Timor showed

Samego, personal interview. 19 July 2004.

Republika, 29

essential to

At

1996.

D.F. Anwar, personal interview, 21 July 2004.

204
Ibid.

207

that the situation

was unsustainable and “a solution

just to Indonesia”

that

would be

just to East

Timor and

was needed.

Therefore. Habibie’s advisers, coming from the liberal wing of ICMI, which he
chaired from

Timor

New
and

its

founding

until

he became president, had already thought of the East

ways fundamentally

issue in

different

from the military and Suharto when the

Order collapsed. Dewi Fortuna Anwar who became senior foreign policy adviser

many

say. the 'real' Foreign Minister during Habibie's time in office, likened the

unresolved East Timor issue to an appendix, mostly useless

dangerous

to the rest

of the body

politic

when

when dormant

?06

'infected'.

In fact,

it

but highly

was considered

an infected appendix that had to be removed for Indonesia to recover, stay healthy and

achieve

its

national interests

which were “the consolidation of democracy,
•>07

strengthening ol national unity, and economic progress.”"

the status

quo

vis-a-vis East

Timor would block

In

other words, retaining

efforts to restore

and renew Indonesia.

For these policymakers then. Indonesia’s national interests were tied to a resolution of
the East

Timor

issue.

The question

that

remains then

is this:

how

exactly did the two

become entwined?
Politically.

Habibie and his team were faced with the urgent matter of initiating

democratic reforms

same time,
also

meant

in a

domestic climate which would accept nothing

the collapse of the

that

New

At the

Order where regime and nation had been conflated

being Indonesian was no longer synonymous with the

"*06

D.F. Anwar, personal interview, 21 July 2004.
207

less.

D.F. Anwar, personal interview. 21 July 2004.
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New

Order

The opposition's promotion of democracy and

construction of Indonesian identity."

human

rights for Indonesia

had not only become the only legitimate way of organizing

Indonesia politically but the basis for a

In the

time that he was

new Indonesian

in office.

identity.

Habibie and his team removed controls on the

media, freed dozens of political prisoners, annulled the ban on political parties, called
for

new parliamentary

the

end of 1999.

work on

elections in mid- 1999, and the selection of a

In addition, a

team of seven

president by

was also put together

political scientists

to

which would fundamentally reconfigure Indonesia’s electoral and

three laws

political system.

These laws

Elections and the

Law on

the

-

the

Law on

Political Parties, the

Composition of the MPR.

significant for building the structural

framework

Indonesia out authoritarianism into a

new regime

least, the

new

that

the

Law on General

DPR

and

would provide

DPRD

-

were

the basis for pulling

type which would include, at the very

elements of an electoral democracy.

Economically, Habibie and his advisers were faced with urgent economic
problems.

In

approaching these problems, they were convinced of three matters.

the financial crisis had increased Indonesia’s

particularly the western

concerned

that this

world countries.”"

was an outside world

continuing occupation of East Timor.

9J0
"

that

dependence “on

More

210

19.

Anwar

19.

2000,

importantly, they were far

•

The East Timor

Aspinall and Berger 2001, 1009.

Anwar 2000,

the outside world,

more

had never recognized Indonesia’s

" IS

2(W

First,

209

•

issue had in tact, inflicted

considerable

damage

to Indonesia's

image and would continue

to

do so especially

in a

world where norms of human rights and democratic governance had emerged as the

common

1

standard for domestic conduct.'

In

order to reverse the

damage and

get the

help that they needed, they were convinced that they had to restore improve Indonesia's

image

in the

eyes of the world.

212
"

During the early days

part of the path

involved

in the restoration

Timor

issue in a

way

the East

that

economic reasons - he did so

awareness

to offer

was

the resolution of

to the international

autonomy

to East

community.

Timor was due

213

to

in order to obtain the help that Indonesia required for

economic recovery. However,
also rooted, in the

of Indonesia's image

was acceptable

At one level Habibie's decision

ol Habibie's time in office,

this

was

a decision, as their statements show, that

that Indonesia

was operating

its

was

in a larger international

context where democratic and liberal norms for domestic conduct were on the

ascendant.

rest

In

Timor

other words, resolving the East

issue

was

a

means

to signal to the

of the world that Indonesia had changed and was no longer the Indonesia of the
also provided

Suharto period.

It

and

understood

his advisers

to

them with

a

way

to align

Indonesia with what Habibie

be the broader normative structure of international

politics.

Thus,

this

was

advisers played a part

perform

2,1

212'

213

a decision

where

- they chose

strategic thinking

to initiate a policy that

their self-described identity as a

Anwar

democracy

2000, 19.

D.F. Anwar, personal interview. 21 July 2004.

Singh 2000.325.

210

to

on the

part of Habibie

would enable them

convince the

rest

and

his

to

of the world

that

genuine

politieal

economic help
where they
that

would

changes were afoot

that they

utilized their

Indonesia, and therefore, to obtain the

in

needed. At the same time however, this was also a decision

knowledge and awareness of

correlate to the

norms of

the social context to act in a

the situation in service of particular ends.

specifically, the broader social structure of international politics

human

rights

was also profoundly embedded
six

months

after

was “prepared

to accept

was

Habibie’s

initial

therefore, a decision that

proposal, Indonesia and Portugal discussed

autonomy

for East

Timor A

some kind of autonomy

By December

for East

? 15

to discuss self-determination or

A

letter

1998. Indonesia

Timor while leaving

to the resolution of the final status ol the territory.”

changed.

where democracy and

in the social.

?14

a model of wide-ranging

open

~

It

independence for East Timor.

from Australia led to a re-evaluation of

radical option ol

becoming an independent

the door

was however, not ready
In

January 1999.

this offer

and

all this

to the

subsequent announcement that Indonesia was ready to give East Timor the

214

More

had become de rigeur for domestic conduct provided both the wellspring

for their actions as well as the constraints on them. This

For

way

much more
216

state

should they reject autonomy.'

Gorjoa 2002, 153.

Indonesia’s plan called for defense, diplomacy, and fiscal and monetary policies to be

reserved for the central government in Jakarta. Negotiations between Indonesia and
Portugal were to be conducted 'without prejudice to their basic positions on the issue of
sovereignty’.
21

"

9 16

Gorjoa 2001, 106.

By

2006;

all

accounts, the letter from

Anwar

Howard played

a role in this change. See Alatas

2000; Gorjoa 2001, 107; and Greenlees and Garran 2002.

Australia, the only western state to formally

sovereignty over East Timor, had retained
repeatedly arguing that East

and actively sought

at this time.”"

in Australia's overall

that “it

"affirmed confidence in the unilateral

to maintain order

*

It

was

not until the last

and security

in the

weeks of 1998

province,

that

was

that a shift took place

stance on East Timor.

Habibie which signaled

In a letter to

emphasized

it

integral part of the Indonesian

moderate the vocal international criticism of Jakarta
1

gathering

In addition,

armed forces

to

position even after Suharto’s resignation,

Timor should remain an

republic during this period.

ability of Indonesia’s

its

acknowledge Jakarta’s claim of

that “Australia’s

this

change, the premier, John Howard,

support for Indonesia’s sovereignty [was] unchanged” and

has been a longstanding Australian position that the interests of Australia.

Indonesia and East Timor [were] best served by East Timor remaining part of

More

Indonesia.”

importantly, he also noted that “there

was

a decisive element of

East Timorese opinion [which was] insisting on an act of self-determination.”"

such, he suggested that

the East

"it

Timorese desire

early and final decision

217

218

Chalk 2001.

2;

Chalk 2001,

2.

219

See Text
in

ol

East Timor

for an act of self-determination in a

on the future

status of the province.”

manner which avoids an
In regard to this.

and Cotton 2001, 135.

Transition 1998-2000:

Dept of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2001

"°

As

might be worth considering, therefore, a means of addressing

Prime Minister Howard's

in

0

Letter, 19

December

Letter, 19

December 1998.

1998.

letter to

An
).

President Habibie. 19

December 1998

Australian Policy Challenge (Canberra:

p. 182.

[Herein. “Letter"]

Howard

referred to France’s

Matignon Accords with

Indonesia on the issue of East Timor.

New

222

For Habibie, the parallel Howard drew

in his letter

with East Timor and France’s colonial relationship with
particularly startling. After receiving

Caledonia as a model for

between Indonesia’s situation

New

Caledonia was

more information regarding

Accords from Foreign Minister Ali Alatas

at

an

initial

meeting

the

Matignon

to discuss the letter.

Habibie responded:

Like

“But

New

Why

does he compare us with France and East Timor with Caledonia?””

many

Caledonia

is

other Indonesians,

a French colony and that

it

was

a colonial arrangement.
923

appears that Habibie was unaware of the

full

circumstances surrounding East Timor’s incorporation into Indonesia.

At the cabinet meeting convened to discuss the

letter in late

Habibie, reportedly, asked the following rhetorical question:

East Timor, because this

oppose colonialism.”'"

to

impact of

this

is

actually violating our

4

Anwar, who was

"What

own commitment

also present

at

January 1999,
are

to

we doing

in

our constitution

the meeting, described the

comparison in the following way:

“There was also sadness and irony

in the realization that the

East

Timor

issue

had badly damaged Indonesia’s international image and Indonesia’s entry into

Timor violated Indonesia’s commitment to oppose all forms of colonialism.
It is a sad fact that Indonesia, which prided itself on being a country born our of
post-colonialism, as a country that came out of an anti-colonial revolution and
East

999

Howard suggested

'

that if Indonesia

based on these accords which gave

adopted and successfully implemented a model

New

Caledonia autonomy with the possibility of a

referendum some time down the road, it would “allow time to convince the East
Timorese of the benefits of autonomy within the Indonesian Republic.” "Letter",
182

'

.

Alatas 2006, 149; and

Anwar

2000.

224
Ibid.

213

p.

has in fact specifically stated in

preamble to the Constitution

its

that

Indonesia

was accused of doing exactly the same
never
really
fully understood and more
thing in East Timor. This was
information came out and Indonesians became much more aware of
opposed

all

sorts of colonialism, that

it

international perceptions of what Indonesia

Hence. Habibie’s

initial

was

puzzlement and even anger over the

between colonial France and Indonesia had given way
through

its

2^5

doing,...”

actions and policies on East Timor, had

parallel

drawn

to the realization that Indonesia,

come

to

be perceived as an

aggressive and colonial state by the world community. Concurrently, they also realized

that the offer

of autonomy for East Timor and the important democratic reforms and

laws that had already been initiated were insufficient for convincing the

world

that the

2^6
"

At the meeting, the suggestions

in

even the Australians had not anticipated

-

Howard’s

letter

were taken

autonomy within

2^7

the Republic ol Indonesia.

that “... giving East

"

move

Anwar 2000,

Timor

the

two options

to establish Indonesia's

in a direction that

the decision to allow the 2-ballot option

where independence would be granted should the East Timorese

:2

of the

Indonesia under Habibie was becoming democratic and was no longer the

Indonesia of the Suharto period.

important

rest

“

to

reject special

Habibie, according to Anwar, believed

decide their

own

future

was

democratic credentials and show

a very

that things

20.

For more on these democratic reforms, see Schwarz

1

999. 37

1

;

and Hosen 2003,

491. For a different conclusion on the effectiveness of these reforms, see Robison and

Hadiz for disagreements.
227

Dewi Fortuna Anwar, 21 July 2004; Interview with Umar Juoro
29 July 2004; and Interview with Dr Muladi, July 30 2004.

Interview with

interview,

214

had really changed.”

228

Moreover,

229
logical step to take.""
In fact,

otherwise for

it

Timor go was “a very

would be “very

the constitution"

and

that Indonesia’s identity

initial

offer of

autonomy

At the very
January 1999.

rights.

them

to

means of convincing
realization

eyes of the world even after the

in the

up the ante.

Habibie and his advisers believed, both

in

June 1998 and

Indonesia had to act in ways that were consistent with a country that

that

was professing

human

least.

led

a

was indeed democratic. Their

had remained unchanged

and

for building an Indonesia that

would be democratic and just. Again. East Timor had become
other states that Indonesia, as self-described,

rational

of Indonesia to do

irrational

230

would be against

it

letting East

that

it

was on

the

way

to

becoming

The actions they had taken

a

democratic nation committed

vis-a-vis East

Timor was

to

part of a social

process to perform Indonesia’s nascent identity as a democracy which had yet to be

recognized and acknowledged by other countries
resolution of the East

Timor

issue

was

initiated

in the international arena.

by actors

who were

Thus, the

acting strategically

but within and through the confines and limitations of a wider social structure of

and

identities.

If the

Habibie government’s attempts to perform

this

based on the norms of human rights and democracy was so
course of the country’s East Timor policy,

why was

new Indonesian

critical in

identity

changing the

the withdrawal process

characterized by a campaign of violence and intimidation rather than respect and

22s

Anwar 2000,

21.

229

Interview with
230

norms

Umar Juoro. 29

July 2004.

Interview with Dewi Fortuna Anwar, 21 July 2004.
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acceptance of the democratic process underlying the referendum and
next section turns

able to

work

its

attention to this question and will focus

its

outcome? The

on how the military was

against the decision of civilian leaders and policymakers

who were

running Indonesia.

and Contentious Territorial

3.6 Oligarchic Political Systems

Between January
independence movement

1

Policies

and October 25 1999. leaders as well as supporters of the

in East

Timor were systematically murdered,

tortured and

’
1

raped."

Perpetrated on a wide scale, this violence often descended into indiscriminate

killings."

Early April 1999 witnessed the massacre of 57 unarmed civilians and the

wounding of 35 others by

a large

pro-autonomy paramilitary force

in a

church

in

Liquisa which had been sheltering 2,000 East Timorese displaced by the violence.
early August, the United Nations Assistance Mission for East

the Catholic

Church separately estimated

displaced, and 3.000

however, peaked

- 5,000

in the

killed

that

Timor (UNAMET), and

60.000 - 80,000 people had been

by pro-autonomy militia groups.

period between September

4.

when

INTERFET

(

''

Violence

the results of the

were announced, and the end of the month when security was
and eastern East Timor by

referendum

finally restored to central

International Force for East

Timor)

forces.

independence supporters were attacked and approximately 70-80 percent of Dili's
business district and 50 percent of

231

232

233

Dunn 2002,

63.

Dunn 2002,

63.

its

homes were torched and destroyed during

Taylor 2003, 181.
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By

the

Pro-

month-long orgy of violence."

4

Hundreds were

killed,

and more than 500,000

Timorese, or more than 60 percent of the entire population, were displaced and forced
to

evacuate in what appeared to be a forced event. The consistency and similarities of

the evacuation processes across East Timor, the scale of the logistics involved as well as

direct witness testimony point to the systematic

infrastructure of an entire

community and

society- had been completely destroyed.'

General Wiranto, head of the Indonesian
that the killing

and destruction

in the

Armed

Forces (ABRI)

in the past

informal links between

involved in

0
ballot.

many

much

few years however, confirm

ABRI

and the pro-integration

militias

237

Documents

who were

Patterns in the behavior of the militia, the police, and

that

and

visibly

ABRI.

as highlighted

by

observers, investigators and analysts present during and after that period, are also

at least parts

of

it

was responsible

and destruction

for

that

Crouch 2000,167.

° Crouch 2000,172-3; and Dunn 2002,

236

’

the existence of formal

the co-ordination and planning of the intimidation, violence

"

time,

of the violence in East Timor in the period before and after the

strong indicators that the Indonesian military or

234

at that

°

post-referendum period were the

“spontaneous reactions of disappointed supporters of integration.”"

have emerged

0

1999, East Timor’s entire administrative and social order - the basic

By November

claimed

and planned nature of the operation.'

Dunn 2002,

63.

63.

Crouch 2000,

168.

° Robinson 2002, 272. It must be noted here that these documents do “not provide the
conclusive evidence of high-level official involvement in planning or committing such
acts of violence that some analysts have claimed” (Robinson 2002, 272).
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4

from interviews and observations

Finally, evidence pieced together

occurred."

Timor render

protests of innocence

early as October 1998

militia activity.

In

from

ABRI

when high-ranking

suspect for they were involved from as

officers ordered, organized

December 1998 and January 1999.

and coordinated

these activities were stepped

up with the formation and arming of more militia groups by the military.'
military also launched Operasi

to assert the irreversibility

in East

41

The

Sapu Jagad (Operation Clean Sweep) around

this

time

of East Timor’s integration with Indonesia through a

campaign of violence and intimidation against pro-independence leaders and
4

supporters.'

"

Fronted by East Timorese paramilitary death squads created, trained and

armed by ABRI.

it

was hoped

that the violence

would generally intimidate people

into

supporting autonomy and “show to the world that the East Timorese rejected the

referendum.”

24

'

Hence, ABRI, clearly against the decision to allow the 2-ballot option
place,

was

able to contravene the cabinet-level decision of January 27 1999 to give the

East Timorese the opportunity to vote on their

the issue of East

240

' 4I

"4

~

Kammen

2001, 181.

Kammen

2001, 183.

How

In this case, contestation

this particular part

of the

did the disengagement end in such a bloody fashion?

Topol Bulletin No. 152 (May 1999):
,

’

future.

Robinson 2002, 272.

(November
_4

own

Timor, led to a bloody and violent end for

disengagement process.

239

to take

4.

See also Topol Bulletin, no. 154/1 55,

1999): 15.

Topol Bulletin, no. 154/155 (November 1999):

1999): 4-6. See p.5.
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15;

Topol Bulletin. No. 152 (May

on

This section examines the proposition that domestic institutional structures also affect

dynamics through which

the

3.6.1 Indonesia’s

Domestic

the processes of contestation are played out.

Political

Structure during The

The New Order operated under

New Order

the auspices of Indonesia's 1945 constitution

which guaranteed a strong president with wide-ranging executive power

that

was

balanced by a parliament, the House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or

DPR), and

MPR)

the People’s Consultative

which functioned both

Under

parliament'.

this

Assembly Majelis Pennusyawaratan Rakyat or
(

as an electoral college

and

to a degree, a 'super-

system, the president has predominant authority which rested

on very broad legislative powers as well as extremely wide-ranging and absolute

powers of appointment
military

to

independently hire and

lire all

commanders, bureaucrats, judges, and senior

The

five

hundred-member

DPR

Cabinet members, senior

state enterprise

managers.

had responsibility over legislation and

approval was required for the annual budget submitted by the government.'

DPR’s

representatives were automatically

Consultative

five

Assembly which was

members of the thousand-strong

the country's highest governing body.

hundred members of the Assembly were appointed

as well as

its

functional and social groups."

4^

its

All of the

People's

The other

to represent Indonesia's regions

Assembling every

live years, the

MPR

elected the president and vice-president and set very broad normative guidelines for

244

24 "

Liddle 1999, 40-1.

Liddle 1999, 40-1.
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4,1

state policy for the next five years.

confidence of parliament, the

While

MPR. w ith

its

the President

was not subject

constitutional power, could

to the

remove

the

former from office.

Under Suharto however, these formal
the country’s political institutions

rules governing the relationship

became mostly

irrelevant

understanding the distribution and balance of power

making and
all

constitutional veto points within the

the roads led to the presidency

The MPR.
the people's will,

and

in

New

between

and insignificant for

Indonesia.

In

terms of decision-

Order's political system, almost

in particular, the

person of President Suharto.

theoretically intended as the highest authority and representative of

was completely controlled by

the government.

Its

500 non-DPR

members, constituting half of the Assembly, w ere not elected but appointed by the
government. Even some of

its

DPR members

parliament - 100 or 20 percent of
for military officers appointed

percent of

its

elected seats

and election process

DPR was

that

seats in 1987

came mostly from

legislative

4

Moreover, the other 400 or 80

the state party. Golkar, and a party system

had been systemically weighted

bill

to

and 1992 for example, were reserved

by President Suharto."

never a wholly elected body. Despite

did not initiate a single

its

its

had been appointed rather than elected

its

in their favor.

Hence, the

role as a legislative body, the

or even veto any proposed by Suharto

in thirty years.

and veto powers severely choked and marginalized under the

DPR

W ith

political

246

Juoro 1998, 194.
247

Liddle 1999. 41.

See section 3.6.2 for a discussion of military's role

politics.

220

in

Indonesian

framework developed during Suharto’s long
rubber-stamping legislature.

During the

New

rule, the

DPR

was

little

more than

24s

Order, elections were contested by only three parties

- Golkar,

Development Unity Party {Parted Persatuan Pembangunan or PPP), and

the

a

,

the

The PPP and

Indonesian Democratic Party {Partai Demokrasi Indonesia or PDI).
,

PD1. the other two political parties allowed to take part in elections, were each formed

1973 after the

in

Four Islamic

New

Order forced several preexisting organizations

were merged

parties

to

to Golkar.

left

amalgamate.

form the PPP while the PDI was formed from pre-

existing nationalist and Christian parties."

disparate parties

to

The forced fusion of these ideologically

each of them deeply divided and unable to pose a serious challenge

They were

also badly disadvantaged

from having branches below

by the

fact that they

the district level in contrast to

were forbidden

Golkar which was

represented wherever there was a government office. This translated into a presence
virtually every village in the country.

politically hamstrung, the

the vote."

PPP and

2M)

the

Lacking independent policy agendas and

PDI were only able

Hence, the composition of the

DPR

to attract a

was highly skewed

modest share of

in favor of

by formal and informal rules and arrangements and therefore, hardly the
fair

and multi-party

political

in

Golkar

result of a truly

system and election process.

24S

Macintyre 2003, 48.
249

Liddle 1999.41.
"

°

For other ways

in

which

the

government exerts control over

electoral processes, see MacIntyre 1999.
“

1

MacIntyre 1999. 268.

the party system and

Golkar, created in 1964 by army officers to co-ordinate anti-communist
organizations,

was able

to incoiporate functional

groups

like labour, peasants,

women.

-)c-)

youth, intellectuals,

artists, etc

functional groups and the

New

within four years of

Order's claims that

Golkar was partisan and really the

political face

its

it

founding.

“

Despite these

represented the nation's interest.

of the

state.

Public employees,

including elected village leaders were not only mobilized for nation-wide elections

every five years but prohibited from joining the other parties. These links with the state

were further tightened by the

fact that local, regional

and national Golkar leaders were

recruited from the ranks of civil servants and retired military officers.

Golkar too had

little

impact on policymaking despite

its

2x

’

However,

position as the country’s

leading party. Besides being an insignificant generator of ideas or policy preferences,

and the corporatist bodies which

framework.

it

encapsulated operated within a state-dominated

As Andrew MacIntyre

notes, these corporatist bodies operated

“primarily as institutional arrangements for political containment rather than as

institutions for aggregating sectoral interests

policy-making process.”

2

and injecting these

interests into the

^

Hence. Indonesia’s political

parties, in contrast to those operating

under

democratic conditions, did not play the crucial role of “providing the institutional link

2

2

Juoro 1998. 198.
2>1

Liddle 1999. 41.

2M
"

^

MacIntyre 1999. 268.

MacIntyre 1999, 268.

909

it

between voters and
parties

the

and elections

constructed in such a

state

machinery of government.'

in

”' v>

Despite the presence of political

Indonesia, the system of parties and corporatist bodies had been

way

by societal groups."

that they limited rather than

67

met

the

demands placed on

the

Instead of providing contending packages of policy

proposals that aggregate and represent public interests in their electoral campaigns, they

were unable

to exert

much

influence

at

any stage of the policy formation process and
050

could not function as partisan veto points on matters that were contested."
Since autonomy of these political institutions and parties was mostly nonexistent during the

New

Order, influence over the policy process was concentrated

within the structures of the state, and especially the presidency and the person of

Suharto.

260

An

important reflection of

action in Indonesia

ratified

by the

came from decrees
260

legislature.

In

this is the fact that the

main source of executive

issued by the president and not from laws

sum. the channels

for broader societal

demands had

been extinguished by the combination of a strong executive provided by

and more importantly, the commandeering of other
interests of Suharto

New

and the

New

257

258

259

260

political

Order was therefore, one where power was mainly concentrated

MacIntyre 1999. 267.

MacIntyre 1999, 268.

MacIntyre 1999, 267.

MacIntyre 1999, 268.
MacIntyre 1999. 269.
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constitution

political institutions to serve the

Order regime. Indonesia’s

0

its

system under the
in "the

person of

the president rather than in political institutions."

the president

was

Unlike other presidential systems,

the only constitutional veto player in Indonesia.

A Second Veto

3.6.2

M

For

many

years,

ABRI was

a vital part of the

regime’s domination over society and supporting
powerful

"

Player - The Military

There was however, one other significant actor
military.

'

political actor in its

own

through the implementation of

its

right,

its

system

in this authoritarian

New

goals.

-

the

Order, maintaining the

It

was however

also a

wielding tremendous power and authority

politically interventionist dwifungsi or dual function

doctrine which defined the military’s role as the maintenance of Indonesia's 'political

stability’

through “defending the state and helping to administer

-0
it."

'

In effect, this

doctrine gave the military a socio-political role in Indonesia and expanded

its

say in

national and local politics dramatically.

Developed

in the

chaotic conditions of Sukarno’s rule during the late 1950s and

early 1960s by General A.H. Nasution and in seminars at the Staff and

College, dwifungsi

was based on

the belief that the Indonesian

Command

armed forces has “two

closely related roles: to defend the country not only from conventional military threats

originating abroad, but also from domestic dangers of any kind, military, political,

socioeconomic, cultural, or ideological.

2M

The chaos of Sukarno’s 'Guided

2(1

Juoro 1998. 195.
2h2

Macintyre 2003, 48.
263

Kingsbury 2002,

5.

264

Liddle 1999. 44.
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Democracy’ period and

the 1965

coup attempt provided the

basis for sealing the central

role of the military in Indonesian political life with the institutionalization of this

doctrine after the arrival of the

New

Order.

This was enabled through the placement of active and retired military personnel

DPR.

throughout the Indonesian political system. Approximately 20 percent of the

MPR

and the regional

legislatures

were occupied by serving officers who reported

directly to their superiors in the chain of military

in the provincial

and

institution ranging

have also tended
political, legal

By
secretaries

district administrations,

from

to

fill

command.

In addition to positions

they were also placed in every state

the cabinet to ministries

and the diplomatic

1

service."'

'

They

pivotal positions in these institutions especially in the areas of

and security

affairs.

the late 1970s, 78 percent of director-generals and 84 percent of ministerial

were

ABRI

7

appointees."'

Military

men

also

formed half the cabinet, over

two-thirds of the regional governorships, and 56 per cent of district officers. In the
foreign service, military officers had been appointed to half of the country’s

ambassadorships by 1977."'
1990s with a
like the

rise in the

Department of

s

While these numbers tended

to decline

number of educated and experienced

Home

Affairs,

which was responsible

by the 1980s and

civilians,

key ministries

for regional

government

765

Liddle 1999, 45. Since they are represented

in the political

process by appointment,

serving military personnel were not eligible to vote or run for public office.
266

Vatikiotis 1998a, 70.
267

Vatikiotis 1998a, 70.
268

Vatikiotis 1998a, 71

and the surveillance of political and

social organizations in the provinces

stayed in military hands. In 1996, retired or serving officers

still

and

districts,

held 25 percent of

cabinet appointments and a larger percentage of second-tier ministerial positions.

Almost 50 percent of the most important

civilian

provincial governorships and district headships

The

- were held by

military also played a leading role in

and informal authority. Moreover,

it

government positions

in the

the military

regime

-

M
.

Golkar through positions of formal

ensured that "civilian officials carried out

their

Golkar assignments, provided security for Golkar campaign events, and obstructed PPP

and PDI meetings and

One
territorial

0

rallies.”'

of the most critical features of the

command

structure that

shadowed

way

the military

was organized was

the state’s governing structure

all

the

its

way

from the national

to the local levels.

command zones

four covered densely populated Java alone while the remaining six

encompassed

-

the

command w as

This structure divided the country into ten

twenty-two sparsely populated provinces of the outer islands. Each

in turn

divided into several layers of

subcommand

with the lowest of

these matching the government's sub-district, the equivalent of "a township or suburb in

the United States.”"

Hence,

this

command

structure enabled the military to be

involved in each level of government either directly or through

this

way,

ABRI

its

parallel system.

had considerable influence over a spectrum of decisions

269

Liddle 1999. 45.
270

Liddle 1999. 47.
271

Liddle 1999, 46.
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at

the local

In

level

Its

ranging from population issues

domination of local

obtain

its

permission
7

politics

in

to the

was made possible by

Critically, this territorial

archipelago from Jakarta to villages

monitor social and

272

the fact that individuals had to

order to travel, organize meetings, deliver sermons or issue any

.

publication.'

production of food and strategic materials.

political

command

in its

structure, covering as

it

did the entire

outermost islands, enabled the military to

developments carefully and keep the population under

274

surveillance."

Hence, the military had tremendous structural power in the Indonesian
system which was derived not only from
the institutionalization of

its

processes which stretched
function and

its

command

The

all

the

272

way down

to the village level.

structure provided

in the

immediate months

system

built

during the

this authoritarian structure

its

coercive

power

but from

it

'

This sociopolitical

with the basis as well as the

means

to

system.

after the fall of Suharto. Indonesia’s highly centralized

New

Order was coming

apart.

The disintegration of

provided the space for identity contestation to take place as

only constitutional veto point - President Suharto - had become increasingly

Kingsbury 2003, 72.

273

Jenkins 1984. 43.
274

Liddle 1999. 45.
272

state

Military and Violent Disengagement

In the

political

monopoly on

participation within the country’s politics and political

function as the other veto point

3.6.3

its

political

Shiraishi 1999,74-5.
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illegitimate and

was ultimately removed from

heart of the structure and

in a state

regime

of flux. While

was

it

substitution with a politically

also

However, the removal of the

weak Habibie

left the

system

provided the opening for the transition from an authoritarian

one and the implementation of new

to a different

contestation

its

the system.

embedded

in

was heading what was ultimately

policies, the process of

an extremely uncertain political context - Habibie

a transitional administration albeit one that

was

in the

process of attempting to fundamentally transform the country’s entire political
architecture from authoritarian rule to a

new democracy."

consensus among a portion of the political

elite

While there was general

regarding the need to integrate

democratic ideals into Indonesia’s political culture, identity and institutions most visibly

and perhaps most quickly through reducing the power of the executive branch, giving
the legislature greater power,

political institutions

political actors

were

still

was

freedom and autonomy, the country’s

operating with the political rules and norms of the

In

govern the outcomes of

particular,

political parties

had not assumed their proper roles and functions. Moreover, some

as their reference point.

to

and

reluctant to

Their involvement

New

other words, democratic rules and norms had not yet

political contests for all actors in the system.

The

Order

come

military, in

embrace these changes.
in

the kidnapping, torture and

the Trisakti University shootings of

murder of

1998 had indeed, begun

activists in

to turn the tide

1997 and

of public

opinion against them. This had the effect of ensuring that they had no choice but to
accept the need to rethink their political role and the dual function doctrine.

27<
’

"

Macintyre 2000, 137.

7/

Bourchier and Hadiz eds. 2001. 280.
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Despite

the push in this direction, discussions and debates held at the

Command

College

resisting their

Bandung

at

in

September 1998 showed

complete withdrawal from

issue within the organization,

politics.

While

Armed

Forces Staff and

that the military

there

was

still

were differences on

this

statements stressed what they saw as their continued

its

responsibility for the welfare of the nation and their right to revert to a ‘security

approach'

if

the situation warranted

reflected their

communism."

Throughout 1998 and 1999,

it.

ongoing preoccupation with
278

ABRI

Hence.

dwifungsi doctrine was being assaulted on

its

by the reformasi movement. As they resisted these

they were able to retain the main components constituting

them

to still function

When

autonomously

who were

protest against the decision.

who

in

its

present

However,

calls for reform,

structural power, enabling

many ways and remain

Habibie made his decision

senior military figures

officers

order and the dangers of

continued to resist any changes to their position within

Indonesian politics despite the fact that
different fronts

stability, unity,

“their language

a veto point.

to

allow East Timor to decide

at

the cabinet

there

was

its

top-ranking officers like

meeting did not lodge much of a

a large group of serving and retired

local military

Adam

Damiri.

commanders

in East

commander of the

Timor

as well as active

territorial military

which included East Timor, Lt-General Tyasno Sudarso. head of military
as well as Lt-General

Zacky Anwar Makarim, former head of BIA."

Bourchier and Hadiz eds. 2001. 280.

end

It

was only

in

2000

Tapol Bulletin no. 52
,

1

(

May

1

999):

5.

See also McDonald

229

command

intelligence,

Finally, retired

that the military

to their socio-political role.

~7
’

future,

held on to the irreversibility of East Timor’s integration into Indonesia.

These included a number of

to declare an

own

et al

2002.

was

able

officers including Generals

Benny Murdani and

General Prahowo were also known

The
First,

military,

it

to

Tri Sustrisno, as well as the sacked Lt.

be part of this faction.

appears, allowed the vote to take place for a

General Tanjung, a very senior military figure

members of the Indonesian

intelligence

in the

were optimistic

number of reasons.

Habibie cabinet, and

that the majority

of the East

Timorese favored autonomy and continued integration with Indonesia rather than
Tanjung’s assistant had written

independence.

initial

in a leaked

military estimates had 75 percent of the East

In military

integration.

memo of July

Timorese voting

in

1999

that

favor of

documents discovered by an East Timorese NGO.

the

explosion of pro-independence demonstrations attended by tens of thousands of people
after Suharto’s fall

were attributed

to the "gullibility'

and

‘stupidity’ of the East

Timorese public “who had been manipulated by the pro-independence clique during an

economic and

political crisis.”'*’

The students and leaders of these demonstrations

were "naughty children' ( anak naked)

who were

venting their frustrations.

Ironically.

Indonesia’s leaders were viewing the East Timorese, as Benedict Anderson points out,

“in the

way

that the

Dutch colonizers used

to

view Indonesians.”

the military reason to brush aside the real concerns
280

Taped Bulletin no. 152 (May 1999):
.

Such analyses gave

and desires of the East Timorese as

5.

"’81

Also confirmed by two senior advisers of President Habibie
2s:

283

2S4

2S

"

Moore 2001,33.

Moore 2001,

30.

Moore 2001.

30.

Moore 2001,

11.
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in

personal interviews.

who

those of irresponsible and mischievous children

what they were doing.

It

them with the conviction

also provided

S(

East Timorese were loyal to Indonesia.

In

an analysis that filtered

its

know

clearly did not

or understand

that the majority

of the

’

way up

the

army hierarchy and became

part of a

confidential booklet issued by the intelligence office of military headquarters in Jakarta.

Major General

Adam

Damiri stated

that the militias’

East Timorese the courage to defy the resistance and

show of force gave

become

the majority of

loyal supporters of

->87

Indonesia despite the latter’s intimidation tactics.-

This campaign of violence and

intimidation that began in October 1998 and continued until the end of September 1999

was

therefore, focused at ensuring that the East

Timorese would ultimately remain

part

of Indonesia.

The

military contravened a decision already undertaken by the civilian head of

the country that providing East

Timor with
^88

in

the long-run interests of Indonesia.

of army

command

'

A

the opportunity to decide

retired general

who was

described Habibie’s policy as a "big blunder”

its

own

future

close to the center

-

particularly

noteworthy for revealing the contempt with which these decisions were viewed.

was thus able

to take a path that

was separate from

because of the institutional context of the
286

287

New

that

was

ABRI

which had already been decided

Order as well

as the chaotic

and

fluid

Moore 2001,35.
.

Moore 2001,

...

“meant as an overview of national political issues,
was distributed in military offices throughout Indonesia and thus became the army's
'true report’ of the event” (Moore, 37).

No

evidence has turned up indicating

encouraging
289

37. This booklet,

this

that

Habibie played any role

campaign.

Interview with high-ranking (retired) military officer, July 26. 2004.

in initiating or

conditions of the immediate period after the

Indonesian political system as well as
to exercise its veto in the violent

3.7

its

manner

of Suharto.

fall

structural

that

it

position within the

power explains how

it

had the means

did.

Conclusion
East Timor’s fate shifted with the rise and

and

Its

identities for Indonesia.

was an

identity

communism

fall

of contrasting political projects

During the Suharto period,

integral part of the process

as threats to the nation.

its

narrative of Indonesian

which constructed communists and

As long

as such threats continued to be part of the

story of Indonesia’s peoplehood. the possibility of change in

its

East

Timor policy was

extremely slim.

During the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, intellectual developments as well as
political

and economic changes had gradually widened the gaps between what was

being experienced and the social expectations derived from the

New

Order’s narrative

of Indonesian identity. These disjunctures created the space available for an alternative

conception of Indonesian identity, one based on the ideals of democracy and the
inclusionary interpretations of Pancasila. to emerge and challenge the

construction of Indonesian identity.

Due

to the fusion of the

New

New

Order’s

Order regime’s

characteristics with Indonesian identity, a successful challenge only took place with the

fall

of Suharto

in 1998.

Critically, the increasing legitimacy of

democratization during the

last half

political order

rights

and

of the 1990s ensured that political reforms geared

towards democracy would follow regime change

When

human

in Indonesia.

regime change took place, the fundamental re-organization of Indonesia's
and identity

in

1998 would have an important impact on East Timor. For

Habibie and bis advisers,

it

was

new and democratic Indonesia

the

that: 'the

strategic behavior

to

show

the rest of the

world

that there

afoot which ultimately resulted in the offers of

and independence. Their actions
Michael Barnett

need

in turn,

was

a

autonomy

underscore the theoretical insight from

attempt to reduce action to either rule-governed action or

might be analytically seductive but

recognize what makes social action what

it

forces false choices and fails to
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it

is.”

Finally, the highly centralized nature of Indonesia’s political system created

conditions

in

an unsteady

which there were only two veto

new democracy

ensured that the
the policy

had

new

still

identity could not matter in

to navigate.

decision on the East

with the military

points.

Timor

It

issue,

unfortunately, noteworthy for

its

present as a significant veto player

all

enabled the military

Suharto’s demise and the rise of

stages of the passage through which

to veto

and openly defy Habibie’s

producing a disengagement process
violent and bloody end.

2W
Barnett 1999, 26.
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that

was

CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION: IDENTITY, TERRITORIAL DISENGAGEMENT AND

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Introduction

4.1

Rather than engaging
invariant cause

and

in

making

definitive statements or conclusions regarding

effect relations for territorial

entire universe of cases across time

investigating identity

and space,

disengagement

this dissertation has

mechanisms and processes

that

may

How do

guided by the following questions.

play a role

chapters

in territorial

tell

identity

in this

encompass an

been focused on

be involved

leading to territorial disengagement. Hence, the discussion

will be

that will

in the

processes

concluding chapter

mechanisms and processes

disengagement? What do the findings from the preceding two

us about the processes involved in territorial disengagement?

How

do the

findings contribute to our understanding of identity in International Relations?

4.2 Identity

and Territorial Disengagement

Identity

who

was

supported the changes that would

East Timor.

It

policymakers

was

dominant

initiate the

also a critical ingredient to

way

how

disengagement from India and

elite British

In

both Britain and Indonesia, change

identity in the colonial or territorial

power

quo was successfully challenged and contested by an
alternative

to

and Indonesian

who opposed disengagement understood and approached

India and East Timor.

the

and Indonesian policymakers

central to the actions of elite British

emerged when changing

social,

that

policy took place

had supported

political

when

the status

alternative identity. This

economic and
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in

challenges from

circumstances

created increasingly visible gaps between what

was being experienced on

and the expectations associated with the dominant
In

territorial

identity.

both cases, identity mechanisms and processes played an important role

disengagement

interaction that

“hence

the ground

in three

ways.

First, identity

were considered "possible,

in

shaped the form of action and

and efficacious" and

feasible, desirable

by implication what forms of action and interaction would be

at least

impossible, impracticable, undesirable, ineffectual."

1

Secondly, practices that were an

intimate part of the construction, establishment, maintenance and validation of an

identity also affected policies regarding territories. Thirdly, territorial

was

also influenced

by the domestic

political structures

disengagement

from which a dominant

identity

emerges.
In Britain

and Indonesia,

identity, in providing a basis for seeing the world,

shaped, influenced and constrained responses to challenges to the territorial status quo

by making some actions thinkable and others, unthinkable. The conception of
Britishness that

was based

in part

on

the principle of democratic constitutionalism

shaped the response of Stanley Baldwin and the reformers
reforms for India.

In particular,

it

to the issue

of constitutional

excluded any actions that would contravene and

contradict Baldwin’s conception of Britishness. Significantly,

it

meant co-operating

with the leadership of the Labor Party who. while not working for the independence of

India,

were

in

favor of these reforms. In Habibie’s Indonesia, the building of a

Indonesia based on democracy not only
policy on East

Timor possible

made

the reconsideration of the country's

but legitimate. Specifically,

1

Tilly 2002, 9.
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new

it

was Habibie’s concern

with demonstrating that a democratic Indonesia

was

afoot that led to policies that were

Dewi

consistent with this principle. Previously unthinkable policies had become, as

Fortuna Anwar. Habibie’s unofficial Minister of Foreign Affairs, described

it.

“extremely rational.”

Approaches
and mechanisms
of identities
involved

to India

that

were necessary

in Britain

in the

and East Timor were also influenced by the very processes

and Indonesia.

to the construction,

First, the

maintenance and consolidation

very processes and mechanisms

construction of these identities also resulted in the simultaneous

construction of India and East Timor with specific characteristics. This concurrent

construction in turn, influenced Britain’s and Indonesia’s policy towards their territorial
possessions. Second, acting and performing the dominant British and Indonesian

identity also contributed to the initiation of policies that

would lead

to their

disengagement from India and East Timor.
In Britain, the constitution of the diehards’ conception of Britishness against an

Indian 'Other' resulted in the simultaneous construction of India as a place that

was

deeply divided by caste, language and religion, and dominated by centuries of 'barbaric’
customs, traditions and beliefs. This particular construction of India as 'uncivilized'

and inferior ensured

that the diehards

for self-determination

were unable

and independence

for

to

recognize Indian calls and desires

what they were. At

the

diehards’ opposition to the proposed constitutional reforms in India

same

time, the

was also

of their fear that such changes would reduce Britain, as Churchill described

titan

on the world stage to a mere

rabbit.

the result

it.

Being British was synonymous with

from

a

political,

economic, social and moral exceptionalism and the passage of constitutional reforms
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in

India

would be not only be an abrogation of Britain’s

destiny, duty

and responsibility

to

spread civilization and progress throughout the world but a negation of their greatness.

Hence, the importance of practices

were needed

that

for the

continued construction and

maintenance of the diehards’ conception of Britishness played a part

on maintaining the status quo

in British

in their insistence

policy towards India.

Processes related to acting and performing an identity for recognition and
validation were also important to Baldwin's support for Indian constitutional reforms.

His support, as discussed

earlier,

was heavily influenced by

principle of democratic constitutionalism,

the

need

to

demonstrate the

one of the most important components of

Baldwin's emerging construction of Britishness during a period of tremendous change

and flux for Britain as well as the Conservative Party. The way
India

was handled was

in

which the issue of

a crucial part of the process not only to act out this principle of

constitutionalism but in sustaining and garnering recognition that Baldwin's

construction of Britishness

In Indonesia,

were also

was indeed

valid.

processes related to construction, maintenance and consolidation

influential in Jakarta's

approach

to East

Timor. During Suharto's

New

Order,

the construction of an Indonesian identity through narratives of a state in constant peril

also resulted in the simultaneous construction of communists, together with other

groups of differing religious and ideological convictions, as threats to the collectivity.
This specific construction of communists as the most dangerous threat
security of

East

Timor

all

to

Indonesians resulted

in

demands

for independence

be viewed as illegitimate and a danger
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to

to the safety

from a

and

Freitlin-linked

Indonesian security, unity and

demands were

sovereignty. Rather than negotiations, such

measures and the maintenance of the

territorial status

therefore,

met by security

quo.

Practices to construct and sustain a particular identity were also a critical

component
later,

Habibie’s offer of special autonomy for East Timor

in

the offer to allow the East Timorese to decide their

referendum

in

January 1999. As discussed

earlier.

own

nation

committed

to

part of a process to

human

was professing

rights.

to be

June 1998 and

future in an indirect

Habibie and his advisers believed,

both in June 1998 and January 1999, that Indonesia had to act in

consistent with a country that

in

on

its

way

to

The actions they had taken

ways

that

becoming

were
a democratic

vis-a-vis East

perform Indonesia’s nascent identity as a democracy and

recognition from the rest of the world that there

was

a

Timor was
to gain

new and democratic Indonesia

afoot.

Here,

it

is

particular identity

interesting to note that the need not only to demonstrate that a

and genuine but for

is real

its

recognition whether within a domestic

or international context led by both Baldwin and Habibie to support the changes that

would have far-reaching

This indicates that periods in which a new' or

emerged and

is

therefore,

particularly critical for

independence for India and East Timor.

effects in the path to

still in

at least

‘newer’ identity has recently

need of consolidation and recognition

changes regarding

in

be

territorial policies.

Finally, these cases also point to the

domestic political system into account

may

need

to take the

disengaging power's

order to fully understand the ways

identity is involved in territorial disengagement.

In Britain, the bitter

in

which

and prolonged

contestation over British identity between the reformers and the diehards through the
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question of India was confined only to political avenues that were open to these

opposing groups. The eventual winners, Baldwin and the reformers, were able

implement

the constitutional reforms that

would go on

India's path to independence without any interference

had exhausted

all

to

to

have profound impact on

from the diehards once the

latter

formal political channels open to them. The political contestation

over identity was confined

in Britain

because

its

political

system only had one veto

player and was parliamentary in nature. The former ensured that disagreements over

identity

would not be bogged down

in a

quagmire as

a

one veto player system provided

only one place within the system where policies could be contravened or vetoed. The
structural proclivities of the latter

its

members and ensured

that battles within the veto player

Britain, the Conservative Party

party.

In the battle of

political

gave a parliamentary party tremendous leverage over

- would be confined

to the structural

this

period

in

channels of the

contending identities over the question of India, the British

system eased the way for Baldwin’s construction of Britishness and the Indian

constitutional reforms

which

it

engendered

to carry the day.

however, identity contestation did not remain within normal

In Indonesia

and bloody disengagement from

political channels but spilled out to result in a violent

East Timor. While

critically,

players.

- during

still

The

it

was

a political system that

was

in transition to a

a system that included the powerful military as one of

latter,

which had held on

to the

New

democracy,

its

was

two veto

Order's narrative of Indonesian

compromise

identity and a specific construction of the East Timorese,

worked

and contravene Habibie’s decision through a different

of measures based on

set

to block,

intimidation and violence to influence East Timor’s ability to decide their
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it

own

future.

Hence, Habibie's ability to validate and make
Indonesia was democratic through performing

second veto player

real his lofty

its

pronouncements

that this

main features was hampered by a

system. Moreover, the Indonesian military’s lack of regard

in the

for the civilian political structure

ensured

be abandoned even though definitive and

that its differences

final decisions

with the

latter

would not

had been made and

implemented.
Besides the need to include identity-related mechanism

in

analyses of the

processes related to territorial disengagement and decolonization, the findings from this
dissertation also point to the need for caution before

making arguments

norms and principles of democracy, human

sole significance of ideas,

that point to the

rights

and

determination. and relatedly, the humanization of the non-Western ‘Other* in

self-

how we

understand the great wave of decolonization that took place in the middle of the
twentieth century

when

a world of imperial powers and colonies shifted to one of

sovereign states."

In International Relations, recent

and well-deserved scholarly attention on these

events and their significance, obscured for decades by the exigencies of the Cold

and when they were filed away as a class of phenomenon

that

had passed firmly not

only into the past but irrelevance, had placed them and their relevance
different light. Particularly important at both the empirical

emerging consensus

that

of self-determination and

it

was

in a

rights,

very

and theoretical levels

the diffusion and gradual acceptance of

human

War

the

is

norms and

ideas

whether within or across borders, which altered

"Crawford 2002; Lustick 1993; R. Jackson 1998; and Philpott 2001.
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the

way

states

understood their interests and paved the road leading

to the

end of

five

hundred years of colonialism.
Three important observations and theoretical arguments about world politics can

and have been derived from
place. First, these

this

changes and

understanding of

how and why

their underlying basis represent a radical transformation

not only in the geopolitical configurations of world politics but

normative landscape. Second

decolonization took

is

more

significantly, in

its

the implicit and explicit conclusion in these

explanations that decolonization, in overturning the legality, morality and racial
hierarchy of colonialism, probably represents one of the final stages in a long-term

movement towards moral progress and

’

the gradual humanization of the non-West.

Regardless of one’s position on these conclusions, there can be

little

doubt that

twentieth century decolonization, in overturning the overt hierarchical practices in

world

politics that

were associated with colonialism,

is

one of the monster periods

in

International Relations

and therefore, deserving of much greater attention and analysis.

Third

argument

is

the theoretical

that

it

argument rather than material reasons
shifts in the international politics

While

ideas,

norms and

was ideas and norms, and processes rooted

that

were central

to

4

in

one of the most dramatic

of the twentieth century.

ethical

arguments regarding human

rights, self-

determination, racial equality and democracy were indeed a very important and

undeniable part of the story, the findings from this dissertation point to other processes

Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Finnemore 1996; Klotz 1995; Crawford 2002; R.
Jackson 1993; and Keck and Sikkink 1998.
1

1

borrow the term, ‘monster period' from Der Derian 1997.
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and mechanisms

may

that

be

at

play

when

states react to challenges

from and regarding

colonies and other territorial disputes. Indonesia for example, invaded East

1975 and remained there for twenty-five years in a period

practices

when

Timor

in

explicit colonial

were condemned internationally and norms of self-determination de rigueur.

Moreover, the

tacit

support of the U.S.. Britain and Australia for Indonesia’s annexation

of East Timor in 1975 illustrate the highly contingent nature of the international

community’s support
had indeed changed,
colonial history,

for such principles in the

why

modern

era. 5

If the

normative landscape

did Indonesia, a country proud of. and constituted by

annex East Timor and

retain

widespread international condemnation?

for twenty-four years

it

Why

even

its

anti-

of

in the face

did the U.S., Britain, or Australia

support Indonesia’s actions?

Second, norms and ideas-based explanations, as already discussed in Chapter
are unable to provide a non-tautological account of

norm

1

selection and in doing so. risk

missing out other significant causal mechanisms and processes. For example, norms of

democracy were indeed pertinent and
Britain

and Indonesia but only as

Indonesian. Thus, the concern

for the Briton

it

critical in the

related to

what

was not so much

disengagement process

it

meant

to be British

in

both

and

for the Indian or the East

Timorese but

and the Indonesian. Recent case-oriented research on Britain's

decolonization of

its

colonies across Asia and Africa in the 1950s and 1960s also

support the importance of maintaining a specific British identity as a factor in

explaining the pace, timing and direction of these processes.'

Simpson (2005: 303).
6

Heinlein 2002.
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In

Todd Shepard’s

brilliant

and detailed study of France’s disengagement from Algeria, another frequently

discussed case

critical role.

far

in

decolonization, he has

shown

that

it

Moreover, Charles De Gaulle and other

more concerned

that Algeria

than with the issue of

human

elite

identity that

had a

French policymakers were

and Algerian Muslims could never be French rather

rights

supporters of a French Algeria

was French

and self-determination.

who based

their

Ironically,

it

was

the

arguments on equality and France's

republican values.

Here,

let

me

reiterate that

principles of democracy,

human

I

do not dispute the significance of ideas and norms

rights

and self-determination

in the large

wave of

decolonization that took place in the middle of the twentieth century nor their increasing

importance in the current social structure of international
that explanations that are

based solely on the suggestion

were primarily responsible

for

how

politics.

that these

the disengaging or colonial

However.

elements

in the heart

do argue

norms and ideas

power came

understand self-determination, sovereignty or the evils of colonialism

critical

I

to

may miss

certain

of these colonial empires. In particular, the cases in this

dissertation as well as recent research

suggest these ideas and norms

conducted on

British

may have been embedded

in

and French decolonization
discursive structures,

processes and mechanism of far greater complexity than previously realized and must

be examined for a fuller and more complete understanding of processes that are
involved.

7

Shepard 2006.
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4.3 Identity

and International Relations

In this section.

foregrounded
Specifically,

in the

in

I

discuss issues and questions regarding identity that were

Chapter

what are

1

in

view of the empirical evidence of

the practices, processes,

mechanisms, actors and

construction and contestation of identities?

at specific

periods and not others?

How

this dissertation.

Why does

politics involved

a particular identity matter

does identity affect or influence politics and

human behavior?
In the matter of

where one should focus one’s

when

attention

it

comes

issue of identity construction, social constructivist theories of identities have

different

from other approaches

in International

Relation and

more

sciences, in having to contend with the levels-of-analysis issue.

for treating this as an empirical question that can

the "domestic or international will

Britain

and Indonesia,

states.

In Britain, cultural

identities

and

dominate

political

life

1.

I

argued

levels.

show

that neither

s

at

at the

of state identity.”

home and

For

in relation to other

domestic level sustained the

imperial themes were a vital and intrinsic part

as well as the high culture of the nation from the eighteenth to the mid-

twentieth centuries.

'

At the same time, grand imperial adventures provided the place

and the means for the exceptionalism and greatness

8

Chapter

domestic

in the construction

processes

-

generally, the social

Britain and Indonesia

were constructed both

diehards’ conception of British identity

of every day

in

been no

and should be examined rather than by

starting with a standpoint that prioritizes either the systemic or

Studying the construction of identity

In

to the

Hopf 2002, 289.

'

See Said 1993.
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that

was such an inherent

part of

British identity to be

performed and therefore, reconstructed and sustained

at the

systemic level.

In

Indonesia, conceptions of Indonesian identity based on the ideals of

democracy, openness, human rights and inclusionary interpretations of Pancasila had
been constructed domestically by oppositional groups and academics
through their alternative narrations of Indonesian history. Habibie,

office,

was unable

proclamation that Indonesia was on

way

to

this self-understanding

was

identity.

becoming a democratic country

were being implemented proved

insufficient.

community and subsequent

recognition from the international

on

its

country

when he came

on these groups’ construction of Indonesian

to ride

the political reforms that

in the

into

His
as well as

For them,

social interactions

based

especially important in order for them to begin to

validate and establish this identity.

East

Timor became

a

means

for this

new

identity to

be performed.

In addition, the findings

from these two cases also indicate

that identity

constructed in a variety of ways within the same country and even within the

period.

In Britain, the diehards’ construction

can be

same

of British greatness was constructed

against an Indian 'Other’ while Baldwin constructed an identity for Britain through

organizing and connecting places, people and events into a coherent story regarding the
timeless character of Britishness. Indonesian identity

was constructed during

the

Suharto regime from a narrative that drew on past historical events which were pulled
together into a story of

how

Indonesia and Indonesians became a people. Within

narrative, Indonesian identity

the

Communist

was

this

also often contrasted and constructed not only against

‘Other’ but against

its

historical past.
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Habibie and his colleagues

built

on new narratives of Indonesian-ness

that

drew on reinterpretations of 1950s and 1960s

Indonesian history and the reprioritization of the anti-colonial component of their
founding. Thus, both the narrativization of identity and the construction of the Self
against an Other were involved

cases support

another

may

Ted Hopfs

at

different times in both cases

examined

findings and arguments that prioritizing one

meaningful theories of

politics are very

1

to build

this dissertation also indicate that

in the construction of identities.

human agency
In Britain.

significant in promulgating a particular vision of Britishness

was based on harmony,

unity, tranquility,

constitutionalism during the Interwar period.

by British politics as well as

moderation and democratic
Baldwin’s actions were however, driven

that of the

turbulent changes in the political landscape

irrelevant and

which

”

much involved

Baldwin was particularly

in part

mechanism over

identity.’

The empirical findings from

that

These

again “capture only a small part of empirical reality and so should not be

treated unproblematically as universally valid a priori assumptions on

and

here.

more importantly, divide

Conservative Party. Fears that the

would render the Conservative Party

Britain

and destroy

its

social

and

political

cohesion were the twin forces that kept him focused on constructing a Britain and a
British identity based

on democratic constitutionalism.

Human agency and

politics

Indonesian identity after the

fall

were no

less significant in the construction of a

new

of Suharto. Intellectual developments as well as the

conscious efforts of academics, students and other activists had interjected an
alternative narrative of Indonesian history and nationhood in the country’s political

Hopf 2002. 263.
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discourse in the late 1980s and 1990s.

democracy was

game

the only

left in

When

Suharto's regime collapsed and

town. Habibie and his advisers did not only

a series of domestic political reforms but offered East

Timor autonomy and

initiate

later, the

option of independence. These policy changes can be viewed as the conscious efforts

who were

of actors

acting strategically to convince the rest of the world that the

Indonesia under Habibie was in fact a

new and democratic Indonesia and no longer

the

Indonesia of old.
Therefore, constructivist theorizing that begin and end with the construction of

from discourses

identities

fail to

recognize that actors have agency and can engage in

practices that are geared towards the promotion and consolidation of re-inscribed

identities.

Such an oversocialized view of actors portrays them

as marionettes

human agency may

control of larger social structures and neglects the possibility that

have a hand

in the

While

my

under the

construction of our cultural landscapes.

project highlights the role of

human agency,

this is

however, not

to

say that structures do not play a role in the construction and constitution of identities.

Actors

who

structures

are attempting to construct an identity are also

in

normative

and are sometimes circumscribed by them. For example. Habibie's actions

perform and act out an Indonesian identity
their East

embedded

Timor

policy, while strategic at

that

one

was democratic

level,

vis-a-vis

changes

human

rights

into

human

action.

The

where norms

were hegemonic.

Finally, this dissertation points to

way

to

must also be situated within what

these elite policymakers understood to be an international social structure

of democracy and

first,

two main ways

in

already demonstrated in

247

to

which

many

identity

works

constructivist

its

analyses, point to the

in

which "identity provides a

set

of parameters within which

and actions are possible, while others are not.”

certain practices

in

way

11

The second

between the importance of practices and actions

the relationship

and validation of an

identity,

identity shall congeal

in

is

rooted

the consolidation

important parts of a process that will "determine whether

around certain ideas or evolve.”

1

'

Both the constraining and enabling effects of identity were apparent during the
Suharto period

when

identity narratives based

on continuing

threats to the unity

and

security of the nation influenced "the cognitive scripts, categories and rationalities that
1

are indispensable for social action.”

that

was perpetually vulnerable

severely limited

relegating

it

its

to the

In particular, the

dangers from communists influenced and

understanding of the East Timorese independence and resistance,

to the realm of security 'threat'

and the corresponding intelligence and

military measures to contain, defuse or eliminate

The second and perhaps

human

action

is

construction of an Indonesia

less discussed

it.

way

in

which

important part of the identity mechanism that formed a

were

initiated

by Baldwin and the reformers

Goff and Dunn 2004, 244.

12

Goff and Dunn 2004. 244.

13

Goff and Dunn 2004. 244.

14

Ringmar 1996,

3.

248

we want

critical

in Britain in

reforms for India, as well as Habibie and his advisers

1

makes

its

way

into

through actions or practices that are tied to defending, consolidating or

validating an identity. These actions, in defense of "persons

that

identity

to

be"'

component

in

4

were an

processes

regard to constitutional

in their re-evaluation

of the place

of East Timor
identity

in the

Republic of Indonesia. Besides pointing

mechanisms have

to the

way

in

examples also underscore

a part in action, these

that

we can have

Some

relations.

in the

number of issues

a better overall understanding of

not

it

how

that

should be examined

identity affects international

of these questions that can form areas for further research in the area of

identity include the following:

agents

is

15

Lastly, these findings also raise a

before

it

make

“only words or ideas, but also the actions and practices that enact the idea,

knowable."

which

Can we

construction of identities?

necessary part of identity formation, as

identity narratives fall within this

isolate a

Is

it

some have argued,

an ‘Other’, like

some have argued ?

mechanism?

form? What alternative forms can

range of constitutive practices and

Is

If so,

a

how and where do

the ‘Other' always in oppositional

assume and how does

it

have an impact on human

action and behavior? If identities are constructed against an 'Other' and through

narratives,

what

is

the relationship

that are in the process

between

identity formation

of nation- and state-building?

How

can

and security

we

in countries

better understand the

processes involved in the co-constitution of identities?

In

summary,

this dissertation,

regarding identity since

however, add

to.

it

is

while making no claims to definitive conclusions

an area where there

is still

and support a small but growing body of

international relations

which are ontologically

built

propositions regarding the nature of identity and the

involved

15

in its

much

left to grasp,

literature

does

on identity and

on several of the following

mechanisms and processes

that are

construction, maintenance and change. First, identities are constructed at

Goff and Dunn 2004, 242.
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both the domestic as well as the international levels. Second, identities are constructed
against an Other, and through narratives. Third, identities do not acquire ‘substance’

once they have been constructed. Rather they are continually constituted by processes,
relations

and practices as

identities are defined, recognized

interaction with and in relationship to others.

and relational.

16

the

way

in

which

enables or constrains actions since

we

want,

who we

16

it

also influences

are or

who we

Mattern 2005.

Identities are thus

This characteristic of identity has

how we understand

9.

say

human

it

come from

in

an actor’s

fundamentally social

important consequences for

human

knowing who we

actions that

we want

in turn,

identity influences

is in

and validated

actions.

are that

we

While

can

identity

know what

the need to act out or perform

to be that are necessary in the process of

becoming.
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